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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an examination of the interplay between democratic norms and 
principles defining philosophical multiculturalism. Its most general aim is to find an 
answer to the following question concerning the possibility of democratic 
multiculturalism; do democracies adopt multicultural policies at the expense of their 
democratic credentials or are the two compatible with each other? The argument 
emerges from the interaction of two strong threads that run through the thesis. First, 
the thesis engages with three prevalent views on how democracies should react to the 
facts of disagreement – count heads, turn difference into a positive resource, and 
design procedures to maximize traditional values lying in the triangle of freedom, 
equality, and fraternity. In response, I offer a fourth view of democracy that combines 
minimalism with normativity. Normative minimalist democracy (NMD) holds that 
these three views are unable to appreciate the respective normative weights of 
dissensus and consensus, both of which have an ineliminable place in the modern 
democratic practices and their normative underpinnings. The second thread responds 
to another trichotomy – the three supposedly democratic challenges that philosophers 
of multiculturalism have brought up over the last two decades (as well as to the 
corresponding liberal-egalitarian counter-responses), which respectively draw 
attention to the importance of recognition, self-rule, and inclusion. With respect to 
these challenges and counter-challenges, the dissertation argues that both supporters 
and opponents of multiculturalism have democratic aspirations; and democratic 
response to multiculturalism should not be overshadowed by either unfounded 
optimism about the prospects of a substantive consensus fair to all previously 
marginalized minorities, nor by pessimism about the relapse into the pre-
Enlightenment world due to the so-called return of parochialism. In between these two 
positions lies a more democratic response to multiculturalism – one that neither 
celebrates the role of culture as a unique vehicle of human fulfilment, nor dismisses it 
as a remnant of the past. The argument for seeking a middle ground arises in part out 
of frustration with the two extremes. Supplementing this critical aspect of the 
argument is a more constructive strand that explores what the individualist core of 
democracy implies with respect to political diversity in the form of disagreeing 
groups. Although NMD leaves room for a theory of groups substantially thinner than 
the one its multiculturalist critiques require because it is more clearly constrained by 
democracy’s individualist commitments, it is still thicker than the one standard liberal 
egalitarianism allows. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Only on rare occasions do newly coined terms enter into the everyday language of 
politics as forcefully as multiculturalism has done in the last three decades in many 
established democracies of the West. From parliamentary debates to electoral 
campaigns, from newspaper and TV commentaries to citizen protests, struggles of 
cultural, racial, religious and other identity groups have received a great deal of – 
supportive or critical – attention. Academic political theory, too, has not remained 
oblivious to the “intensification and multiplication” of political struggles “mobilized 
on the basis of gender, race, language, ethnicity, indigeneity, religion, and sexuality.”1 
The discussion of multiculturalism has grown from a few books published in the late 
1980s and early 90s into a voluminous literature by the early 2000s. 
Despite its proliferation in recent decades, like any new literature, the political 
theory of multiculturalism has had a limited scope. Emphasis has been placed on 
discovering the correct principles of justice that would apply in adjudicating 
multicultural questions. A range of influential theories have been proposed to 
advocate or challenge the validity of liberal principles of justice in dealing with 
multiculturalist concerns such as recognition and “reasonable accommodation” of 
cultural diversity, and rights and freedoms of  cultural groups. In recent years – in a 
move that political theorist Will Kymlicka characterises as the beginning of a new 
stage in “the multiculturalism wars” – the scope of the literature has broadened as 
political theorists have begun to focus more on the relationship of multiculturalism to 
citizenship and the institutional conundrums created by specific multiculturalist 
                                                            
1
 Eisenberg and Kymlicka, Identity Politics in the Public Realm, 1. 
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principles.2 But it remains the case that political theorists engaged in the 
multiculturalism debates have largely been unwilling to supplement the justice lens 
with other relevant perspectives through which the challenges of multiculturalism can 
be viewed. Particularly disconcerting is the absence of the perspective of democratic 
theory. Theorists who have debated at length the practicality and theoretical 
soundness of liberal multiculturalism have not addressed sufficiently deeply and 
systematically the relationship of multiculturalism with democracy, the most 
characteristic feature of the western political landscape. 
Let us look more closely at some examples of how the democratic perspective 
on multiculturalism is chronically understudied. To be sure, the works of the 
proponents and opponents of multiculturalism – Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Brian 
Barry and others – are not bereft of references to democracy. For example, Will 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship makes numerous allusions to “liberal-
democracy” and “democratic principles.” But democracy is not treated as a 
component of the normative investigation. To the extent that democracy figures in 
Kymlicka’s theory, it does so in a rudimentary fashion.3 Only at the end of his book 
does Kymlicka observe that  
It is not enough, therefore, to show that minority rights are consistent 
in principle with freedom and justice. We also need to determine 
whether they are consistent with the long-term requirements of a stable 
liberal democracy, including the requirement of a shared civic identity 
                                                            
2
 Joppke and Lukes, Multicultural Questions, 113-15. 
3
 The references to democracy scattered throughout Multicultural Citizenship give one the impression 
that democracy is something that obtains when we follow the liberal-egalitarian principles of justice. 
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that can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation, and 
sacrifice that democracies require.4 
Even there, what Kymlicka does can at best be seen as defending his multiculturalism 
against some underdeveloped propositions about democracy such as trust and 
fraternity. There is no structured analysis of democratic principles that would allow 
one to call Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism also a democratic multiculturalism.   
Coincidentally, in Brian Barry’s Culture and Equality too, an attempt to relate 
multiculturalism to democracy comes at the end of the book. Although, throughout his 
anti-multiculturalist treatise, Barry claims to be writing from a democratic 
perspective, his engagement with democracy is limited to brief remarks on the 
specialness of majoritarianism and some unsystematic considerations about the 
centrality of equality to democratic practice.5 To be sure, as we will see in coming 
chapters, Barry does mention some likely tensions between multiculturalism and 
democratic principles but he does not look into democratic ways of resolving these 
tensions other than noting that “we have a clear prima facia case for resolving 
disputes by adopting the policy favoured by the majority.”6 On a closer investigation 
of democracy, we will see that this is too hasty a conclusion to make.  
Helpful as a beginning point, but insufficient as an account of the relationship 
between democracy and multiculturalism, are the works that have for decades shaped 
our thinking on democratic pluralism. Although writers like Joseph Schumpeter, 
Robert Dahl, and more recently Ian Shapiro take seriously the empirical background 
of ethical pluralism within which democratic decision-making has to be carried out, 
                                                            
4
 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 173 -174. 
5
 See Barry, “Is Democracy Special?” 
6
 Barry, Culture and Equality, 300. 
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their respective approaches to democracy emphasize certain aspects of the democratic 
ideal at the expense of understating some other aspects.7 For instance, Schumpeter 
justifies forcing almost all aspects of representative democracy other than periodical 
elections out of his account for the ease of making sense of ethical plurality.   
The upshot is that it is difficult to tell what democratic principles imply with 
regard to the questions of multiculturalism without analysing the complex interaction 
between democratic norms on the one hand and the normative concerns of 
multiculturalism on the other. This shortcoming is more disturbing if we are to accept 
that many of the questions faced by contemporary liberal democracies are questions 
about how to resolve the tensions that arise between democratically made decisions 
and the demands for recognition or accommodation made by particular religious, 
cultural, or ethnic minorities. This brings to our attention the importance of the 
democratic character of societies in which the multiculturalism and justice debates 
takes place. 
This dissertation is an examination of the interplay between democratic norms 
on the one hand, and principles of philosophical multiculturalism on the other. The 
general question it addresses is the question of the compatibility of democracy and 
multiculturalism. More specifically, the dissertation aims to determine if democracy is 
undermined by the adoption of multicultural policies. It proposes that we break with 
the tradition of viewing multiculturalism through the lens of liberal justice theories. 
The proposal is motivated by the expectation that a systematic inquiry into the 
interplay of multiculturalism with democracy will reveal an important insight that will 
hold true independently of the liberal justice debate while also deepening our 
                                                            
7
 See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy; Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics. Shapiro, 
Democratic Justice; Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory. 
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understanding of it. The dissertation presents a democratic theory of how 
contemporary Western societies should respond to the presence of a plurality of 
worldviews and ethno-cultural traditions in their midst.  
There are a number of views about how democracy is to respond to difference. 
The dissertation engages with three groups of thinkers that respond differently to the 
question of what a democracy has to do with respect to pervasive disagreement.  The 
first group of theorists, the classical minimalists such as Joseph Schumpeter, advocate 
doing little more than counting heads and making sure that the respective majorities 
of the day get what they want. For them democracy is just a method of counting 
during elections and coming up with technocratic projects that ensure efficient 
government operation between elections. So this kind of democracy is responsive in a 
very limited sense, and responsive only to the majorities of the day. 
The second group of theorists who have a more sophisticated idea of how 
democracy should handle difference consists of writers who believe difference and 
diversity have to be turned into a positive resource that reinforces democracy.  
Proponents of this overtly optimistic view of democracy believe that interests can be 
transformed through enlightened debate, and that recognition of differences will help 
people realize their common purposes through seeing the justice of other involved 
parties’ claims and making respective adjustments to their own. These writers (e.g., 
Iris Young and Melissa Williams) offer a strange mixture of an original disagreement 
and a final agreement, which despite all their avowed commitment to diversity, in the 
course of this investigation, turns out to be either unfounded optimism or some kind 
of socially engineered consensus.  
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The third group, which includes Brian Barry and other contemporary 
defenders of the “Enlightenment project”, view democracy as a tool for realizing the 
traditional democratic values lying in the triangle of freedom, equality, and fraternity. 
Private disagreement, for these writers of liberal egalitarian stripe, is fine; but public 
disagreement, particularly on matters concerning the common good, can undermine 
the overall goals of egalitarian justice. Impartiality and uniformity of laws in the 
context of multiculturalism, to these authors, translate into a univocal rejection of the 
multiculturalist concern for recognition, inclusion, and varying degrees of self-rule.  
This thesis defends a fourth view of democracy. To put it in a nutshell, 
normative minimalist democracy (NMD) is a non-revisionist theory. Its minimalism 
lies in the prominent role that it assigns to existing electoral and contestational 
institutions such as regular elections, political parties, legally recognized oppositions, 
and various ways of devolving law-making and executive powers. Its normativity 
rests on the fact that it does not take these institutions as given, in their existing 
perimeters, while also accepting the possibility of reform and expansion in accordance 
with their implicit normative underpinnings rather than some other outstanding 
independent ideals.   
NMD takes a different stance from all three of the views presented above on 
the question of difference and democracy. It holds that the three views are unable to 
appreciate the respective normative weights of dissensus and consensus, both of 
which have an ineradicable place in the modern democratic practices and figure 
extensively among minimalist democracy’s normative underpinnings. NMD claims 
that the two strands cannot be permanently reconciled, and the tension between them 
cannot be resolved once and for all. But this is no reason for serious concern or 
revision of democratic practices because NMD offers internal resources to cope with 
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these tensions and to manage them in a principled and effective way – better than any 
alternative that these three groups of views can offer. 
The second strong thread that runs through this dissertation responds to 
another trichotomy – the three supposedly democratic challenges that philosophers of 
multiculturalism have brought up over the last two decades (as well as to the 
corresponding liberal-egalitarian counter-responses). With respect to these challenges 
and responses, the dissertation argues that both supporters and opponents of 
multiculturalism have democratic pretensions.  
Defenders of multiculturalism such as Iris Young (who presents the inclusion 
challenge), James Tully (the self-rule challenge), and Charles Taylor (the recognition 
challenge) hold that their various multicultural challenges to existing liberal 
democratic practices suggest a clear need for radically revising contemporary 
democratic norms and practices. Existing democratic practices are, in different ways, 
fundamentally hostile to the recognition, inclusion and decolonization of the ethno-
cultural minorities with long histories of legitimate grievances. Writers such as 
Young, Tully, and Taylor advocate a radical realignment or renegotiation of existing 
political and legal arrangements. They believe democracies of today do not have the 
conceptual resources to motivate justice towards these groups.  
On the other hand, theorists such as Brian Barry – and outside of political 
philosophy, intellectual historian David Hollinger – argue that multiculturalism 
represents a challenge to existing forms of democracy and, more importantly, to any 
possible reform in more egalitarian directions. So both groups of theorists – the 
multiculturalists and their critics – argue for democratic reform. They have extensive 
outcome-related expectations that they would like democratic governance to realize. 
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One group believes substantial improvements will be achieved by building the 
multicultural ethos, while the other side holds that the prospects of democracy hinge 
on the suppression of the multiculturalist excess through the reassertion of the liberal-
egalitarian agenda. Theorists such as Barry view multiculturalism as an impediment to 
the securing of a substantive common good. They think multiculturalism is a 
departure and distraction from the goals of progressive politics and a threat to the 
universal impartiality of the law. Compromise on this last point, according to Barry, 
would throw us back into the dark ages. Because under the pretext of freedom 
multiculturalism creates a hierarchical and inegalitarian political milieu, the solution, 
for Barry, lies in looking sceptically at multiculturalist demands and resisting 
concessions.  
Having seen the theoretical context in which the argument of the thesis 
unfolds, we can now turn to the argument itself. This dissertation argues that the 
democratic response to multiculturalism should not be overshadowed either by 
unfounded optimism about the prospects of a substantive consensus fair to all 
previously marginalized cultural minorities, or by pessimism about the relapse into 
the pre-Enlightenment world due to the so-called return of parochialism. In between 
these two positions lies a much more suitable, democratic, response to the facts of 
multiculturalism – one that neither celebrates the role of culture as a unique vehicle of 
human fulfilment, nor dismisses it as a remnant of the past. The argument for this—
for seeking a middle ground—arises in part out of a recognition of the inadequacy of 
two extremes. The view defended in this study rejects claims of both radical 
egalitarian multiculturalists and their liberal egalitarian critics since it finds their 
views of democracy unable to explain or appreciate the value of the major democratic 
institutions that we see in the western democratic societies. I argue that NMD offers 
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us enough conceptual resources to take on board much of the multiculturalist critique 
without a need for significant revisionism of the kind that radical egalitarian 
supporters and opponents of multiculturalism demand.  
Supplementing this critical aspect of the argument is a more constructive 
strand that explores what the individualist core of democracy implies with respect to 
political diversity in the form of disagreeing groups. It maintains that normative 
minimalist democracy neither rules out, nor promotes multiculturalism. Although 
NMD leaves room for a theory of groups substantially thinner than the one its 
multiculturalist critiques require because it is more clearly constrained by 
democracy’s individualist commitments, it is still thicker than the one that standard 
liberal egalitarianism allows. As a result, it can prove compatible with the various 
degrees of recognition, self-rule, and inclusiveness demanded by theorists such as 
Taylor, Tully, and Young. Many of these concerns associated with multiculturalism 
are accepted, albeit for reasons different from those that the multiculturalists put forth. 
For instance, in the case of Taylor, we may accept a more provisional notion of 
recognition, but reject Taylor’s cultural stability or survival thesis (because of the 
permanence and necessity that they prescribe). Similarly, we could accept some of 
Young’s criticisms of existing democratic practices (because these represent a 
travesty of the underpinning normative ideals) without accepting her radical social 
ontology that requires making significant changes to contemporary democratic 
practice – including, but not limited to, ways in which democratic decisions are made. 
With regard to Tully’s radical self-rule challenge, one could maintain a commitment 
to democratic individualism and at the same time ensure that Aboriginal communities 
run their daily affairs with as much dignity, and as little intervention, as possible, 
without the need to change our way of thinking about democracy. In other words, 
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there are ways of improving democracy’s capacity to adequately deal with 
multiculturalism by focusing on the internal potential that an improved understanding 
of core democratic norms and the more technical improvements concerning the 
subsidiary standards of transparency, competition, and accountability could offer. 
An outline of the argument is presented below.  
The second chapter takes up the Schumpeterian challenge and uses it to define 
the notion of normatively sound minimalist democracy. It explores the minimal role 
that various concepts associated with modern democracy need to play in a competitive 
pluralistic political system for the latter to remain true to its normative underpinnings.  
The important prescription that comes out of this chapter is that different norms 
making up the multidimensional notion of democracy can at times pull the theory in 
different directions. But there is nothing bad or incongruent about this indeterminacy, 
which very neatly fits the openness and indeterminacy of democracy as a political 
system.  
The third chapter explores the respective roles of agreement and disagreement 
in the theory of NMD by focusing on two of its most central normative elements– 
those of equality and non-domination. The chapter defends an account of democratic 
equality against the more and less substantive versions of the theory. The second part 
of the chapter takes up the notion of democratic non-domination.  
Chapter four starts with an examination of the three multiculturalist challenges 
to the existing democratic theory and practice. Theorists who make the three 
challenges of recognition, self-rule, and inclusion believe that these pose a serious 
democratic challenge to the existing political and legal practices of western liberal 
democracies. In this chapter I explain why, to an important extent, these challenges 
INTRODUCTION 
19 
 
misinterpret democratic principles. The fifth chapter evaluates the anti-multiculturalist 
counter-response to the three multiculturalist challenges. The main focus here is on 
the normative theories presented by Barry, Okin and other like-minded critics of 
multiculturalism. 
The third part of the dissertation brings together the lessons of the first two 
parts and offers an alternative view of the relationship between the two sets of norms 
– one that is neither overly optimistic nor unduly pessimistic about the interplay 
between democracy and multiculturalism. Chapter six examines the theory of groups 
for which the norms of minimalist democracy and its individualist commitments leave 
room. It explores democratic reasons in support of constructing such a theory, and 
defines its contours by contrasting it with the more positive and substantive views of 
group engagement in democracies. The defining contrast is between ascriptive 
conceptions of groups and more voluntaristic conceptions revolving around some 
perceived interest. The argument is that an egalitarian reinterpretation of interest 
groups pluralism fits NMD more than the more substantive alternatives.  
 Chapter seven is an exploration of similarities and differences between the 
emerging theoretical construct and the well-known multiculturalist and anti-
multiculturalist positions that were criticized in part two of the thesis. The chapter 
uses the body of theoretical evidence from the previous chapters to offer a final 
response to what NMD implies with respect to various multicultural and anti-
multicultural concerns and to consider whether or not the emerging theoretical 
construct deserves the title of democratic multiculturalism. The argument of the 
chapter, and the response to the guiding question of the thesis, is that NMD offers a 
theory of democracy with significant multicultural potential. 
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Chapter 2: The Normative Underpinning of  
  Minimalist Democracy 
This chapter is not an attempt to answer the famous question, what is democracy? Given 
the vast geography through which this form of government has spread, and its rich 
historical sources of development, it may be hard to pinpoint the perfect democratic 
theory. Yet, I argue that we should be able to say what democracy is not, or to put it 
more positively, to identify the boundaries of democratic theory within which several 
kinds of contemporary democracies can justly enjoy their highly respected title. 
 Because even the latter question concerning the boundaries of a legitimate 
democracy is too big to be answered in one chapter, I try to limit the scope of this 
chapter to considering one specific hypothesis; namely, that democracy is not merely 
about elections, and the existence of competitive elections cannot be taken as the sole 
indicator of democracy. I begin with an examination of the Schumpeterian theory of 
minimalist democracy that views this form of government as characterized primarily by 
electoral competition. I defend the opposing thesis that democracy has a normative 
extra-electoral dimension. I go on to draw out the parameters that this extra-electoral 
dimension would require at a minimum. In doing all of this, my aim is twofold: I want 
to remind enthusiasts of the ancient ideal that Schumpeter has taught generations of 
theorists concerning inapplicability of the ancient ideal to the modern world. On the 
other hand, I want to draw attention of the modern day Schumpeterians to the 
inconsistencies from which their minimalist democracy would suffer unless its 
normative foundations are clarified and embraced. 
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2.1 Schumpeterian Conception of Democracy 
One of the most influential accounts of what counts as a democracy was developed by 
Joseph Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, first published in 
1942. Although much of that long volume is not directly relevant to the question at 
hand, in chapters XX through XXIII Schumpeter builds an original view that has 
generated a lot of debate among scholars of democracy. I take Schumpeter’s theory to 
be a lucid and influential example of the position that I want to criticize. But there are 
other accounts of minimalism that make similar mistakes. So my criticism of 
Schumpeterian minimalism is directed at all theories that hold a vision of democracy 
limited to voting procedures.  I argue that Schumpeterian minimalism cannot form the 
basis of democratic legitimacy. Let me begin with a synopsis of the key Schumpeterian 
points before getting into critical examination of his minimalism, and arguing that such 
minimalism cannot form the basis of democratic legitimacy.1  
In Schumpeter’s view, what he calls the classical doctrine of democracy suffers 
from the eighteenth century’s misjudgements about social and political life. 
Philosophers of the eighteenth century failed to see the plurality of interests existing in 
society. They thought a utilitarian interest in some aggregate happiness such as 
economic prosperity exhausted the realm of personal and public interests. To the 
utilitarian fathers of democracy, Schumpeter observes, disagreements over common 
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 Ian Shapiro builds his theory of democracy by supplementing rather than rejecting Schumpeterian 
account. I am quite sympathetic to Shapiro’s theory as the general idea that I want to lay out in this 
chapter bears some resemblance to Shapiro’s formulation of the democratic ideal. Despite this affinity 
between what I argue and the view Shapiro expounds in The State of Democratic Theory, there is an 
important difference in the way Schumpeterian ideas figure in this dissertation and in Shapiro's work. I 
think Shapiro tends to overlook how his effort of supplementing the Schumpeterian conception of 
democracy to make it more legitimate can be too un-Schumpeterian. Shapiro emphasises the similarities 
between his account and Schumpeterian democracy without discussing how the changes he proposes 
(e.g., the role he assigns to courts (73-77)) would transform democracy in a direction that Schumpeterians 
might find objectionable. In contrast, I do not deny that Schumpeterians may want to reject the 
reformulation and extension of Schumpeter's democratic theory in this dissertation. I am aware that 
although the minimalist approach to democracy outlined in this dissertation includes certain 
Schumpeterian elements, it diverges from the democratic minimalism of Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy (hereafter, CSD) in important ways. 
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good simply indicated a rationally removable obstacles to human progress. But, to 
Schumpeter, the politics of his time showed rather clearly that irreconcilable differences 
about human values, not an eliminable ignorance about real interests, lie behind the 
persistent failure to agree on common good. These differences could not be rationally 
bridged because “our conceptions of what life and what society should be … are beyond 
the range of mere logic.”2 That common good is an impracticable ideal, for Schumpeter, 
rules out the most vital ingredient of classical democracy – volonté générale. For the 
absence of an understanding of the common good empties the general will of any 
meaningful content. This, as a consequence, requires one to dismiss classical democracy 
as a false theory. 
In Schumpeter’s view, one can still rescue the logically sound dimension of 
democracy – government in some sense responsive to, or approved by, the people – by 
ditching the eighteenth century philosophers’ untenable commitment to a nonexistent 
common good and the respective general will. On this purged account of democracy, 
the function of demos consists of “produc[ing] a government” rather than “deciding 
political issues,” something that demos under the classical doctrine of democracy was 
responsible for.3 Schumpeter thinks this construal of democracy allows one to escape 
from the incoherencies of the classical doctrine. Democracy, on his account, no longer 
rests on a dubious idea of general will, but is reduced to characterizing the competitive 
struggle over the right to rule. As long as elites compete for political power through 
elections, what happens between elections remains outside of the subject of democracy. 
This, for Schumpeter, is the supreme account of democracy because government is 
marred neither by disingenuous philosophical inventions such as volonté générale, nor 
by the incorrigible ignorance of the masses about almost all important issues in politics.  
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Since the publication of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, the above 
outlined view has become the most commonly accepted notion of democratic 
minimalism. As long as, electoral pluralism is attained, a country is widely considered 
democratic. Anything beyond that, although inspiring, either has nothing to do with 
democracy or is imbued with the mistaken idealism of the classical doctrine. The 
question that I try to answer in the remainder of this chapter is whether the foregoing 
conception suffices to explain democratic legitimacy. I proceed with this task by taking 
Schumpeter’s conception as a beginning point and going on to demonstrate why it is 
insufficient. 
2.2 Democracy: Method or Ideal? 
We need to begin with a crucial conceptual question concerning democratic theory. 
Schumpeter contends that “[d]emocracy is a political method … incapable of being an 
end in itself.”4 If we are to conceive democracy as more than a mere method, the 
Schumpeterian critique very quickly loses its initial appeal because the very distinction 
between the classical and modern doctrines becomes fairly blurry. For part of the reason 
Schumpeter can move so quickly from (a) condemning the classical doctrine for its 
unrealism to (b) espousing the modern doctrine for its realism is the largely 
unquestioned idea that democracy is only a method of organizing governments. 
Recognizing that democracy is not merely a method could encourage one to experiment 
with different variations of democratic norms, classical and modern. Once we see that 
democracy is more closely related to ideals that we cherish than Schumpeter is willing 
to acknowledge, we restore its necessary normative dimension. But first we have to 
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show that democracy can coherently be thought of as more than a method in the 
Schumpeterian sense. 
To substantiate his view that democracy is a method, Schumpeter uses a thought 
experiment about an intolerant community that persecutes Jews or Christians.5 
Schumpeter notes that by setting up constitutional limits – e.g. not allowing non-Jewish 
majorities to expropriate and jail Jews – we restrain the scope of democratic action. 
Schumpeter does not deny that democracies often engage in this kind of action (i.e. 
setting constitutional limits), but he holds that the action is essentially undemocratic. 
However, as we will see in this chapter, there are essentially democratic justifications 
for such constraints, which could be supported even from within Schumpeterian 
minimalism. We can find evidence for the compatibility of constraints of this kind with 
minimalist democracy in the sections of CSD that deal with the issues of competition 
and individual freedom.  Therefore, we have to make a detour to explore what 
Schumpeterian competition does and does not entail.  
Schumpeter is deliberately, but disturbingly, vague about what the notion of 
competition at the heart of his account of elite democracy consists of. He writes that 
“[b]etween this ideal case [of free competition] which does not exist and the cases in 
which all competition with the established leader is prevented by force, there is a 
continuous range of variation within which the democratic method of government 
shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible steps.”6 Despite this striking 
acceptance of his proposed theory’s vagueness and the problems that it may cause, 
Schumpeter does give us some explicit and implicit conditions that the notion of 
competition would have to meet for his theory to avoid the shortcomings of the classical 
doctrine. The electoral competition, he writes, is “free competition for a free vote”, 
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which “excludes many ways of securing leadership which should be excluded, such as 
competition by military insurrection”.7 He does somewhat reluctantly rule out practices 
such as election by acclamation – meaning that he accepts the use of ballot – and, more 
definitively, accepts the importance of “a considerable amount of freedom of discussion 
for all … and freedom of the press.”8 These, coupled together with the acceptance of a 
list of implicit conditions that the rest of this section examines lead to an interesting 
answer to what is perhaps the most basic conceptual question about democracy that I 
tried to capture in the title of this section. I now turn to consider the list of more implicit 
– but it turns out, very important – presuppositions of democracy.  
Schumpeter tries to provide an alternative theory of democracy – one that is 
“much truer to life” 9, which must involve more coherence, feasibility, and conceptual 
distinctness. By doing away with the concept of volonté générale and the equally 
unfounded notion of definite “individual volition” that motivates it, Schumpeter intends 
to improve the plausibility of the theory of democracy. Toning down expectations by 
“reversing” the respective roles of governments and electors – assigning the function of 
policy making to the former, and the function of producing or forming the government 
to the latter –is meant to make Schumpeter’s theory more feasible than its classical 
alternative.10 Moreover, fixing the competitive method as “the essence of democracy”11, 
Schumpeter thinks, produces “a reasonably efficient criterion by which to distinguish 
democratic governments from others.”12 All of these indicate how Schumpeter thinks 
his reinterpretation of democracy is better than the classical understanding. 
Furthermore, under these visibly evaluative criteria come even more strikingly 
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normative notions that not only sustain Schumpeter’s democratic theory, but embed it 
deeply in a sociocultural context. 
In Schumpeter’s account of realist democratic theory, the aforementioned central 
notions of freedom and electoral competition are supplemented by a list whose status 
may at first appear somewhat confusing. Although Schumpeter alludes to most of these 
ideas at different points in CSD, he groups them all together under what he calls “the 
conditions which I hold must be fulfilled for the democratic method to be a success”.13 
These range from the setting of evaluative criteria for minimalist democracy to the 
appropriate mode of behaviour for politicians and electorates. Schumpeter is not only 
concerned with the “high quality” of elites or the predominance of relatively non-
ideological issues in the public agenda. He also stipulates the proper attitude that 
everyone – “all the groups that count in a nation” – has to adopt in order for democracy 
to be successful. Namely, voters “must be on an intellectual and moral level high 
enough to be proof against the offerings of the crook and the crank”.14 Towards the end 
of the part of the book in which he presents his theory of democracy, Schumpeterian 
minimalism seems to make even a bigger move away from the realm of machines to the 
ideational realm: “[E]ffective competition for leadership requires a large measure of 
tolerance for difference of opinion.” Leaders and voters must learn how to “stand by 
patiently while somebody is attacking their most vital interests or offending their most 
cherished ideals”. What is required is not just a passive and grudging disregard, but 
“genuine respect for the opinions of one’s fellow citizens”15 that teaches electors and 
politicians the virtue of moderation. 
Together, these conditions tell one why and how the competitive model of 
democracy comprises a feasible, coherent and conceptually distinct alternative to its 
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classical counterpart. In the words of William Connolly, “Schumpeter invokes a specific 
code of rationality to vindicate a realist democratic method.”16 The conditions of 
democratic success or the institutions of free press and competitive elections do not 
simply describe how a mechanical process unfolds, but point out how human beings can 
bring about a political arrangement by relating to each other in certain predefined ways. 
All of this shows that, in contrast to Schumpeter’s original insistence on the analogy 
with soulless machines, he too cannot deny that democracy has a non-mechanical, 
ideational dimension.  
It is in light of this reading of Schumpeter and the elucidation of the link 
between democracy and its ideational surrounding that I want to return to the 
Schumpeterian thought experiment concerning Jews and heretics that motivated him to 
espouse the language of science and machines. Imagine that a democracy was to 
expropriate and jail all those who voted for some of the options listed on a ballot. As the 
foregoing paragraphs suggest, at some point, this would have to become unacceptable 
even by Schumpeter’s own standards of electoral competitiveness. Otherwise the 
resulting theory becomes quite an arbitrary, irrational enterprise, unworthy of being 
tolerated as a system of government. Less dramatically, consider simply discounting 
votes for certain candidates. Why are these two measures regarded as violations of 
Schumpeterian democracy, whereas the persecution or exclusion of Jews, heretics, or 
slaves is not? 
One answer that Schumpeter gives is that demos should be left free to define 
itself. Schumpeter holds that democracy requires all to leave a particular community 
free to decide the kind of communal life it wants to live. Just as Americans deem 
convicted felons unfit to vote, a demos with religious fanatics could deem homosexuals, 
                                                            
16
 Connolly, “Democracy and Territoriality," 467. 
CHAPTER 2 – The Normative Underpinning of Minimalist Democracy 
28 
 
apostates, and heretics unqualified for political participation.17 But this really begs the 
question: Shouldn’t, then, demos also be free to shun those who vote for unfavourable 
options? Some Catholic bishops in America had similar aspirations when they called for 
excommunication of anyone who voted for John Kerry in the presidential election of 
2004.18 Insofar as Schumpeter is making a distinction between the two kinds of 
discrimination, according to the definition put forward by himself, he gives us a theory 
of something other than democracy. For it is perfectly compatible with the literal 
meanings of demos and kratein – if one is to espouse the kind of selective and primitive 
reading done by Schumpeter – that a majority could persecute not only the originally 
eccentric or unorthodox but also those who have changed their opinions after the 
historical moment in which the demos happened to define itself. This way of drawing 
the line, i.e., approving of the demos’ right to define itself at Ti but disapproving of it by 
positing desiderata for electoral competitiveness at Tn , becomes even more arbitrary if 
one thinks that, according to very plausible theories of power, disenfranchisement is 
often a direct consequence of uncompetitive practices. It is through the uncontested or 
unchecked exercise of power that certain definitions of demos become prevalent.  
The upshot of this brief discussion is that the competitive electoralism proposed 
by Schumpeter is not a self-evident statement or a default political position, but has 
ethical content. Just as its flawed Schumpeterian version rests on some faulty claims 
about human potential, its much more robust and true to the world version, in order to 
avoid the above developed charge of arbitrariness, must rest on certain ethical claims 
about government, society, and human condition in general. Pursuing this objection 
even further would help us fill the gaps left by Schumpeter’s theory of electoral 
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 In Schumpeter’s words, “religious fervor for instance is certainly compatible with democracy however 
we define the latter. There is a type of religious attitude to which a heretic seems worse than a madman. 
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competitiveness. But for now we shall focus on the implication of the ethical dimension 
for the view of democracy being merely a method.  
There is, to conclude this section, one objection against the critique of 
instrumentality that Schumpeterians may raise: They may want to resist my attempt to 
uncover the normative underpinnings of the Schumpeterian thesis by taking up the 
following point. Schumpeter does not deny democracy can have instrumental value or 
that it can be a useful tool to attain some other normatively valuable ends. What still 
remains as the case, even in the face of the foregoing discussion, a Schumpeterian could 
argue, is that democracy cannot be an end in itself; hence it has to be a method. Let me 
show why this response cannot work against my argument. Part of the initial appeal of 
Schumpeter’s metaphorical allusion to steam engines and disinfectants had to do with a 
conflation of two important questions – one about how to approach to democracy and 
the other concerning the value of democracy. The locus of enquiry for the first question 
is the relevance of normative thinking to the notion of democracy. If democracy is 
merely a method bereft of any ideational elements, it ought to be primarily studied as, 
for instance, the tools or concepts of thermodynamics should be studied. The second 
question about the value of democracy however is concerned with the issue of 
instrumental and inherent worth.  
The Schumpeterian critic is right that my exegetical excursion into the CSD does 
not establish democracy is intrinsically valuable. So Schumpeter could still be 
technically right about the second question.19 However, one does not have to posit 
intrinsic worth for democracy in order to diminish the Schumpeterian argument that 
democracy is merely a method. As long as the argument is successful in showing that 
democracy needs to be conceptualized as a normative ideal rather than a mere method, 
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the fact that, as a mode of government, it is exclusively utilized to produce good 
outcomes does not really undermine the point of this section. What matters is the non-
contingent bond between democracy and certain understandings of freedom, equality, 
competition, leadership, etc. as concepts with normative undertones. Whether this ideal 
is an end in itself or is valuable exclusively for its relation to other more fundamental 
values does not alter the conclusion that it is an ideal. The question of intrinsic or 
instrumental worth may be an essential question when looking at ideal theoretical 
situations in which it is possible to envisage a benign autocrat who more consistently 
provides the fundamental value (whether it is equality, negative freedom or some other 
value) than democratic procedures. But given that we do not dwell in such kingdom of 
godly autocrats, we have enough reasons to postpone this question. 20 21  
Once we recognize that democracy, contra Schumpeterians, is not merely a 
method, judging one political act as democratic or undemocratic becomes a much more 
complicated task. In making such judgements – political theorists cannot avoid making 
them – we need not be exclusively concerned with the essence or core of a timeless 
concept that democracy is misleadingly thought of being. A much more useful way of 
thinking about these issues is to come to terms with the essentially contested nature of 
political concepts. Like normative components of any political concept, the ones 
comprising democracy are not going to nicely complement one another at all times. 
Political concepts are often made of constitutive ideas that pull in opposing directions.22 
Such complexity, if theoretically manageable, need not worry us as it reflects the 
complexity of real-life social phenomena. Instead, we should be concerned about 
solutions that are motivated by relatively monolithic views of democracy. 
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Finally, given that democracy is not merely a positive method but has a 
legitimate normative dimension, the logical connection between dismissal of the 
classical doctrine and acceptance of Schumpeterian doctrine is weakened. We no longer 
can take for granted desirability from the democratic perspective of existing conditions. 
More accurately, the recognition that democracy is not just a method, reintroduces the 
question of desirability into our thinking about democracy.  
2.3 Filling in the Gaps 
What I want to do in this section is to probe whether the minimalist enterprise can be 
rescued from its inconsistencies. I suggest four normative components that can 
reinvigorate and systematize Schumpeterian minimalism by ridding it of theoretical 
inconsistencies and false assumptions about political reality.  
2.3.1 Equality 
That democracy involves equality in relations of citizens with respect to political 
matters not only is at the core of most classical and modern definitions of democracy, 
but also forms an indispensable part of healthy democratic practice.23 Schumpeterian 
democracy, in this regard, stands as a remarkable counterexample. My aim in this 
section is to demonstrate some of the inconsistencies from which democracy without a 
commitment to the notion of equality suffers. The weight of the principle of equality, 
however, cannot be determined in one subsection. 
Ideals of equality have played an important role in concepts of democracy since 
the latter’s Greek inception. Although the Athenian demos, by denying citizenship to 
almost nine-tenths of its residents (most of whom were born in Athens), infringed on 
what many of us today regard as uncontroversial principles of equality, it rested on 
some clearly egalitarian principles. In the words of Demosthenes, one of Athens’ 
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greatest statesmen, Athenians recognized that “under a democracy each man has his 
share of just and equal rights.”24 We can see the prevalence of the association of 
equality with democracy also from the fact that much of the criticism directed to 
demokratia had to do with its egalitarian undertones. Plato for instance criticized it for 
undermining virtue and excellence, for ostracism and many other crimes against the 
truly noble.25 In contemporary democratic theories too some variant of egalitarianism 
plays a pivotal role. Schumpeter, however, is quite dismissive of attaching even a 
minimal role to equality. 
Let us briefly look at the minimalist democracy’s reasons for not accepting 
equality as an essential democratic principle. Schumpeter’s explicit discussion of 
principles of democratic equality is limited to one brief paragraph and two footnotes, in 
which he quickly dismisses equality as the religious counterpart of the utilitarian 
conception. Schumpeter thinks postulates like People and Common Good are replicas of 
the Christian God. And the principle of Equality is derived from Christ’s 
indiscriminating commitment to the redemption of all souls. This, Schumpeter thinks, in 
the absence of a factual basis for the egalitarian aspect of democracy, is “the only 
possible sanction … of ‘everyone to count for one, no one to count for more than 
one’.”26 Because there is no empirical basis on which egalitarian arguments could be 
grounded, and the only available justification of equality is the religious one, 
Schumpeter thinks, existing democracies are wrong in practising the Benthamite one-
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person-one-vote. Similarly erroneous, according to Schumpeter’s observations, is the 
notion of equality before the law. Because human beings are not naturally equal, 
Schumpeter thinks, outside of the religious argument there is no justification for legal 
equality, or what the ancients knew as isonomia.27  
To be sure, Schumpeter does not have many followers in this strikingly harsh 
dismissal of democratic equality. Many modern minimalists are willing to concede the 
centrality of the one-person-one-vote principle.28 Unlike the debate among egalitarians 
on the object of equality, one-person-one-vote, and isonomia in general, seem to enjoy 
close to universal support among democratic theorists. If one-person-one-vote has 
survived as the minimal requirement of democratic equality, there must be some strong 
reasons that have consolidated this principle. There are many angles from which the 
principle can be justified and there is no room to consider all arguments in its favour. I 
simply want to draw attention to how in its absence democracy becomes 
indistinguishable from undemocratic forms of government.29  
First and foremost, there seems to be no imperative that human beings need to 
be proven empirically equal in all respects in order to be treated as equals in politics. 
Inequalities in the private and economic realm have coexisted with equality in political 
realm both in theory and practice for hundreds of years. Schumpeter cites “All men are 
created equal,” the famous line from The Declaration of Independence, as evidence of 
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the religiously inspired and empirically unsound nature of equality. But this historic 
phrase is given a more sensible reading in Abraham Lincoln’s famous speech on the 
Dred Scott decision. There Lincoln notes:  
The authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but 
they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not 
mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, 
or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what 
respects they did consider all men created equal - equal in "certain 
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. This they said, and this they meant.”30  
A powerful argument for the distinctness of political equality specified by Lincoln 
comes from Hayek. Hayek notes that equality before the law, which he calls “the great 
aim of the struggle for liberty,” does not rest on the presumption of factual equality: 
“This argument not only recognizes that individuals are very different but in a great 
measure rests on that assumption. It insists that these individual differences provide no 
justification for government to treat them differently.”31 Hayek goes on to point out that 
basing equality before the law on empirically testable claims about factual equality 
would be a dangerous argument for the proponents of the former, as any demonstration 
of a slight difference between two men would justify the state’s treating them 
differently.  
Having seen that Schumpeter is wide of the mark when grounding equality in a 
comprehensive worldview such as utilitarianism or Christianity, and a presumption of 
factual equality in all matters does not have to be the basis of democratic equality, we 
can now turn to consider the necessity of political equality even in a minimalist 
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conception like Schumpeter’s own. The question that I want to address next is whether 
Schumpeterian competitive democracy is served better by dismissal or acceptance of 
political equality.  
Even Schumpeter accepts that all those who are considered fit by a particular 
polity should be included in the demos.32 Let us leave aside for a moment the question 
of discriminatory exclusions on religious and ethnic grounds. In a community of non-
discriminating adults, what would be consequences of assigning varying degrees of 
importance to people’s electoral preferences?33 For instance, let us think of a 
community where school drop-outs form an increasingly populous group. Obviously 
dropping out of school does not make one a thoughtless or immoral person, but one can 
reasonably argue that it reduces one’s capacity to digest political information in a 
developed capitalist democracy. Now let us also think that one of the several major 
parties with a good chance of winning a plurality or majority of votes in an upcoming 
election decides to make a special appeal for votes of the school drop-outs. If we are to 
think that the right to having a say in politics is a right to which all citizens are not 
equally entitled but is a matter of gradation and is to be distributed along a scale of 
competence, we will be led to two adverse consequences.  Firstly – perhaps this is the 
weaker argument in the eyes of a minimalist – we will have a group of people whose 
interests are not taken into account, and who are marginalized by politicians unwilling 
to compete for votes that count less. Secondly, and this is the point of ultimate 
importance to someone who accepts competitiveness as the proper standard of 
democracy, we will be led to an overtly uncompetitive electoral outcome. This violation 
of electoral competition will not only affect the people whose interests are denied equal 
representation, but will also affect the party, i.e. the part of the political elite, that wants 
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to see the problem of school drop-outs resolved. The upshot of this discussion is simple. 
Any marginalization of a demographic group can easily become a departure from, and 
degradation of, the idea of competition. If competition is the regulative principle, we 
should be interested in having more and healthier competition than settling for less than 
realistically available competition.  
These observations about the sheer damage that could be done to the 
competitiveness of a political system by establishing, or choosing to passively disregard 
an existing, hierarchy of opinions (i.e. recognizing some opinions as unworthy or less 
worthy) are confirmed by the studies in organizational and economic sociology. Joel 
Podolny in his seminal work on the role of status perceptions by third-parties in market 
competition, observes that status concerns can spawn and strengthen market hierarchies, 
which in turn undermines the traditional view of free market competition. By pooling 
and analysing data from numerous industries like jewellery, investment banking, etc., 
Podolny notes that “[a] higher-status actor cannot enter an exchange relation with a 
lower-status actor without running the risk of diluting status.”34 One of the vital aspects 
of Podolny’s findings for the question at hand is that in some sectors those involved in 
market exchanges show less concern with status than in others. In economic sectors 
where there is a higher degree of uncertainty, Podolny notes, parties are more willing to 
engage in exchanges with those of lower status.35 The possible implications of these 
studies for democratic politics conceived in terms of electoral competitiveness are rather 
clear. Podolny demonstrates that status matters in market relations which are in many 
respects much more competitive and uncertain than those of modern day politics.36 It is 
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not hard to see how attaching official labels to some political positions as unworthy will 
further diminish free competition for votes. 
A Schumpeterian will try to rebut this objection by noting that competition is 
only about producing a government and not over particular decisions like assisting 
drop-outs or producing any other policy outcome. This is because Schumpeter hopes 
that, between elections, elites will lead their countries without any degree of 
responsiveness. And in the next subsection I will focus on the obvious falsity of 
Schumpeter’s argument with respect to the degree of actual influence that unelected 
citizens can, and often do, exercise throughout the political process. This influence is 
important for two reasons. First, it is important from the viewpoint of citizens, namely, 
if politicians can be influenced, citizens would be interested in having as much 
influence as possible. Second, it is important from the perspective of the political elites 
themselves. That is, if the way governments are formed and remain in power does not 
depend solely on their being political parties (i.e., part of the political elite), but also on 
what they stand for and how they live up to their promises in the course of their tenure, 
some politicians and their parties, that is some part of the political elite, would be 
unfairly treated by the flaws in the competitiveness of the system. In other words, it 
seems that Schumpeter assumes an ideological vacuum in which elites operate. 
Competition in such an ideological vacuum would not show the strong need for political 
equality that I have defended in this subsection. There would need to be very little 
correlation between ideology and vote for the normatively very meagre notion of 
competition to remain relevant. But such an ideological vacuum does not and arguably 
cannot exist. 
The significance of equality for competitive democracy is also directly related to 
majoritarianism.  Only equality effectively guarantees that majoritarianism will be 
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respected. Departures from the ideal of equal consideration can quickly undermine 
majoritarianism, which is an implicit but crucial cut-off point for the minimalist position 
centred on the idea of competitiveness. As Dahl’s famous response suggests, the refusal 
to espouse some version of the egalitarian principle eventually results in severe 
inconsistencies:  
Suppose that in the [American] South, as in Rhodesia or South Africa, 
Blacks had been a preponderant majority of the population. Would 
Schumpeter still have said that the Southern states were “democratic”? 
…. If the rulers numbered 100 in a population of 100 million, would we 
call the rulers a demos and the system a democracy?37  
The only way out of such paradoxical situations seems to be accepting the Benthamite 
dictum as the point of departure: namely, “everybody to count for one, nobody for more 
than one”. 
There are, of course, much more foundationalist defences available for 
democratic equality than showing that free competition would require the law to treat all 
preferences equally. Because we are dealing with a question in normative theory, we 
cannot ignore the ideational dimension of political equality. The idea behind democratic 
equality, as it has been identified by theorists of both left and right, is the idea of equal 
standing and concern.38 Democracy is a form of government that emerges in places 
where individuals are sceptical of a single person’s or group’s right and capacity to rule 
better than others. As Dahl points out this can be a tribal society without entrenched 
status and power hierarchies, or a modern constitutional polity where citizens think of 
each other as roughly capable of, and entitled to, governing their own lives.39 Despite 
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Schumpeter’s disdain for the idea of equality, it can safely be taken as forming the core 
of democratic theory and practice. Moreover, as we saw in the foregoing passages,  
placing it at the core of Schumpeterian competitive pluralism turns that construct into a 
much more plausible candidate for the proper democratic minimum. But the idea of 
equality remains incomplete and dysfunctional unless we buttress it with other 
indispensable elements of democracy. 
2.3.2 Responsive Government  
The second element, responsive government – or some degree of participation if we are 
to focus on the inverse relationship – also enters into the formula of democracy through 
exposition of the Schumpeterian argument rather than its rejection. In this subsection I 
defend responsive government, one of the extra-electoral dimensions of the democratic 
minimum. I argue that Schumpeter’s commitment to electoral competitiveness, if the 
latter is to be taken as a normative ideal, presupposes a responsive government.40 
Schumpeter writes that one of the pillars of his preferred theory of democracy is 
acceptance of one party or leader out of the lot of those who have made themselves 
available for electoral competition. The corollary of this, without which the function of 
the electorate could not be complete, Schumpeter concedes, is withdrawal of that 
acceptance by the electorate. But he elaborately points out that this acceptance or its 
withdrawal should not be called control of elected representatives, or the political 
process, by the electorate. For the term control means that one can give direction to the 
course of politics. But under the Schumpeterian democracy, a citizen’s role is restricted 
to passively accepting decisions made by the elected government. Any attempt to 
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exercise influence over the elected government in order to compel “a certain course of 
action,” Schumpeter thinks, is “contrary to the spirit of the democratic method.” 41 
My contention is that Schumpeter is, at best, partly right about the modern 
electorate’s lack of control over the elected representatives, because his claim that 
electorates only install and eject governments does not, and arguably cannot, hold true 
even in the minimally participatory systems that currently characterize the Western 
political landscape. First and foremost, without the corresponding notion of responsive 
government, the project of competitive democracy becomes difficult to sustain. Second, 
to view democratic politics as a dichotomy between the Athenian direct democracy and 
the Schumpeterian ‘competitive democracy sans responsive government between 
elections’ leaves out the vast majority of established democracies of our own day.  
Let us first look at how competitive democracy is likely to suffer in the absence 
of the norm of responsiveness and conditions that sustain this norm. The endpoint of 
Schumpeterian democracy, as Shapiro correctly interprets it, is to control power by 
subjecting it to electoral competition.42 Then, democracy is ill-served by positing an 
unbridgeable gulf between elected officeholders and the mass public. To be sure, 
Schumpeter did not think that a competitive political environment could be sustained 
over time unless certain conditions obtained.43 In other words, he recognized that 
political competition is not the default position. It has already been noted in the 
literature on elections theory that political environment can be competitive only to the 
extent that officeholders are vulnerable to being defeated in future electoral cycles.44 
Without such actual vulnerability, politics of peaceful competition favoured by 
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Schumpeter would remain out of reach.45 Vulnerability of officeholders in a competitive 
democracy, in turn, is made possible by the electorate’s capacity to make a somewhat 
meaningful choice between available options.46 If voters are unable to identify 
candidate(s) who have served the public interest well or are going to serve it better than 
incumbents and other available candidates, we cannot speak of a systemic competition. 
Conceived in irrational terms – that is without reference to rational calculations on the 
part of voters – competition for electoral office would not be easy to maintain; as one 
author has already noted, voters would lose their incentive to take competitors seriously 
if there were no meaningful way of differentiating between rival electoral platforms.47  
Even if it could be proven that voters can gain information necessary to make a 
choice between available candidates during campaign periods alone, the responsiveness 
criterion would still conduce political parties to make themselves available to electoral 
control between elections. As long as there is a general commitment to the normative 
principle of responsive government, I think, the view of officeholders as willing to do 
everything to avoid electoral control is ill-founded. In a system that relies for its 
operation on periodic evaluation of contenders for elected office by their electorates, 
contenders can be assumed to have as much interest in making themselves responsive to 
preferences of their electors as electors have interest in keeping rascals out of office.48 
In order to see that the above described situation is not just an instance of wishful 
thinking, we need only to briefly look at the way established democracies function. 
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In contrast to Schumpeter, one can identify at least four different types of 
influence that electorates in established democracies exercise over elected officials 
between elections. These are (a) direct influence over elected representatives through 
their constituency offices or interest groups; (b) indirect influence through opinion 
polls; (c) the parliamentary influence through official oppositions; (d) the constitutional 
oversight through independent judiciary. Although none of these modes of influence are 
predetermining features of, or amount to full-fledged control over, democratic politics, 
together they comprise one of its most indispensable parts.  
Although examining these modes of control could be a worthwhile exercise in 
its own right, in order to back my claim that electoral control is not a figment of a 
normative theorist’s imagination, I only need to allude to their presence. Any careful 
observer of politics will confirm that the Schumpeterian notion of (lack of) 
representation that rules out a continuous direct contact between representatives and 
members of their constituencies, which Schumpeter borrowed from Edmund Burke, has 
lost in practice to notions of representation that are more in line with the normative 
condition of responsiveness defended in this chapter. The facts are too numerous to list, 
but here are a few obvious ones: All members of legislative bodies maintain 
constituency offices which operate between elections. Moreover, all parliamentary, or 
congressional, debates include references to on-going dialogues with members of one’s 
electorate, public opinion polls, letters and petitions addressed to parliamentarians. I 
think these references are not merely rhetorical because it would be hard to envisage the 
parliamentary process in its current role if parliamentarians were to substitute such 
references with scientific data. To be sure, technicalities constitute a large part of the 
committee meetings, but overlooking the role of interested citizens and interest groups 
would be a gross misrepresentation of contemporary politics.  
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In addition to trying to remain connected to their electorates, the norm of 
responsiveness induces elected officials in proper democracies to “anticipate the future 
judgment of the electorate on the policies they pursue.”49 To this end, political parties in 
power and opposition parties employ public opinion researchers and political analysts to 
measure popularity of potential and actual policy proposals. Although most 
governments in democratic countries are not obsessed with mirroring public preferences 
in political outcomes, it is very uncommon for political parties in power to deliberately 
make decisions unpopular enough to alienate major parts of the electorate.  
Parliamentary control is the other important source of control over parties in 
power. Schumpeter talks of the political process as if the winning party and its leader 
are always given a sweeping majority. Reality, however, is different; in most 
parliaments oppositions and governments are separated by narrow margins. To be sure, 
in some occasional remarks, Schumpeter registers his contempt for minority 
governments, but the influence of parliamentary oppositions is not restricted to minority 
governments alone. Even in democracies where one party holds a majority of seats in 
the legislature, oppositions continue to carry out an important democratic function. The 
fact that debates in parliament do not often result in nonpartisan legislative outcomes is 
not sufficient to dismiss the role of parliamentary oppositions. What makes 
parliamentary control more relevant to the popular control of governments is that 
members of the legislature from major opposition parties often pursue a much stronger 
public presence and interaction with their electorates in the hope of winning public 
support. In no democratic society do they wait until the official commencement of 
election campaigns. As the American cliché about elections suggests, as soon as one 
campaign ends, the next one begins. This is equally true in countries where 
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governments depend on the confidence of the parliament, and where there is less party 
discipline.  
Hitherto, I have attempted to show why the practice of alternation of parties in 
power, the most minimal requirement of democracy, requires responsive government. 
And responsive government, as the current practice tells us, seems to favour continuous 
contact between electors and electorate. The degree of actual influence the citizenry 
enjoys between elections, however, is a matter for empirical researchers to identify. 
What matters for this work is that such an influence is easily observable and responding 
to it is not a voluntary act on the part of elected officials. Elected politicians’ 
receptiveness towards these modes of influence is largely shaped by the structure of 
political institutions and the intensity of citizens’ desire to influence politics, not by 
individual volitions of political leaders. This makes democracy a distinctively 
responsive form of government. Hence Schumpeter is not right to argue that dei gratia 
autocracy can be similarly responsive to the preferences of its subjects.50 A benign 
monarch can act with a sense of justice and try not to oppress his populace but there is 
no guarantee that he will always act in this way. 
Finally, modern-day Schumpeterians could incorporate these facts about direct 
and indirect influence into their theories of electoral democracy by accepting that, in 
today’s democracies, elections are never-ending processes. However this 
acknowledgement would require one to accept the extra-electoral nature of democracy 
consolidated by the modern practice. Namely, one would have to accept the fact that the 
Schumpeterian model of elitist democracy is flawed or deficient even by the non-ideal 
standards of contemporary democracies – governments in consolidated democracies are 
not immune to being controlled or influenced. The job of normative theory is to explore 
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these established practices and go to the root of principles and objectives that have 
given rise to them.  
2.3.3 Non-Domination 
Remnants of what I discuss next have been described in the literature under such names 
as the principle of non-tyranny, non-domination, constitutional democracy, etc. 
Although non-domination shares a lot conceptually with non-tyranny and 
constitutionalism, there are important differences between these terms. Non-tyranny 
implies a more minimal condition, while constitutionalism could imply a more or less 
expansive notion depending on the thickness of political morality embedded in the 
original constitution and the demandingness of the amending procedures. Non-
domination seems to be a much more open-ended notion, and for this reason, more 
suited to capture the relevant element in democratic thought. In this subsection I draw 
attention to the important role of this element in democratic thought. But as with the 
previous elements, I will try to do this, as much as possible, by extending the 
Schumpeterian argument. 
Although the defence of democratic non-domination rests largely on the notion 
of democratic equality, the principle of non-domination cannot be derived in full from 
the minimalist reading of equality that grounds the principle of majoritarian 
government. Democracy uncontroversially accepts the equal status of all citizens before 
the law. But this kind of equality would prove ephemeral if what we meant by it was an 
unbridled exercise of whatever power one has as part of an electoral grouping over the 
rival groupings. At the time of America’s founding this worry manifested itself in the 
concern for the sanctity of property, which in turn led to the creation of the Senate and 
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establishment of certain constitutional constraints.51 Although having one’s say in 
politics was taken as a precondition of protecting one’s interests, American founders 
thought that the equal worth of votes did not guarantee equal protection for all citizens. 
Today the worry manifests itself in a different form, namely, democracy is criticized for 
its failures in protecting rights of cultural minorities.  
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy eloquently identifies one major source of 
domination in democratic states. The democratic common good, Schumpeter observes, 
must involve an imposition of beliefs and values that at least some individuals find 
unacceptable due to the "fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the 
common good is bound to mean different things."52 To a Schumpeterian, Rousseau’s 
volonté générale represents a textbook example of democratic domination, whereby the 
irrational volitions of some are mistaken for the enlightened popular will, and conferred 
with "exclusive ethical dignity".53  
Even though Schumpeter is right about the difficulty of arriving at a truly 
common good in the face of the pluralism underlying modern democracies, this need not 
mean a wholesale dismissal of all collective projects. It is true that some classical and 
modern democratic theorists have placed strong emphasis on social unity and like-
mindedness, which undermine the natural plurality of interests. However, there is no 
reason to think that a plurality of interests mandates complete disunity or that no 
common orientation can be compatible with it. The thought that the social unity 
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characteristic of small communities is among the preconditions of a well-functioning 
democracy is increasingly being challenged. One need not look far to see that too much 
unity is at least as undesirable and dangerous for a democracy as too little of it.  
A look at existing democracies and historical examples from around the world 
confirms the point that producing an agreement at any cost is not a function of 
democracies, but leaving room for contestation is. Experience confirms that political 
thinkers have good reasons to treat with scepticism the alleged connection between the 
largeness of an electoral margin and the strength of a mandate or its other democratic 
qualities. It is not a mere coincidence that leaders of authoritarian regimes often gain 
“electoral support” from more than 80% of their citizens, while many western 
democracies are governed by simple majority or plurality of votes.54 Inflated numbers 
not only imply the possibility of voter and/or vote manipulation but also the lack of 
effective political oppositions. In this regard, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 
despite its misleading silence on the normative content of democracy, has taught 
generations of political thinkers an important lesson, namely it has helped the discipline 
realize that democratic quality of electoral mandates could not be determined by 
aggregating votes alone. Schumpeter’s postulation that competitiveness of elections be 
made the paramount test of democratic quality has inspired a host of theorists from 
Robert Dahl to Ian Shapiro to develop important arguments concerning the role of 
democratic oppositions.  
The job of a democratic theorist, then, is to reconcile the functional need for 
agreement with the ineliminable fact of principled disagreement. Once we accept the 
place of disagreement in democratic corpus, the nature of democratic public good 
changes as well. That is, acceptance of disagreement compels us to attenuate our 
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expectations with regard to the achievement of the common good. It becomes more 
appropriate to prioritize building a framework that makes disagreement possible and 
allows each to pursue their own good rather than identify “specific objects, activities, 
and relations.”55 In this regard, it seems quite natural that one overarching good 
common to all citizens is the distaste of being tyrannized or dominated.56 Recently Ian 
Shapiro drew the attention of political theorists to this “stripped down conception” of 
the common good.57 Shapiro traces his formulation of the democratic common good as 
non-domination to the thought of Nicholas Machiavelli. In the remainder of this 
subsection, I shall explain why I find Shapiro’s appraisal of the idea of the common 
good as non-domination quite plausible, and offer some independent reasons for 
adopting this line of thinking.58  
This view of the common good seems to fit well with the non-engaging picture 
of the average citizen that Schumpeter draws. From the fact of widespread lack of 
motivation to participate in democratic politics, critics of participatory democracy seem 
right in assuming that political participation is far from being the premier good. But 
individuals whose main preoccupation is not politics can be more realistically thought 
of as having an interest in being free from domination or tyranny rather than having no 
interest in politics or aspiring to a transformative political project. On this account, the 
construal of democracy as the embodiment of the collectivist impulse for communal 
progress becomes inappropriate. But equally inappropriate is presenting it as a form of 
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government where the majority of citizens abstains from exercising continuous political 
judgement.   
Another advantage of this account is that if minimizing domination is thought of 
as one of the primary goods associated with democracy, making sense of democratic 
disagreements becomes easier than under the Schumpeterian proposal. Let us remember 
that Schumpeter neither offers us a guideline for settling those disagreements, nor 
proposes a democratic modus-vivendi. Disagreements being plentiful in daily politics, to 
Schumpeter, implies the impossibility of determining the common good. Nonetheless, 
under his electoral pluralism, governing elites remain free to embark on collectivist 
projects on which quite naturally and inevitably no common agreement exists. In this 
sense I cannot see how Schumpeter's formulation is more respectful of parties whose 
preferences do not make it into the final decision. The notion of democracy that accepts 
non-domination and political equality as basic principles, however, offers us viable 
guidelines for resolving disagreement through arbitration or agreeing to disagree.  
Of course, one still has to address an important criticism concerning the 
desirability of non-domination as the basis for democracy or the democratic common 
good. There are several criticisms of this idea. The most important one is that once we 
start to think about democracy along these lines, we are thinking about something else, 
perhaps a just society. Critics may concede that non-domination is a meaningful part of 
justice but may go on to argue that justice and democracy are two different things. It is 
possible to draw out such criticisms from the text of Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy. 
Undeniably, what is realistically available under the complex conditions that we 
find in populous and pluralistic modern states is a far cry from the ancient ideal of 
ruling and being ruled in turn. If democracy as non-domination is to be defended we 
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need an argument other than the one that rests on the Greek ideal of unity of the 
governor and the governed. The fact of irreducible ethical pluralism very forcefully 
pointed out by Schumpeter does not allow us to appeal to the volonté générale in order 
to counter claims that in a democracy even those who are on the losing side are not 
being dominated. This, however, does not prove that democratic non-domination is 
impossible, because the vice of domination can be objected to from within democracy 
itself. 
I think asking the following question can help us see the centrality of non-
domination to democracy more clearly. How appropriately can we think of a society 
where individual citizens stand to each other in relations of the dominant and dominated 
as democratic? It is true that decision-making in democracy almost always takes place 
along some form of the majoritarian principle. But as I have already indicated in this 
chapter, to view democracy as a system of government in which majorities are constant 
winners and the dominant, and minorities are constant losers and the dominated makes a 
travesty of democratic majoritarianism. As I discussed in section II, constant 
disenfranchisement on basis of political preferences turns democracy into an incoherent 
theory by disrupting even the minimalist notions of competitiveness and 
majoritarianism. There are sufficiently good reasons to think that making some citizens 
unable to challenge the outcomes of majority vote – without officially disenfranchising 
them – by confining them to the permanent categories of disadvantage does exactly the 
same: it weakens democracy’s plausibility and appeal as a theory of good government. 
But, fortunately, the extreme version of majoritarianism is not the reason why millions 
of people in established democracies value democracy, and many more aspire to it 
around the world.  
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2.3.4 Regenerative Dimension 
This brings us to another, related and crucial, dimension of democratic legitimacy. What 
I describe next is rendered consequential by the non-ideal nature of democratic politics. 
In the realm of ideal philosophical discussion, characterized by the assumptions of full 
compliance and relative abundance, the legitimacy of democracy would not depend on 
the presence of the regenerative dimension. But democracy like any other form of 
government requires certain material and non-material resources, which I will refer to as 
democratic capital. As the passage of time, as well as social-political frictions, take 
their toll on this democratic capital, I argue that acts that block democracy’s 
regenerative capacity would inhibit democratic legitimacy. As with the previous 
dimensions, my intention here is not to specify the content, but to demonstrate the 
presence, of this aspect of democratic legitimacy.  
Let us first look at the kind of issues that we have to deal with when theorizing 
the regenerative dimension and democratic capital. First and foremost, there are the 
economic costs associated with democracy. The most basic democratic acts like voting 
and census-taking come with significant costs. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau 
estimated that the 2010 census would cost American taxpayers around $14.5 billion 
dollars.59 To this we can add the cost of administering national and local elections, 
occasional referenda, etc. For instance, experts estimated the cost of the 2010 mid-term 
elections for the U.S. Congress at a minimum of $3.7 billion dollars.60 This, of course, 
is only the tip of the iceberg. Once we start to calculate costs of maintaining law and 
order, defending borders, etc., the cost of even a libertarian state turns out to require 
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significant contribution from individual citizens. This issue is given an instructive 
treatment in Cass Sunstein and Stephen Holmes’s The Cost of Rights.61  
Furthermore, there is a consensus among democratic theorists that democracy 
does not only require elections and defence. All established democracies offer their 
citizens, albeit with varying intensity, social services ranging from public education to 
healthcare and low-income benefits.62 The underlying rationale is that unless citizens 
have access to a certain minimum, democratic politics will suffer a setback. To 
generalize, a certain level of material welfare is often taken as a precondition for 
democracy. Modern democracy with its representative institutions, vast bureaucracy, 
and the social safety net, is a much costlier undertaking than its ancient counterpart. 
The flip side of the coin tells us that democracy also requires nonmaterial 
resources, the principal one being willingness of citizens to cooperate and undertake 
their fair share in regenerating democratic capital. The more citizens are unwilling to 
vote, pay taxes, do jury service, or care for their environment, the harder it becomes for 
the democratic form of government to survive. Moreover, even the kind of negative, 
moderately self-regarding, engagement with politics emphasized in this chapter requires 
certain character traits. Maintaining competitiveness of elections would be hard if a 
majority of citizens were to view sub-standard economic performance as a divine curse 
or were to espouse an all-out pessimism about their impotent status as political agents.63 
That citizens have a sceptical attitude towards authority and avoid becoming 
complacent, many liberal democratic theorists have rightly noted, is among the virtues 
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that “distinguish ‘citizens’ within a democracy from the subjects of an ‘authoritarian’ 
state.”64 The upshot is that democracy, more so than any other form of government, has 
to rely on the virtue of its citizens.  
But the advantage of democracy is that democratic virtue is not a particularly 
difficult kind of virtue to inculcate if by democracy we mean such things as recognition 
of people’s desire to avoid domination and reliance on competitive elections to achieve 
this result. Just as a free and competitive market is the best teacher of skills required to 
succeed economically, free and competitive electoral systems across different levels of 
government are the irreplaceable teachers of civic virtue. This is the line of thinking that 
is present in the ancient thought and the thoughts of J.S. Mill and Tocqueville.  
Now, the theory of democracy sketched in this chapter valorises such democratic 
precepts as equality, responsive government and non-domination, thus propounding a 
normative framework that encourages a more enhanced role for citizenry than the one 
Schumpeter’s account concedes. I think I have, so far, been able to show that a 
reasonably secure foothold exists for these mainly procedural values in Schumpeter’s 
own positive theory. This final subsection is perhaps theoretically the least demanding 
part of my argument because only someone absolutely detached from real-world 
concerns about political stability and good government would turn her back on the idea 
of democratic regeneration. Despite its avowedly positive tone, Schumpeter’s 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, shows a sensible degree of concern about 
maintaining the minimalist order. Therefore, Schumpeterians could object to the project 
of making minimalist democracy more normatively stable on the grounds that the 
conditions required by NMD are too demanding to be democratically regenerated. 
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The motivation behind discouraging the average citizen’s engagement in politics 
is that “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as 
he enters the political field.”65 On Schumpeter’s account, to expect the average citizen 
to overcome this shortcoming is unrealistic, because losing grasp of reality as we move 
farther away from our most direct interests is part of what he calls “Human Nature in 
Politics.”66 This, then, is the rationale for leaving decision-making to political elites. But 
being unable to provide a satisfactory answer to two very basic questions – namely, who 
are these elites and how knowledgeable are they? – is a troubling weakness of 
Schumpeter’s account. Some crucial evidence Schumpeter provides to prove ignorance 
of the apolitical class conflicts with his uncompromising faith in the competence of 
political class. Here we do not have room to address all conditions, so I will focus on 
the problem of knowledge that apparently motivates Schumpeter to favour 
disproportionately strong elite participation.  
Schumpeter concedes that  
the reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective 
volition [reason’s for ordinary citizen’s ignorance and lack of 
judgement in matters of domestic and foreign policy] … are if 
anything more shocking in the case of educated people and of 
people who are successfully active in non-political walks of life 
than it is with uneducated people in humble stations.67 
He goes on to cite lawyers as a class of people who are particularly unqualified to deal 
with national and foreign policy. Then the proper political knowledge required for 
regeneration of the Schumpeterian democracy is something that only full-time 
politicians can possess. But modern political science questions the possibility of such 
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expert knowledge. Unfortunately, lawyers, economists, or historians do not cease 
having imperfect political knowledge once they become full-time bureaucrats.  
 A quick look at the findings of the post-Schumpeter scholarship on the subjects 
of political knowledge and public opinion suggests that Schumpeter failed to take his 
astute observations about the nature of knowledge in politics to their logical conclusion. 
In this regard, Phillip Converse’s work is quite instructive. In his famed study, The 
Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, Converse reveals that elites are not decisively 
better than non-elites in comprehending politics.68 According to Converse’s findings, 
the more political knowledge one acquires, the more doctrinaire one’s views become. 
While non-elites suffer from not having a well-developed belief system that would 
enable them to gain more political knowledge, elites suffer from the ideological 
constraints of their individual belief systems. 
To be sure, Converse’s findings do not settle the dilemma of knowledge that 
imperils Schumpeter’s thesis. Schumpeter accepts that in the long-run people are better 
judges of the bigger picture of politics. But he immediately goes on to note that history 
is a continuum of short-run segments.69 Nonetheless, one need not surrender too quickly 
in the face of the grim picture drawn by Converse’s findings and shortcomings of 
Schumpeter’s theory. Converse’s study shows that elites are not decisively better judges 
of political matters, which disturbs Schumpeter’s conception of competent elites. But it 
does not show that citizens of established democracies cannot strike a diligent balance 
in combining benefits of elite knowledge and popular wisdom. Slight improvement in 
political knowledge of masses over the second half of the twentieth century noted by 
Converse, and the record of democratic stability in the face of minority governments, 
social movements, and amateur politicians, give one more reasons to reject 
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Schumpeter’s contempt for those dabbling in politics.  
2.4 CONCLUSION  
What is different in the views propounded in this chapter from those in Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy and other minimalist theories of democracy? The main 
difference is that the normative dimensions of equality, responsiveness, non-
domination, and regeneration enable democracy to perpetuate itself in the face of 
different kinds of problems. Electoral theories of democracy suffer from inescapable 
problems of corrosion through manipulation, disenfranchisement, and the like. Silence 
on normative content, as I tried to demonstrate in this chapter, not only does not offer us 
any protection against democracy’s decline, but also provides us with no coherent way 
of assessing when the decline begins. Evaluating democratic quality necessarily 
involves an appeal to normative standards. This was something that the Schumpeterian 
focus on democracy qua method could not provide. Moreover, another implicit criticism 
of Schumpeter that motivated this approach is the inability of the Schumpeterian model 
to explain and make sense of our political language of democracy and present 
institutional embodiments of democratic ideals. Schumpeter’s model of democracy falls 
short not only of the ideal of democracy shared by utopian egalitarians of the 17th and 
18th centuries Europe, but also it overlooks many crucial aspects of the institutional 
evolution of democracy. Normative Minimalist Democracy, which I begin to develop in 
this chapter, seems to be a reasonable non-revisionist, and still normatively sound 
alternative to Schumpeterian theories on the one hand, and the general will theories on 
the other. 
I believe another strong thread combines ideas formulated in this critical, but 
broadly sympathetic, engagement with Schumpeter. The norms of non-domination, 
equality, responsiveness and regeneration point out the normative significance of 
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agreement and disagreement, assent and dissent. What makes democracy distinctive in 
the view that I defend in this chapter is the principled relationship between these two 
stances. Overemphasizing consent gives us a version of utopian liberalism, socialism, or 
deliberative democracy. Overemphasizing dissent produces a more libertarian utopia. 
Restoring both ideals to their respective place in the democratic thought seems to lead 
to a particularly robust theory that comes closest to explaining modern institutional 
embodiments of democratic ideals in our own world, as well as providing the necessary 
conceptual resources for reform. This I call the normatively sound minimalist 
democracy. 
 
58 
 
CHAPTER 3: Why Equality and Difference Matter? Limits and 
     Value of Consensus and Dissensus 
What is the relationship between consensus and dissensus and how does this 
relationship define normative minimalist democracy? The argument advanced here 
holds that if there is any one question that most heavily bears on the shape of 
normatively sound minimalist democracy, it is the question about the limits of 
agreement and disagreement. To answer this question, this chapter picks up the two 
most central components identified in the previous chapter’s search for a more coherent 
normative theory of minimalist democracy and goes on to specify what role each 
element fulfils in NMD. A close scrutiny of non-domination and equality, and the 
political arrangements that follow from them, reveals that consensus and dissensus have 
their limits, which a more coherent theory of democracy has to recognize.  
3.1 Why Equality Matters 
In the previous chapter I discussed why Schumpeterian minimalism could become a 
more consistent theory by coming to terms with the importance of equality to its 
normative core. There, the focus was on how excluding equality from the picture leads 
to inconsistencies and suboptimal outcomes even by the standards of Schumpeter’s 
theory. In this section, I elaborate on the role that the equality plays in a theory of 
normatively sound minimalist democracy and what shape the concept has to take in 
order to perform that role. First, I begin with an account of how equality is at the core of 
what makes democracy distinctive. Second, I discuss how some conceptions of equality 
suit this account better than others. I end the section by discussing some criticisms of 
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this minimalist conception of equality from the proponents of more substantive 
democracy. 
3.1.1 How equality figures in the distinctiveness of democracy? 
Perhaps, the point that some notion of equality lies at the core of democracy requires 
very little defence. While this is supposed to provide the concept of democracy with an 
important degree of theoretical stability, it also underlies many of the confusions 
surrounding the concept. Very often, the egalitarian nature of democracy goes poorly 
clarified because many writers seem to assume that since equality is such a ubiquitous, 
easily satisfiable or abstract aspect of democracy that meaningful and productive 
discussion about the concept has to focus on other aspects. This, however, ends up 
obscuring important features of democracy to the extent that the shape of equality bears 
on the other more practical questions. For this reason, I begin with a brief excursion into 
what makes democracy distinctive and the role that equality plays in this picture. 
 Many political ideals or goods are invoked as potential explanations for what is 
most distinctive about democracy. One commonly held view is that “the central virtue 
of democratic forms is that, in the presence of a suitable social background, they 
provide the most reliable means of reaching substantively just political outcomes”.1 Iris 
Young, for instance, shares this view when she writes that at least part of democracy’s 
value has to do with its being “the best political means for confronting injustice and 
promoting justice.”2 Other views see the distinctiveness of democracy in its connection 
to political stability and economic prosperity. To these authors, democracy is a more 
acceptable form of government than its alternatives because it is better at securing 
goods that people most value. To be sure, democracy does often lead to outcomes such 
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as political stability and economic prosperity that are comparatively superior to 
outcomes such as political discord and poverty. If one is to take a similarly comparative 
view in the realm of values and ideals, it is difficult to miss that democracy favours such 
values as freedom, autonomy, and peaceful coexistence over tyranny, submissiveness, 
and political violence. We may have independent reasons to value these advantages that 
ensue from democratic forms of government. But neither autonomy and peaceful 
coexistence, nor political stability and economic prosperity tell us what definitional 
distinctiveness of democracy as opposed to non-democracy is. It is at least thinkable, if 
not practicable, that these values can be achieved through undemocratic measures, or 
through measures that undermine certain aspects of democracy. As Estlund notes, some 
basic moral principles such as the principle of maximal utility or categorical imperative 
can be available as a “moral ground of democracy,” but this would not make that idea 
democratic.3 In short, the distinctive core of democracy cannot be that it offers us 
ideally the most equitable, harmonious or stable type of society that one can think of 
because we could think that we have all or some of these without having a democracy, 
and similarly because we could have a democracy yet find it difficult to achieve those 
goods.  
 Another commonly entertained option is that what underlies democracy is the 
concept of popular sovereignty. Democracy is a form of government in which people, as 
opposed to an absolute monarch or natural aristocracy, make decisions. Proponents of 
this view initially seem to have etymological evidence on their side. However, because 
in contemporary political theory, with the exception of some nationalist theories, the 
people is rarely assigned an independent normative agency, what most theories have in 
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mind is a numeric majority. The principle of majority rule is certainly one of the most 
important elements in the modern concept of democracy, but on its own it fails to offer 
us a satisfactory account of democracy’s distinctive appeal as a political theory. The 
immediate worry is that because majoritarianism can be practiced in an array of ways 
commonly perceived as undemocratic, it cannot account for what is distinctive about 
democracy.  
 Once we recognize that majority rule derives its legitimacy not from numbers, 
but from being a decision-making mechanism that respects the political equality of 
persons, we can appreciate the qualitative difference between a majoritarian decision by 
a gang to execute one of its members and majoritarianism as practiced in healthy 
democracies. Although majoritarianism is quintessentially an egalitarian principle, 
unless bolstered by certain constraints, it can very quickly degenerate into a form 
contradictory to its raison d’être, namely, maintaining political equality among the 
members of demos. Researchers of democratic theory have convincingly shown the 
connection between equality and majority rule. Unlike other decision-making 
mechanisms such as unanimity or supermajority that also lay claim to being democratic, 
the rule of simple majority does most to respect the status of citizens as political 
equals.4  
 This brief account helps us come up with a rudimentary working definition that 
distinguishes democracy from non-democracies. Put abstractly, the most distinctive 
characteristic of democracy is that it entitles those governed to figuring as equals in 
determining how they are governed. Hence, the rejection of asymmetric power relations 
between citizens is central to democracy. With its denial of asymmetric political power 
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and status, democracy stands in contrast to other forms of government, notwithstanding 
how the latter perform along other dimensions of good governance. For instance, 
Schumpeter points out how a benign dictator or king can secure peace and stability 
among his subjects and even ensure an equitable distribution of resources.5 It is also 
thinkable, but not probable, that autocratic rule of the benign nature often invoked by 
critics of democracy can follow public sentiments closely and take people’s empirical 
will quite seriously when deciding. This kind of society may even have subjective 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, but it would still fail to achieve conditions of 
democratic legitimacy because it does not satisfy conditions that distinguish 
democracies from non-democracies.  
 One can note that the foregoing characterization of democracy is not based on 
self-evident truths. After all, a critic could object that democracy would be a more 
universally acceptable ideal, had it not appealed to concepts that have historically been 
associated with certain metaphysical views of life.6 In chapter two, we saw how 
Schumpeter attempts to denounce the idea of equality for being an empirically 
groundless religious ideal. Schumpeter’s rejection of equality does not hold true 
because there are numerous non-metaphysical justifications of the notion of equality 
that can ground the equalitarian requirements of democracy. Here I want to focus only 
on one of them as I think it suits the purpose of normatively sound minimalist 
democracy. 
 To obtain an insight into democratic theory’s distinctive egalitariainism, and 
also to dispel concerns over its metaphysical undertones, it is important to remind 
ourselves which socio-political environments are most favourable to democracy. As 
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Robert Dahl points out, democratic forms of governance have taken hold in a diverse 
range of environments from tribal societies to modern industrialized nation-states.7 This 
diversity already implies that democratic equality must have little to do with ethno-
cultural variations. The emergence or consolidation of democracy in different historical 
settings, however, is not just a matter of coincidence.8 There are certain characteristics 
shared by human beings in the tribal societies mentioned by Dahl, ancient Athens, and 
modern democracies that can explain why equality has been so important to democracy. 
More generally, these characteristics have to do with the rejection of entrenched status 
and power hierarchies among citizens. To be sure, weakness of status and power 
hierarchies can be the default position, as in the case of British colonies in North 
America.9 But when symmetrical power relations do not precede the political 
constitution, as in most historical and present cases, certain minimalist assumptions 
about human nature can provide justification for them. For instance, Rawls grounds his 
conception of persons as free and equal in their having the two moral powers – “a 
capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good.”10 It is possible to take a 
more minimalist reading of these capacities and interpret the first as a rudimentary sense 
of right and wrong, and the second more as a negative limitation intrinsic to all humans 
than a positive capacity. On this more minimalist reading, because of such 
characteristics of our species as self-interest, limited altruism and fallibility, we cannot 
forfeit our judgement and entrust others with the right of determining what is right for 
us.11 For instance, the capacity to have an elaborate conception of the good is not 
necessary for the minimalist understanding of human nature to take into account a toned 
down version of the second moral power. The potential for finding oneself in 
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disagreement with somebody else’s conception of the good is a sufficient reason to 
include the second element. Although these two general statements about human nature 
are not specific enough for one to derive a particular theory of human equality from 
them, together they provide a strong rationale for the egalitarian outlook of democracy. 
Namely, they give one reasons to reject asymmetrical political authority and seem to 
offer a firm foothold for “one person, one vote” – the bedrock of modern democracy.  
 Let me expand on how these two observations about human nature, the 
possession of the sense of right and the impropriety of alienating it to others, militate 
against hierarchical forms of political organization, and take one in a distinctively 
democratic direction. As Bernard Williams suggests “what keeps stable hierarchies 
together is the idea of necessity, that it is somehow fore-ordained or inevitable that there 
should be these orders”.12 These hierarchies could be sustained if we were to support a 
different conception of good governance such as the one that values political stability or 
romanticizes a benign monarch who respectfully follows his subjects’ desires and tries 
to stay in good faith with them. But in this particular, democratic, understanding of what 
good government amounts to, these hierarchies “must eventually be undermined” by the 
recognition of what Bernard Williams calls man’s potential for “reflective 
consciousness”13 Later on, when we study democratic individualism, this aspect of 
democratic agency will be more closely scrutinized. Here it suffices to point out that the 
idea of reflective consciousness, the ability to stand apart from structures of power and 
take a position on them from the personal point of view, is captured by the 
aforementioned two observations about human beings.  
Then, equality in the context of distinguishing democracies from non-
democracies amounts to a rejection of power hierarchies and the assertion of a 
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horizontal relationship between citizens with respect to their collective government. 
This aspect of the ideal is, to an important extent, captured by such modern democratic 
principles and practices as ‘one person, one vote’ and equal concern for citizen interests. 
Although the equality of “one person, one-vote” offers us a firm beginning ground, it 
leaves room for a significant degree of variation. For example, a small town 
administering itself through direct engagement of its citizens in day-to-day decision-
making will present a different model of equality than a large representative democracy. 
In the former case, citizens will have more time and expertise to deliberate over issues 
of town politics. In the latter case, however, only a handful of people – legislators – will 
deliberate. Perhaps a small fraction –special interest groups –  will participate, and 
democracy for the remaining millions will consist of casting a ballot on the election day, 
usually every two, four or even five years. This latter picture is often invoked by critics 
of modern representative democracy when denouncing the shallowness of its egalitarian 
character. I will have to address this point in the following sections. I think this 
objection can be met if we show that the combined egalitarian power of the four 
conditions  of democracy is greater than that implied in mere formal political equality. 
 Not all of the variation in how ‘deeply equal’ societies accepting equal standing 
of citizens can turn out, however, to be due to differences between large and small, 
participatory and representative, or modern and ancient societies. It is true that all of 
these play a role in determining what the ideal of democracy can and cannot 
incorporate. In a political group of hundred individuals determined to maintain a 
democratic regime, a proponent of “strong democracy” may feel more at home, but I 
have doubts that he/she can have all of his/her equalitarian ideals realized. For people 
even in fairly small-sized forums will show different levels of political enthusiasm. 
Political fervour will show variances not only from person to person, but even in the 
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case of the same person from situation to situation. Some will find certain political 
questions more relevant than others, and one debate will appear to one person timelier 
than another. Even under ideal circumstances of equality, people may perform 
differently. This shows that it would be a mistake to identify actual equality of political 
influence as the benchmark of democratic equality even in a small group. 
 Moreover, there are some political inequalities that are endemic to democracy 
understood in its current meaning – as a representative form of government where 
electorates evaluate candidates for, and those already in, office along several criteria 
such as performance and congeniality of their proposals. If democracy is in some way to 
remain associated with good government, not all interests can fare equally well. Even 
under a significantly improved democratic order, where the effects of money are offset, 
talent and dexterity (or at least the appearance of such ability) on the part of politicians 
will often translate into more votes, resulting in significant inequalities in how the final 
outcome treats the politically aspired. The current debates on luck egalitarianism offer 
some useful examples of what could go wrong if political equality is interpreted in a 
more expansive way. Were luck and other similar factors to be politicized, the new 
concept of political equality would aspire to alter human motivations such as that of 
being persuaded by more congenial reasons, or rewarding achievers as opposed to those 
who fail. Even quite thick concepts of democracy would have difficulty in 
accommodating such expanded notions of equality.14 This is another indication that 
political equality, if interpreted as an outcome-related ideal, is bound to conflict with the 
uncertain nature of democracy as a decision-making mechanism. The upshot is that 
equating democratic equality with political equality will not in itself dissolve 
indeterminacy surrounding the former.  
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The above discussion offers us a glimpse at the contours of equality suitable to 
NMD by giving us some idea on what equality cannot mean, but no definitive political 
concept is yet available. The next step in the argument is based on critical engagement 
with Charles Beitz's Political Equality. In that work, Beitz presents several competing 
procedural and substantive definitions of equality and rejects them in favour of his own 
reconstruction of procedural and substantive elements into what he calls "complex 
proceduralism". Beitz's argument merits close attention because one of the working 
definitions of equality that he eventually rejects appears to fit most aspects of what I 
have tried to establish as ineliminable norms of NMD.  
3.1.2 Charles Beitz 
Beitz criticizes a majority of political theorists writing on democracy for subscribing to 
“the simple view” of political equality. Proponents of the simple view, according to 
Beitz, “treat political equality as concerned exclusively with the distribution of a single 
unambiguous value” such as power. What follows this assumption of singularity is that 
fairness is often reduced to the assessment of how well political institutions can 
distribute that single good.15 Beitz identifies three leading manifestations of the 
defective simple view of equality: “best result, popular will, and procedural views.”16 
Best result theories hold that terms of participation, and equality for that matter, should 
be constrained by the consideration of optimal social and political outcomes. The 
primary example of this view discussed by Beitz is John Stuart Mill’s proposal of plural 
voting.17 Beitz rejects this approach largely because it commits its advocates to the view 
that optimal political outcomes “can be established independently.” Beitz is not content 
with the second alternative – theories that assert the sovereignty of the will of people – 
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for reasons similar to Schumpeter’s rejection of volonté generale explored in the 
previous chapter of this thesis. Briefly, his concern is that ‘will of people’ theories 
assume a transparent and homogenous set of preferences endorsed by all citizens. This, 
in Beitz’s view, is inconsistent with the fact that “citizens’ preferences are frequently in 
conflict.”18  
Having ruled out the first two groups of theories as insufficient in accounting for 
the egalitarian requirements of democracy, Beitz turns to the discussion of the third 
simple view – proceduralism. He notes that proceduralist democracy may initially look 
less problematic than the preceding two alternatives because it neither assumes a set of 
outcomes whose desirability can be proved independent of any democratic mechanism, 
nor presupposes knowledge of a transparent and homogeneous popular will. Perhaps, 
proceduralism’s initial appeal is not merely due to avoiding mistakes of the former two 
theories, but also due to the amicable relationship of its provisions (e.g. “equality of 
opportunities to influence political outcomes”19) with elements of modern democratic 
practice. However, Beitz thinks that none of the justificatory lines taken by proponents 
of proceduralism can produce an adequate understanding of equality. 
Beitz divides procedural theories of fairness into three groups based on their 
sources of justification. The first two types of procedural theories appeal to hypothetical 
bargains. The first type – “fairness as compromise” – requires that democratic 
procedures are modelled on the hypothetical compromise of those who know their 
actual political interests and conditions. For the second type of proceduralist, the aim is 
to avoid the unfairness of the first type, namely, the impact of parties’ bargaining 
positions on the final settlement. Thus fairness for the second type proceduralist consists 
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in following those procedures that are shown to be ex ante equalitarian. Ex ante fairness, 
proponents of fairness as impartiality think, can be achieved by imposing a knowledge 
restriction (or veil of ignorance, to use the Rawlsian terminology) on the parties to 
hypothetical bargain.20 “The third approach abandons altogether the attempt to conceive 
fair procedures as the outcome of a hypothetical bargain and concentrates instead on 
what might be called their expressive or symbolic function in giving public recognition 
to the equal status of citizens. This is “fairness as equal respect.””21 
 Of all the theories that Beitz examines, the version of proceduralism that 
emphasizes the expressive functions of citizenship resonates most with considerations 
often appealed to by those trying to justify “generically democratic institutions” – 
Beitz’s synonym for minimalist democracy.22 In addition to not committing mistakes of 
an undemocratic nature – such as allowing unequal bargaining outcomes under duress 
in the case of fairness as compromise, or imposing on parties procedures that they have 
no pragmatic or moral reasons to accept, as in the case of fairness as impartiality – 
expressive proceduralism is conducive to the formation of such important elements of 
healthy democracy as active citizenry, contestation of government decisions, and 
electoral competition.23 Nonetheless, Beitz finds expressive proceduralism deficient as 
regards the fairness criterion. He notes:  
No doubt these considerations [i.e., the ones central to expressive version 
of proceduralism] furnish strong reasons for preferring democratic to 
other kinds of institutions. However, they do not determine the question 
of institutional fairness; indeed, they leave open significant room for 
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variation. In particular, they do not establish that fair institutions should 
have egalitarian procedures.24 
Despite the fact that the expressive version of proceduralism can honour all the vital 
democratic goods, it is considered a failure, because the ideal of equality underlying this 
type of proceduralism is not complex enough to account for the need to justify its 
fairness to every person: “What these criticisms suggest is that no such justification is 
likely to be persuasive if it excludes considerations about results entirely. The political 
outcomes to be expected from the operation of a set of procedures are simply too 
important to be left out of account.”25 
 Beitz’s third form of simple proceduralism, as far as democratic equality is 
concerned, seems to provide us with a sound theoretical framework. But interestingly, 
he rejects it. We need to take a closer look at what the modified – hybrid – version adds 
and takes away from the suitability of the former kind of proceduralism to ground 
democratic equality.  
 Let us start by noting that the addition of what Beitz calls ‘regulative interests of 
citizenship’ is the only significant addition to the proceduralism that rests on the 
expressive functions of citizenship. With the addition of three regulative interests – 
recognition, equitable treatment, and deliberative responsibility – Beitz thinks that the 
new theory can ensure fairness of procedures towards all citizens; once citizens see that 
democratic procedures satisfy their regulative interests, they would have no reasonable 
grounds for not accepting these procedures.26 The addition of these interests, according 
to Beitz, fills an important gap in the contractualist literature – the lack of actual reasons 
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as to why a particular arrangement is acceptable – by supplementing formalism of social 
contract with substance that relates to the interests of actual citizens.27 As a result, under 
the hybrid theory, “the terms of participation are fair if no one who had these 
(“regulative”) interests and who was motivated by a desire to reach agreement with 
others on this basis could reasonably refuse to accept them.”28 Beitz thinks the above 
formula, particularly the addition of substantive interests that straightforwardly follow 
from democratic citizenship, allows us to achieve a number of important things, among 
them preserving the truth in proceduralism and realizing the contractualist promise of 
justifying political authority to all citizens.  
 As a matter of principle, I find nothing objectionable from the perspective of 
NMD in what Beitz calls “regulative interests”. These are, to a large extent, 
straightforward democratic presuppositions, and mostly could be derived from the two 
minimal observations about common human experience to which NMD committed 
itself in the earlier section. The problem is that their acceptance may not lead to an 
agreement on the terms of participation, let alone reassurance that the process satisfies 
all expectations of fairness. To give an obvious example, citizens could accept the 
significance of equal treatment, but continue to disagree on what it implies as far as 
access to social and political resources is concerned, even with respect to identifying 
correct basic procedures. Similarly, the impulse to reach an agreement coupled with a 
commitment to deliberative responsibility could fall short of producing an agreement on 
how best to improve political participation. In short, the worry is that there is no 
guarantee that these regulative interests can take us from a very abstract agreement 
around a very abstract issue to an agreement around a concrete issue.  
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 Let me explain why this is a difficult issue for Beitz to overcome. Beitz quite 
rightly leaves these interests imprecisely defined. Otherwise, his proceduralist 
credentials – even his claim to being only a hybrid proceduralist – could be subject to 
dismissal. In anticipation of this challenge, Beitz leaves the boundaries of these interests 
and their substance open to the influence of social context. In his own words: “Because 
the structure of the theory incorporates less normative content than more formal views, 
it is less determinate in its consequences.”29 Furthermore, Beitz is also careful enough to 
note that “the regulative interests themselves stand in need of justification”, in order to 
pre-empt the challenge that the democratic framework is arbitrarily curtailed.30 
Although these are important points that allow Beitz to continue to lay claim to an 
important degree of proceduralist credibility, they are also indicative of an important 
issue with his larger contractualist framework. The crucial question is how this search 
for standards of reasonable acceptability is any different from the search for consensus 
around outcomes or procedures? The worry that motivates one to ask this question is 
that if not different, Beitz’s account seems to take us back to where he started. 
 The answer to the foregoing question is as complex as Beitz’s proceduralism: 
“The interests I have identified function within the theory as the criteria by which 
political institutions and procedures are to be assessed when they are regarded from 
each person’s point of view.”31 To me, this neatly worded synopsis of Beitz’s answer 
suggests that Beitz unsuccessfully tries to interweave two different responses. The first 
bit is that Beitz asserts regulative ideals as the content of the reasonable acceptability 
criteria. As he points out earlier in the book, the three regulative interests are intended 
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“to give content to the idea of reasonable acceptability”.32 He arrives at them 
“inductively” by considering “cases [of] paradigmatic unfairness”, and constructing 
reasons around which people would converge when objecting to these practices on 
grounds of fairness.33 Leaving aside the reference to reasonable acceptability, the 
answer that Beitz gives shows how his account is different from those put forth by 
proponents of hypothetical or actual consensus. Moreover, this is a way of exploring 
democracy’s normative principles that most accounts of procedural democracy, 
including NMD as I will explain later on, engage in. To give an influential example, 
here what Beitz claims sounds analogous to what Dahl writes about criteria for 
procedural democracy.34 
 The second bit of Beitz’s answer, although not contradicting the first, takes 
away its effectiveness in responding to the question. It is references to acceptability 
from “each person’s point of view” that seem to regenerate the “problems” of the first 
two kinds of proceduralism. The stipulation for some kind of meta-consensus – the 
additional requirement that fairness of the basic democratic principles hinge on their 
acceptability – introduces a further difficulty for the model of democratic equality that 
focuses on the expressive function (the third proceduralist type). To be sure, such meta-
consensus could be easier to attain at the hypothetical level. Namely, one could choose 
to ignore actual disagreements and focus on hypothetical agreements between 
reasonable persons. This would be similar to fairness as impartiality or compromise that 
Beitz rejected earlier in the book: that is, it would raise the question of why should any 
real person view hypothetical agreements as morally binding. Any attempt at building 
an actual consensus, on the other hand, would also result in serious difficulties. The 
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ensuing arrangement, leaving aside the huge (insurmountable?) challenge of 
practicality, could be very conservative and inegalitarian – placing disproportionate 
powers in the hands of the groups benefitting most from the status quo, as Beitz himself 
recognized.35  
 Beitz is aware of this problem. He recognizes that trying to move away from the 
goals of hypothetical or actual consensus paves the way for the objection that 
“[regulative] interests furnish the main basis for resolving disputes about procedural 
design; the contractualist framework seems not to contribute anything of its own.”36 The 
main part of the answer offered by Beitz – “[t]he regulative interests themselves have a 
contractualist justification”37 – is not helpful at all. For introducing circularity to save 
the justificatory element from the charge of emptiness also re-introduces the problems 
that required Beitz to assert the regulative interests as normative ideals in the first place. 
The overall issue with Beitz’s view is that he underestimates the problem of arriving at 
a definition of reasonableness as a standard of acceptability that is more satisfactory 
than other hypothetical devices available in the social contract literature.  
 I will finish this subsection by adding a caveat. The intention of these critical 
remarks on Beitz is not to undermine Beitz’s concern with fairness for all, nor to try to 
argue against the influential tradition of Rawlsian public justification. To the contrary, 
as later chapters will make clear, I do think that some internal notion of fairness has a 
role to play in NMD. My concern, simply, is that the social contract interjection – the 
idea of reasonable acceptability from the vantage point of all citizens– is in tension with 
Beitz’s otherwise remarkable sensitivity towards the normative significance of 
differences between real individuals, and individuals subject to the “veil of ignorance”. 
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For reasons that the second part of the chapter will elaborate, I find this latter aspect of 
Beitz’s proceduralism much more appropriate to adequate theorization of modern 
democracy than its alternatives. I think this, together with what Beitz writes about 
expressive function of equality and the importance of extending our notion of equal 
concern, is what we need to borrow from Beitz when moving forward with the account 
of equality in a normatively sound minimalist democracy.  
3.1.3 From Beitz to Limits of Agreement  
To wrap up, in Beitz’s account of democratic equality we get more than the same 
limitations of the consensualist liberal theory. We also get a subtle picture of the tension 
between the normative weight assigned to persons as real democratic agents and the 
conception of reasonable persons that reverts back to the views criticized by Beitz, 
which shows that Beitz is aware of the problem. His solution does not have the 
conceptual resources to take further necessary steps that would give his theory of 
democracy a greater degree of consistency. To achieve this, we need to study the limits 
of agreement, and the constructive contribution of recognizing the normative worth of 
disagreement. As this dissertation argues, democracy is not just a method for reaching 
agreement but also one deemed most suitable for managing disagreement.  
 No matter how instructive a focus on equality, the latter has a tendency to give 
us only a partial account of the democratic citizen. It tends to capture the relatively non-
confrontational, easily reconcilable, more prone to consensus aspects of political 
engagement. The notion of equality suggests things are already in balance. After all, 
why would citizens, especially the reasonable ones, not accept the place allotted to them 
by the principle of equality? This seems to be the main reason why thinkers who place 
equality at the core also happen to neglect the other aspect of democratic politics. The 
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two aspects are not merely in tension but in some kind of symbiotic relationship as we 
will more fully realize in the later chapters, particularly in chapter six. It would not be a 
gross generalization to suggest that the other, no less important, aspect of politics is 
often captured in the liberal political theory as a nuisance. This is because theories lack 
conceptual resources required to appreciate the normative weight of disagreement.  
 Before I turn to the subject of non-domination and the normative significance of 
democratic disagreement, I will consider two general objections to the minimalist 
notion of democratic equality that come from two different strands of democratic 
theory. 
3.1.4 Returning to Minimalist Equality: Two general objections 
Let me begin with the one that comes from those theorists who are generally supportive 
of the normative variant of minimalist enterprise. In recent years, some theorists have 
attempted to push the term equality out of democratic theory. Przeworski, for instance, 
prefers the term anonymity to equality as he thinks the former is a better 
characterization of the (in)egalitarian ethos of democracy. He holds that “for a 
collectivity to govern itself, all of its members must be able to exercise equal influence 
over its decisions.” He goes on to note that because political equality requires “effective 
opportunity” to equal influence, and representative democracies do not provide this, 
equality “does not characterize democracy.”38 Similarly, Ian Shapiro holds that the 
notion of non-domination obviates equality in democratic thought, for non-domination, 
rather than abstract equality, is the ideal that people can really know and aspire to.39  
 Anonymity cannot provide the normative justification that the equalitarian 
dimension of normatively sound democratic minimum requires, although it can be an 
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appropriate term to characterize the democratic outcome in which what law offers to 
one is indistinguishable from what it offers to others. A state that treats its citizens along 
the principle of anonymity could replace each citizen’s name with codes and randomly 
discriminate against them. For example, in a state where anonymity is the proper 
characterization of the state-citizen relationship, only those whose national 
identification numbers start with 2 could be asked to serve in the military, while those 
whose numbers start with 5 could be required to work for an entire year without earning 
any wages. These bizarre forms of discrimination can well take place under conditions 
of anonymity. Equality, on the other hand, is a normative ideal that requires equal 
treatment or consideration. To be sure, democratic states do pass legislation that 
requires citizens of certain age groups to serve in the military and they do tax their 
citizens according to different rates. But these burdens are distributed in accordance 
with laws that are made with the equality of citizens in mind. For instance, the military 
service law justifies the age discrimination on the grounds of fitness for military service 
– judging children and the elderly as unfit by several criteria. Tax laws also offer several 
forms of justification to citizens being required to pay more than their peers. The 
validity of these justifications is not important when trying to determine the force of the 
principle. What matters is that such justifications are frequently voiced and debated in 
democratic environments. 
 The second objection comes from the historian of political thought John Dunn, 
and alludes to the portrait of democratic transformation presented in the first paragraph 
of this chapter. In his recent book, Democracy: A History, Dunn compares and contrasts 
two pictures of democracy. One is the radical egalitarian ideal of ‘pure democracy’ or 
‘real democracy’ epitomized by the thought of French revolutionary socialists Babeuf 
and Buonarroti; the other is the model that characterizes Tony Blair’s vision of 
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society.40 Dunn relates the attenuation of democracy’s egalitarianism – dramatized as 
the shift from the democracy of Babeuf to the democracy of Tony Blair – to the fact that 
democracy “has passed definitively from the hands of the Equals to those of the 
political leaders of the order of egoism. These leaders apply it (with the active consent 
of most of us) to the form of government which selects them and enables them to 
rule.”41  
 Dunn’s account of democracy’s origins portrays quite effectively the chasm 
between historical and contemporary ideals of democracy. Nonetheless, I have 
reservations about calling the egalitarian ideal associated with contemporary democracy 
a totally modern invention. Despite all the differences of scope and character between 
the modern and classical embodiments of the egalitarian dimension of democracy, the 
justificatory role of equality has remained largely stable. The composition of a ballot 
and the process of casting it, among many other features of democracy, may have 
changed – we no longer decide whether a citizen should be put to death or stripped of 
citizenship through public hearings in town centres, and privacy is a predominant 
concern in modern elections. Despite periodic suggestions for differentiating between 
the rich and poor, educated and uneducated citizens, each citizen continues to have one 
vote.42  
 The multidimensional account of the democratic minimum developed in this 
dissertation may offer an alternative, and less cynical, explanation for democracy’s 
incredible success in gaining near-universal support.  A less cynical, nonetheless 
plausible, explanation for democracy’s glorious status is that it has been able to develop 
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into a coherent normative theory and institutional framework which accommodate the 
natural tensions between major human aspirations. As we will see in the next section, a 
large part of democracy’s outperforming its rivals is due to its recognizing the 
normative importance of disagreement. An important related factor is that democracy 
does not try to carve in stone the boundaries of these different motivations but ties them 
to an egalitarian, responsive, and tentative politics. 
 We can now return to the point with which I ended the previous subsection 
(3.1.3), and begin to discuss how recognizing disagreement’s normative significance 
will allow one to escape Beitz’s problem. Not surprisingly, developing this point will 
also respond to the two objections we considered in this subsection.  
3.2 Why Non-Domination Matters 
My goal in this part of the chapter is to elaborate on what shape the concept of non-
domination has to take in order to fill the gap left by the concept of equality. That is, I 
will mainly focus on how the concept addresses those aspects of political reality that 
any normatively sound theory of minimalist democracy should address, which are left 
unaddressed due to what can be loosely called the conceptual limitations of equality. 
Therefore, most of the section will focus on distinct strategies of operationalizing non-
domination into an effective political ideal. I think we can highlight three such 
strategies – contestation, decentralization, and privatization. Substantively, the focus 
will be on showing how these strategies help achieve two goals – make democracy 
more disagreement-friendly and improve how democracies effectively respect equal 
standing of citizens. These could also resemble Beitz’s regulative interests, but in a way 
that conveys how disagreement is acceptable from the democratic vantage point. I first 
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begin by commenting on the normative importance of disagreement and talking about 
the theoretical gap left by consensus theories.  
3.2.1 The Fact of Disagreement and Democratic Non-Domination 
Although disagreement is an ineliminable, even ubiquitous, aspect of political life in 
any established democracy, very little political theory has addressed its normative 
significance. Since contemporary democracies are by far more respectful of political 
differences than undemocratic states, democracy is rightly revered for its amicable 
relationship with disagreement. Despite this favourable association between 
disagreement and democracy, much of democratic theory seems to attach almost 
exclusive normative significance to agreement. Many democratic theorists – perhaps 
among them deliberative democrats most enthusiastically – hold that ideal democratic 
decisions should represent a reasoned agreement.43 Others, including many liberal 
democrats and constitutionalists, hold that important democratic decisions should 
require greater numbers, that is, a stronger agreement, than a simple majority.44 Because 
the issue of disagreement gains more significance when we theorize the proper 
democratic response to the issues of multiculturalism, here we need to shed some light 
on its actual place in the normative enterprise.  
Disagreement is certainly not a contemporary idiosyncrasy; people are not in 
more disagreement today than they were, say, five hundred years ago. However, given 
that historically disagreement has never been as safe an option as it is in today’s 
advanced liberal democracies, the continuing silence on the normative worth of political 
disagreement is a striking feature of contemporary liberal and democratic political 
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theories.  Much of contemporary political theory, even if not hostile to disagreement, 
views at least some types of it as objects of legitimate abstraction – features of socio-
political life that we need to bracket off, or even permanently disregard, if our theories 
are to reach a level of generality characteristic of good theories.45 Perhaps, John Rawls’s 
formulation of a hypothetical construct – Original Position – that will result in citizens 
reaching a consensus on the principles of justice46 is the most famous example of such 
abstraction. Rawls maintains this line of argument in Political Liberalism when he 
writes that the first thing that the notion of “a well-ordered society” implies is “a society 
in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same 
principles of justice”.47  
As Jeremy Waldron points out, this is a particularly surprising presumption if 
one recalls that Rawls and Rawlsians have quite aptly recognized the ineradicable 
diversity of comprehensive views of the good. In the words of Waldron, “liberals have 
done a less good job of acknowledging the inescapability of disagreement about the 
matters on which they think we do need to share a common view, even though such 
disagreement is the most prominent feature of politics of modern democracies.”48 Given 
that political actors in advanced democracies vigorously disagree over many justice-
related issues that liberal theorists try to adjudicate through hypothetical constructs, 
Waldron seems to have identified an important problem that democratic theory ought to 
avoid. Waldron agrees with Rawls on the importance of justice to a well-ordered society 
and the need to have commonly accepted principles of justice. However, he adds that 
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“the need for a common view does not make the fact of disagreement evaporate.” What 
this “fact of disagreement” tells us is “that our common basis for action in matters of 
justice has to be forged in the heat of our disagreements, not predicated on the 
assumption of a cool consensus that exists only as an ideal.”49 This formulation neatly 
corresponds to what I identified in the earlier chapter as the important job of pluralist 
democratic theory – finding principled ways of squaring the need for functional 
agreement with the fact of political disagreement.  
Attempts have been made to make Rawlsian liberalism more inclusive by 
broadening the definition of reasonable or watering down its quasi-substantive 
requirements that seem to lead to liberal exclusion.50 The underlying point of this 
section, and one of the overarching themes of this dissertation, is that it is wrong to 
think of these strategies as exhausting the realm of possible responses to disagreement. 
There is an alternative, although not mutually exclusive, approach to disagreement that 
is clearly defensible on democratic grounds. This alternative approach does not wish 
away disagreement, nor try to protect against it exclusively through substantive legal 
guarantees. It recognizes that no matter how inclusive, how other-regarding public 
policy becomes, there will be profuse disagreement. What it tries to achieve, rather than 
minimizing disagreement, is prevent disagreement from turning into domination. I do 
not mean to present this as an alternative to liberal egalitarianism, because the two do 
converge in many of their philosophical presuppositions and practical implications. 
However, this, more disagreement friendly, approach may add new conceptual 
resources to the arsenal of democratic theorists.  
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The preceding point about the often-overlooked normative importance of 
political disagreement foreshadows the argument for the place of non-domination in 
NMD. Had consensus been an accurate characterization of democratic politics or even a 
realizable aspiration for it, one could question the need for the norm of non-domination 
and instead would expect the norms of equality or responsiveness to do the entire job. 
Moreover, as I argued in more detail in chapter two, the failure of the classical accounts 
of democracy to account for normative worth of disagreement and ethical diversity is 
just one side of the coin, and only part of the problem that democratic non-domination 
will have to resolve. Recognition of disagreement, by itself, does not give us an answer 
to what has to be done.51 The notion of non-domination, then is dually important; both 
as a way of respecting the place of disagreement but also helping to rescue democracy 
from a potential stalemate. Once we recognize that democratic politics is largely about 
reconciling the functional need for agreement with the ineliminable fact of principled 
disagreement, the nature of democratic common good changes as well. That is, 
acceptance of disagreement not only may compel us to attenuate our expectations of 
common good, but it becomes more appropriate to prioritize building a framework that 
makes disagreement possible and allows each to pursue their own good rather than to 
identify “specific objects, activities, and relations.”52 In this context, there emerges a 
compelling case for viewing the distaste of being dominated as one of the overarching 
democratic goods commonly sought by all citizens.53  
Before we go on to explore what non-domination as a political good amounts to 
and how it helps us make sense of the relationship between agreement and disagreement 
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in democratic theory, there is a need to formulate a preliminary definition of the concept 
to prevent us from digressing too much. In terms of minimalist democratic theory, I 
want to define domination as finding oneself entrapped on the losing side of politics 
without a meaningful chance of getting the kind of attention to one’s most defining 
interests that the democratic ideal of equal concern implies. Domination occurs when 
one individual or group has more, often uncontested, power to force on another 
individual or group an outcome that departs from equal concern and gives the latter a 
sense of impinged status and agency. In established democracies there are groups whose 
political experiences resemble what is summed up in this definition. They are known as 
permanent minorities. Whether defined along cultural, racial, or some other 
socioeconomic fault line, these groups represent a particularly systemic challenge to 
contemporary liberal democracies. For this reason, and also because this chapter is part 
of a larger project on the possibility of democratic multiculturalism, in the rest of the 
chapter I will discuss elements of non-domination, as much as possible, with reference 
to multicultural permanent minorities.  
3.2.2 Different Elements of Non-Domination 
There are different theoretical elements that in different ways could support the goal of 
democratic non-domination. These are contestation, devolution, and democratic privacy. 
All three elements are very closely related to the notion of meaningful democratic 
equality and the fact of ineliminable disagreement, and operate in interrelated ways. 
Also, in the process of spelling out the political implications of the ideal of non-
domination we will be able to make the ideal of democratic equality more concrete. A 
democratic citizen with improved access to these venues of non-domination will to that 
extent enjoy a greater degree of political equality.  
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(a) Democratic Contestation 
Contestation is an important power that normative minimalist democracy has to reserve 
to its citizens to enable their resistance to domination.54 Through effective 
contestability, citizens can ensure that policies track “their relevant interests or relevant 
ideas” rather than being arbitrary interferences by a particular majority.55 Conditions of 
the non-domination dimension of democracy cannot be satisfied through provisions of 
individual or collective vetoes because any decision among those who agree about the 
desirability of a broadly defined goal will always leave some more satisfied than others: 
“Matters of common, recognizable interest can often be advanced in different ways, 
where one way is more costly for this group, a second more costly for that, and where 
the different groups therefore will prefer different approaches. … There will always be a 
minority who are negatively affected by any improvement in the tax system, a minority 
who depend for their livelihood on industries hard hit by antipollution legislation.”56 
Moreover, the power of effective contestation is more compatible with democracy’s 
open-endedness than consensualism could be.  
In contemporary democratic regimes, decisions are contested on a daily basis. 
Perhaps, the most famous cases of contestation have occurred in courts. It is this judicial 
element and the association of contestation with constitutions and courts that have led 
many to think of contestation as a process whose main function is to check democracy’s 
excesses and shortcomings. For instance, a legislative assault on the rights of gay 
citizens or a certain policy that presumably has disproportionately adverse consequences 
on a specific ethnic or racial group could be challenged in the courts. An alternative, 
and more adequate, conceptualization of contestation is possible. Under this alternative 
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account, contestation is placed at the core of democracy rather than on its margins or 
opposition. 
It is helpful to think of contestation as tied to democracy both at its ideational 
and also institutional levels. Democratic theory, through its commitment to norms of 
non-domination and equality, makes contestation inevitable. Moreover, democratic 
method, with its reliance on representative governance and electoral competition, 
encourages contestation and to a large extent relies on its abundance. Contestation is 
one of very few democratic goods that directly contribute to minimalist democracy’s 
quality. Its absence – for instance, a blockage of channels of contestation – can result in 
a significant threat to democracy in the form of power accumulation and emerging 
uncompetitive electoral setting.  
Democratic oppositions provide one venue for contestation. Oppositions in 
legislatures have an important mandate to contest government decisions and also an 
important interest in contesting as effectively as possible. In a competitive democracy, 
electoral success largely depends on perceived effectiveness of such contestation. 
Because contestation is largely viewed as a democratic good closely linked to other 
democratic goods such as transparency and accountability, governments have an interest 
in not being viewed as unresponsive, or opposed, to contestation. Opposition parties 
institutionalize major democratic disagreements and make their democratic management 
possible.57 On the other hand, their strong presence curbs the enthusiasm of the 
governing forces to bring about sweeping partisan changes. 
Contestation, however, is not, and should not be, restricted to oppositions in 
legislatures. In theorizing contestation as a venue for the rectification of minorities’ 
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democratically relevant grievances, there is no reason to limit ourselves to considering 
legislatures or courts. To be sure, these two could be regarded as the main loci of 
deliberative functions that Pettit views as central to contestation. For this reason his 
republicanism is not very amicable to interest group pluralism.58 Minimalist democracy, 
however, is less optimistic about the possibility of a reasoned agreement emerging on 
matters of deep contention.59 For reasons that I will explore in Part Three, on many, if 
not most, occasions, parties cannot be expected to settle issues through a deliberative 
exercise. Thus NMD regards contestation as important not only for its power to compel 
a reasoned discussion, but also for improving the competitive position of those that do 
not otherwise enjoy an effective chance of winning electoral support for their 
preferences. It does so by giving publicity to their voices and exposing acts of 
domination from which they suffer. In some instances the result is a reasoned agreement 
on a common denominator, but in many others contestation will reveal the urgency of 
some other, more structural response to problems – e.g., decentralization of decision-
making to such levels that make a democratic resolution more realistic. Because an 
overambitious focus on deliberation is not appropriate, other less deliberative socio-
political institutions such as mass media, think-tanks, and interest-groups could also 
play a significant role in the process of contestation that we see in the day to day politics 
of contemporary democracies. 
(b) Decentralization/Devolution 
As pointed out in chapter two, Schumpeter eloquently identifies a major source of 
domination in democratic states. The classical theories of democracy with their notions 
of general will and common good, Schumpeter observes, in reality involve not the 
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discovery of a will that is genuinely general but the imposition of the values and beliefs 
of one part of the citizenry on another.60 The normatively sound minimalist democracy 
accepts the kernel of truth in Schumpeter’s critique of classical democratic ideal. The 
lesson that we learn from Schumpeter – note that Chapter 2 shows this is a lesson that 
Schumpeter himself is unwilling to learn – is that whenever we see elements of the 
democratic method (e.g., the principle of majority) employed we cannot prima facie 
assume that all the conditions associated with democratic minima have been satisfied. In 
other words, normative minimalist democracy does not presuppose that the mere fact of 
a majoritarian decision obtaining in demos A with pre-set boundaries makes that 
decision a democratic one. Among other things, this leaves the door open for 
decentralization.  
Most existing advanced democracies are decentralized to an extent, since they 
have multiple levels of government. However, decentralization is sometimes viewed as 
an unpleasant but unavoidable solution to an important predicament of modern 
democracies – the size problem.61 But this view of decentralization as a necessary evil is 
misconceived as there seem to be important democratic reasons for devolving powers to 
lower levels of government independent of the size problem.  
Let us begin with a discussion of how devolution and decentralization can 
improve the problem of the fictitious general will pointed out by Schumpeter. An 
immediate Schumpeterian criticism of decentralization would be that it simply 
multiplies the problem rather than addressing it in any ethically significant way. That is, 
disagreements over the common good characteristic of any polity will not be eliminated 
by the division of that polity into multiple subunits and the subsequent devolution of 
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some decision-making authority to those subunits. In other words, critics suggest that 
decentralization can, at best, localize disagreements but will not lead to their democratic 
resolution. This objection is instructive insofar as it points out that devolution does not 
make the ideas of general will or common good in their “classical democratic” senses 
more credible. It is true that provinces or cities are not immune to the patterns of 
domination that populations of nation-states suffer from.  
 However, devolution can make a difference in several respects overlooked by 
the foregoing objection. For this, we first have to clarify what democratic common good 
can realistically amount to. Normatively sound minimalist democracy (NMD) rejects 
Schumpeter’s claim that there can be no collective good for democracy to pursue. As 
we saw in chapter two, NMD agrees with Schumpeter’s observations that common good 
is not a homogenous entity discoverable through correct aggregative or deliberative 
functions.62 But NMD disagrees with Schumpeter’s contention that attempts to 
democratically resolve a collective action problem have to result in a “deadlock or 
interminable struggle”.63 On the question of common good NMD accepts Dahl’s 
following observation as its point of departure: “Our common good, then – the good and 
interests we share with others – rarely consists of specific objects, activities, and 
relations; ordinarily it consists of the practices, arrangements, institutions, and processes 
that ... promote the well-being of ourselves and others...”64 In this framework, non-
domination stands out as one of the most important democratic goals that define 
individual wellbeing. NMD holds that this framework will remain acceptable and 
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workable as long as the necessary adjustments to it can be made under some form of 
citizen control.  
Having clarified boundaries of democratic common good, we can now try to 
determine how decentralization and devolution could make it more attainable. One way 
in which decentralization often facilitates democratic common good is by making room 
for the diversity of interests and preferences that characterize modern democracies. 
Under a decentralized system of government what would otherwise look like 
unbridgeable disagreements are turned into democratically manageable policy issues. 
As one scholar of decentralization points out, a decentralizing arrangement such as 
federalism “combines unity and diversity and bases both unity and diversity on popular 
consent, thereby allowing people to have their cake and eat it too, namely, large-scale 
democratic governance for the things large-scale governance is necessary and small-
scale democratic self-governance for the things that make life most worth living.”65 It is 
not difficult to see the actual impact that decentralization has on the management of 
widespread diversity. For instance, in the United States, around 500,000 elected 
officials in 87,900 localities share governmental authority with 537 elected officials 
presiding over the federal state.66 This multiplicity of jurisdictions allows diverse 
communities to carry out their day-to-day lives in a democratic way. Turning those 
500,000 local officials into bureaucrats accountable only to their managers in the central 
state and 537 elected officials overseeing them would, at the very least, disrupt the 
socio-political life in these communities, reduce democratic responsiveness, and create 
many more instances of domination.  
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Then decentralization does not just localize disagreements but also helps manage 
some very important ones. It enables each subunit to focus on issues of more 
significance to itself rather than taking part in debates that are of more importance to 
other subunits. And more importantly, it allows each subunit to develop policies that 
match preferences of its own constituents. To be sure, decentralization does not result in 
a political order in which preferences of all citizens are equally satisfied. However it 
improves responsiveness and minimizes domination by attending to the reality of 
“preference clustering”.67 By leaving those issues characterized by greater heterogeneity 
at the national level and more preference clustering at the local level to the lower levels 
of government, decentralization avoids a political system in which regions with clearly 
observable preference clustering fight each other to enact their own points of view.68  
But a critic could still claim that devolution unnecessarily complicates decision-
making. Imagine that there is a demos of ten people that run themselves through 
democratic procedures. Can they decide, on an issue-by-issue basis, which five or six of 
them constitute the relevant demos? The crux of this objection is that decentralization 
could needlessly complicate the process of democratic decision-making. If we were to 
take the underlying principle to its logical conclusion, the objection would go on to 
warn, we would end up creating a huge number of distinct demoi. Not only would this 
mean a huge number of demoi but also a huge number of separate votes to establish 
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which demos is the appropriate one for each decision.69 This objection, I think, is 
informative but not insurmountable.  
The preceding objection is informative in the sense that it shows what can go 
wrong with the attempts of drawing democratic boundaries along the principle of 
affected interest.70 Namely, shifting democracy’s focus from settling issues to settling 
boundaries does not seem like a very effective thing to do on a day-to-day basis. But the 
objection is misleading for a number of reasons. First, it fails to recognize how 
democracies can choose to devolve powers to lower governments in a principled and 
non-reductionist sense. Such devolution will not happen on daily basis as this objection 
suggests, but will be considered as a solution to well-studied cases of preference 
clustering that are known to have produced strong tensions and resentment.  
On the other hand, the point that decentralization is unnecessarily complicating 
politics does not become more plausible even if one accepts the claim that central states 
could also remedy problems related to preference clustering. Daniel Treisman, in his 
sceptical study of decentralization, examines numerous arguments for and against 
decentralization. As far as preference heterogeneity is concerned, Treisman 
acknowledges that preferences can show clustering, but goes on to suggest that such 
preferences could effectively be satisfied through centralized governments.71 Most of 
his examples are from authoritarian states such as the Stalinist period in Soviet Union 
and Ottoman Turkey.72 In his consideration of the more democratic settings, Treisman 
suggests that constitutionalism could do the trick.73 Although the specific points that he 
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raises are quite effective in demonstrating how decentralization is not always a ‘must 
have’ of political architecture, his general reasoning does not reduce the significance of 
the point that decentralization can be a democratic way of tackling certain problems; 
and more often, when other centralized avenues such as constitutionalism are not 
attractive or available, for one reason and another, it can be the only way out. 
Underlying much of modern unease over the idea of decentralization is the 
worry that it will undermine democracy’s decision-making capacity, with the worst 
impact being on redistributive capacities. A common point of reference among those 
who subscribe to this view is the classical argument made in The Federalist Papers: 
multiplicity of the levels of governance will make mustering passionate majorities more 
difficult and hence make “it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”74 That this argument has 
important democratic shortcomings as far as advancing non-domination is concerned 
has been widely pointed out. As Shapiro notes, “hamstringing government can preserve 
domination embedded in the status quo” or domination that could “occur in civil and 
private institutions.”75 Shapiro thinks the modern calls from the political left and right 
alike for “political decentralization, “strong” civil society, and the transfer of 
government functions to civic groups ... pose the double danger of further reducing the 
institutional capacities of the state by dismantling them, and of creating additional veto 
points further to constrain governmental action in the future.”76 Furthermore, some 
critics of devolution have drawn attention to other disturbing forms of reactionary 
conservatism that devolution could lead to. In the American context, being a supporter 
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of state rights has sometimes been equated with an open or covert support for slavery, 
and in the more contemporary context with inegalitarian opposition to gay rights and 
other civil rights issues.77  
 To respond to the last point, these risks concerning racism and other forms of 
reactionary conservatism remind us that in such hostile environments decentralization 
and devolution will have to be more carefully managed, but they do not give one 
reasons to move away from all kinds of decentralization. The empirical and theoretical 
arguments against devolution that draw on these risks are marred by numerous 
exaggerations and flawed causal connections, and can at best serve a cautionary 
purpose. Theoretically, such arguments often fail to distinguish between its different 
types. The concepts of political devolution, fiscal decentralization, and constitutional 
federalism are often mistakenly thought to apply to the same phenomenon.78 Critics 
often bring forth arguments against one of these and pretend that they hold true vis-à-vis 
the other types as well. For instance, Shapiro criticizes federalism for leading to 
“institutional sclerosis” but also dismisses devolutions of other types, which imply all 
proposals that carry the potential of bringing government closer to people.79 It is true 
that different types of devolution may have a lot in common, but they do differ 
significantly as far as their democratic implications are concerned. The forms that 
matter to NMD as ways of protecting disagreement neither create racism/slavery nor 
tolerate any such injustice. As I have been arguing, concern for individual agency and 
equality have to remain key motivations when choosing to adopt these strategies.  
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Empirically, several studies have shown that there is less causal connection 
between decentralization and redistributive politics even in the context of federalism. As 
one scholar of federalism puts, “federalism may be one factor affecting welfare state 
spending, but it is by no means the most important one.”80 There are other important 
contextual and historical variables such as “the government’s budgetary situation,” the 
composition of party politics, institutional design of the branches of government, 
institutional relationships between different socioeconomic interests that explain why 
some federations have more egalitarian distribution of wealth than non-federations, and 
also among federations some more decentralized ones are more redistributive than those 
less decentralized.81 Another important fact about federalism often overlooked by its 
critics is that in many instances federalism has allowed some smaller provinces to act 
“as a laboratory for social experimentation”.82 For example, Saskatchewan’s Universal 
Hospital Insurance enacted in 1947 was the main point of reference in the process that 
led to the adoption of Medical Care Act in 1966, which established universal 
government health insurance in Canada.83 
I want to complete this discussion of decentralization by briefly drawing 
attention to how it could make the polity more disagreement friendly in the context of 
multiculturalism, for some of the most critical multiculturalism issues, as we will see in 
the following chapters, require a decentralized approach.  
Bracketing off the possibility that decentralization could create a more intolerant 
province than the liberal state84, we can see how it can benefit even minorities that do 
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not go on to constitute a majority in the newly created territorial unit. For instance, if a 
group of minority voters that make up 5% of the national population constitute 20% of 
the newly formed province, they can enjoy a significantly improved competitive 
advantage in the new democratic setting. Another important assumption – but one that 
should relatively easily obtain – behind the argument that decentralization will be a net 
benefit for minority groups is that the newly created territory mirrors the competitive 
electoral setting of the central government. Also, in a decentralized state, minority 
groups could use the channels of contestation more effectively than in a large 
centralized state at least for the reason that the channels of contestation would be 
multiplied.  
The last point brings us to a different kind of decentralization that can be 
particularly helpful when, for one reason or another, federalism is not an attractive 
option or is not enough. Decentralization need not just mean devolving decision-making 
powers. Governments could decentralize, that is partly outsource, the deliberative and 
evaluative function to certain citizen-expert commissions, auditing bodies, etc. This 
could be done in a way that maintains democratic accountability and even decision-
making. Findings of commissions and task forces could be used in more democratic and 
transparent ways than evaluations made in bureaucratic contexts. Such commissions 
would have strong input from citizens involved in issues at hand and through their 
strong advisory mandates could play the role of a democratic bridge between citizens 
and their representatives. The ensuing recommendations could be reported to the 
parliaments or adopted by politicians during election campaigns. It is important to note 
that such mechanisms have been employed by democratic governments for decades. 
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Perhaps the most ambitious and famous of such commissions was the Canadian Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The commission’s recommendations 
were debated in the Parliament and ushered the official policies of multiculturalism and 
bilingualism. The democratic character of the process is open to debate. What matters 
most is that such commissions be democratically designed and their recommendations 
implemented in democratic ways.  
(c) Democratic Privacy 
Despite the merits of the previous two strategies in terms of making a democracy more 
difference friendly, one has to recognise that no degree of contestation or devolution 
will represent a satisfactory resolution to the issue of democratic disagreement. Even in 
the most devolved system of government backed by various genuine channels of 
contestation, there will remain some people who find themselves in a permanent 
minority status. Part of the difficulty has to do with the challenges of identifying the 
proper level of contestation and devolution for a decision to have democratic 
legitimacy. This probably depends on other considerations such as the urgency of 
making certain decisions, and also considerations that have to do with the nature of the 
issues being discussed, namely, the kinds of interests that are at stake.85 The likelihood 
that, in any particular case, venues of contestation and devolution may eventually run 
out brings us to the discussion of the third element of democratic non-domination that 
NMD has to accept if it is to prove serious about its commitment to the normative 
significance of disagreement. This third element – privacy – may appear 
quintessentially different from the previous two because, in contrast to them, it seems to 
more seriously constrain the scope of democratic action. In reality, however, it allows 
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us to more fully cash out the account of democratic agency that underlies preceding 
elements as well. 
The notion of privacy has come under fire from different ideological camps. Its 
place in the corpus of democratic ideas has been questioned by radical democrats (most 
commonly feminists) and conservatives alike. Feminists have long claimed that “the 
personal is political.” For them, separation of life into two spheres – the private and the 
political – preserves the male domination and oppression of women that take place in 
the private sphere. From the other end of the political spectrum, conservatives and 
communitarian critics of liberalism have criticized privacy as another liberal invention 
that unjustifiably limits collective self-government. In this respect, it has featured 
prominently in the larger context of the debate over a majority’s right to steer the 
legislative wheel of the state on questions concerning public morality. For instance, 
Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court writes in his dissent from the 
Court’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas: “Countless judicial decisions and 
legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority's 
belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational 
basis for regulation.”86 Scalia goes on to cite another Supreme Court majority decision, 
Bowers v. Hardwick: “The law is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all 
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.” This ironic convergence between these 
ideologically most opposed camps actually points to how important clarifying the 
relationship between democracy and privacy is.  
We could start looking for a democratic justification for privacy by considering 
an influential argument that has been popularized in recent decades due to its frequent 
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invocation by American judges and legal scholars in landmark Supreme Court cases. 
This line of argument claims a close relationship between privacy and autonomy. In a 
nutshell, the argument maintains that decisional autonomy in matters of private interest 
underlies the exercise of fundamental political freedoms (e.g., those enumerated in the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution) closely associated with the 
successful functioning of a democracy. There is also an extensive agreement among 
proponents of linking privacy with autonomy that matters of private interest can only 
include “certain unusually important decisions that will affect [one’s] own, or [one’s] 
family’s destiny.”87 Another legal theorist tries to provide a more concrete definition of 
these interests: “Put compendiously,” Joel Feinberg writes, “the most basic autonomy 
right is the right to decide how one is to live one’s life, in particular how to make the 
critical life decisions – what courses of study to take, what skills and virtues to cultivate, 
what career to enter, whom or whether to marry, which church if any to join, whether to 
have children, and so on.”88 However, there appears to be a kernel of truth in the critics’ 
suggestion that most attempts at defining privacy remain ambivalent and do not provide 
rigid standards for discriminating between what falls under the scope of privacy and 
what remains outside.89  
As a first step in making the notion of privacy less ambiguous, I want to return 
to the idea that collective self-determination hinges on individual self-determination. It 
is difficult to think that a theory of government could place political authority in matters 
of collective action in democratically formed institutions on any grounds other than 
some form of reliance on individual capacity for self-direction, whether conceived in 
negative or positive terms. This position is even more difficult to reject following 
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Schumpeter’s potent criticism of such constructs as the Rousseauian general will.90 Is it 
possible for one to reject individual agency and remain a proponent of collective self-
determination organized along the lines of competitive elections, responsive governance 
and political equality? Only if one subscribes to a dubious ontology that meaningful 
democratic agency is impossible outside of the aggregate level. That is, individuals 
themselves are bad judges of how to live their lives, but when they exercise their 
individual judgment through secret ballots in general elections and referenda, the 
outcome is a far superior judgement of how individual lives should be lived. But most 
democratic theorists reject the claim that nations, states, or another group, can be self-
governing in any meaningful sense of the word. Even those who disagree on whether 
democracy is a substantive or procedural idea agree on the notion that self-government 
“is a human good in its own right; certainly not the only human good, maybe hard to 
defend as the chief human good, but still a human good that is not paltry, and one that it 
does not seem that a group or community can have” because “we cannot see [the latter] 
as having a consciousness and a will of its own.”91 
This recognition of individual political agency reveals that even for a staunch 
collectivist who wants to remain a democrat there must be limits to what collective 
action can require from individuals. If we accept that the rationale for collective self-
government is derived from individual agency, we can no longer view political society 
as a body that can move in any direction that the majority wants it to move. For 
example, political society could not meaningfully move in the direction of 
disenfranchisement or any comparable political outcome that permanently 
disadvantages one group of individual voters in relation to another. This is tantamount 
to the self-contradictory project of using democratic mechanisms to abolish a 
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democracy. Only normatively the most efficacious theory could be comfortable with 
such a direction. If we take it as a noncontroversial matter that a minimalist democracy 
should incorporate norms of protection against violations of democratic equality, then it 
is not clear why norms of protection of a similar kind with regards to protecting the 
minimal agency should raise concern.  
Moreover, there is something counterintuitive, to say the least, about our staunch 
collectivist who wants to continue to lay claim to democratic legitimacy. Namely he/she 
seems committed to two principles that do not easily cohere in the absence of some 
third, often quite far-fetched, principle posited to glue them together: (a) citizens are 
capable of exercising adequate judgment in guiding collective action by directing 
legislation (b) citizens require guidance from the collectivity or the collectivity has 
paternalistic reasons to provide guidance to citizens on matters concerning agency in 
private matters. In other words, it seems unreasonable to claim that a citizen can choose 
when his/her compatriots should go to battle or what portion of their income they 
should pay in taxes, but is not capable enough to decide whether to use contraceptive or 
whom to marry.92 One such third principle that could render (a) and (b)’s conjunction 
more reasonable is that (c) unlike an individual citizen who is not qualified to do either 
of the two tasks, a majority with its pooled knowledge is a better judge of public and 
private matters. But (c) makes an empirical claim that is very difficult to verify and also 
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paves the way for a series of grave problems that eventually force one to renounce 
democratic proceduralism and find alternative, more technical and less democratic ways 
of grounding legitimate governance. To avoid these unwelcome consequences, 
epistemic democrats such as Estlund posit norms of individual acceptability, which 
reasserts what I said above about the relationship between (a) and (b).93 I continue to 
explore the incoherence of extra-individualist justifications for democracy in chapter 6. 
For now, it suffices to see how difficult it must be to deny the essential place of some 
minimum democratic agency.  
Objections to the agency-based justification of privacy are not just limited to the 
communitarian critique of the “disembodied self.”  Some make the claim that this 
argument suffers from an analytical mistake; namely, those who reject state intervention 
in private matters base their arguments on principles that they cannot consistently apply 
to all cases.94 For instance, proponents of autonomy-based privacy doctrine hold that 
miscegenation statues or laws forbidding contraception constitute intolerable 
interventions into private life, while prohibition of polygamy or certain sexual 
deviances such as incest do not. To the opponents of autonomy-based privacy, this 
brings us back to Justice Scalia’s point that public morality constitutes a legitimate 
source of prohibitive legislation. But one could avoid this conclusion if one identifies a 
principled way of differentiating, say, disagreement over a tax code from that over 
sodomy or miscegenation laws. 
The discussion up to now suggests two closely related criteria to avoid the claim 
of indeterminacy on which the foregoing objection draws. One of these has to do with 
the centrality of democratic equal concern, the other with the incongruence between 
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democratic agency and a totalizing state. Democratic debates, whether in legislatures or 
among wider citizen community, about resolving a given contentious issue should focus 
on whether its political resolution will reflect the kind of equal concern that democratic 
citizenship requires. For example, in a multicultural democracy that recognizes the 
importance of having a day off for citizens to fulfil their personal obligations such as 
religious, communal or familial ones, an insistence that Sunday can be the only publicly 
sanctioned day off – even when it is electorally the most popular preference – would 
probably fall short of the equal concern criterion.95  
The second criterion is more directly related to the ideal of non-domination; it 
warns against totalizing tendencies in legislation. Whether this aspiration manifests 
itself in a push for rational consensus, or the more readily objectionable mere use of 
force, it has to be treated with strong scepticism. Some authors claim that there is a 
relatively straightforward solution to the problem of a totalizing state, and one need not 
focus too much on the contentious topic of an inviolable minimal agency. They claim 
that legislation may be said to have a totalitarian impact on citizens’ lives if it attempts 
to prescribe a certain type of conduct as opposed to specifying the range of unacceptable 
actions. This model, as one author puts it, “calls for a shift in focus ... from the 
individual who finds that the particular life he would choose for himself is forbidden to 
him, to the individual who finds that a life is being forced upon him.”96 This distinction 
between proscriptive and prescriptive legislation is useful only if we keep in mind how 
easily proscriptive legislation can over time turn into prescriptive legislation. The fact 
that multiplication of restrictions can produce the kind of prescriptive effect that the 
anti-totalitarian nature of democracy so strongly detests adds strength to the significance 
of the democratic norm of privacy. Democracy’s anti-totalitarian nature – the main basis 
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of the norm of non-domination – rules out such invasion of individual lives by the state. 
And quite unsurprisingly, it also implies that assimilative programs, insofar as they 
prescribe majority’s way of life and make divergence difficult, have the same 
totalitarian impact.   
3.3 Limits and Value of Consensus and Dissensus  
We can now more clearly see that both consensus and dissensus are common features 
of, and have an ineliminable place in, the political life of a properly functioning 
democracy structured along the lines of NMD. The distinction between these two, at 
times conflicting but not contradictory, tendencies largely maps onto the two concepts 
that lie at the heart of NMD. Democratic equality, insofar as it specifies the terms on 
which citizens will relate to each other and to their state, sets the terms on which they 
will work to reach political agreements. Non-domination marks the boundaries of 
democratic agreement and reminds us that disagreement is normal and indispensable 
and that one should not try to push too much to reach a greater, more comprehensive, 
deeper agreement. Disagreement is not objectionable or inferior. A priori, as far as one’s 
democratic responsibilities are concerned, it is nothing to be ashamed of. Given the role 
that it plays, one has no good reasons to assume that it is less important than the 
consensualist disposition.  
 To be sure, a precise demarcation is not possible. It would obviously be wrong 
to say that equality means consensus and non-domination means disagreement in 
categorical terms. The distinction is meant to serve mostly an explanatory purpose, and 
is mainly concerned with showing that both consensus and dissensus are important 
elements of democracy rather than trying to isolate equality and non-domination. The 
classification also intends to point out the blind spot in many contemporary liberal 
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political theories rather than defects or shortcomings of the concept of political equality. 
Once we get to view the two concepts in conjunction, we see that non-domination is 
hard to explain without a reference to equality, while equality is hard to pin down 
without a reference to those aspects of democratic citizenship that allow us to clearly 
see and appreciate the normative significance of contestation and disagreement. The 
conceptualisation of the two elements as distinct is crucial, for the valorisation of 
consensus in much of contemporary liberal theory suggests that disagreement can be 
easily lost sight of or devalued. The endpoint is to be able to recognize that these two 
dispositions in the functioning of a healthy democracy operate to the benefit of each 
other and towards a better functioning of the system rather than in a kind of stark 
tension that would require subsuming one under the other. Submerging the two under 
one would be impracticable, as well as undesirable, from the perspective of NMD. 
Also, the two are inextricably linked in another related way. Namely, we get an 
important degree of non-domination in the ideal of equality, and an important degree of 
equality in the ideal of non-domination. By itself, each concept would limit our 
understanding of democracy, but together they form the core of a normatively consistent 
modern practice. Let me give an example of the limitation of focusing on one element to 
the relative exclusion of the other. As we know from the previous chapter, the idea of 
non-domination developed in this work shares certain elements with Ian Shapiro’s  
formulation of the same concept. I adopt Shapiro’s suggestion that domination has to do 
with the exercise of illegitimate power. But there are also differences between the view 
defended here and Shapiro’s notion of non-domination. Probably, the most important 
difference is that Shapiro holds that non-domination is sufficient as a foundational ideal 
for democracy. This he thinks makes a more suitable alternative to the foundational 
ideals espoused by liberals such as political equality. When asked why political equality 
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should not be included as a principle of equal normative worth within the concept of 
democracy, his response is that equality is too abstract and what people can often 
explain and complain about is inequality, which is captured and measured better by the 
concept of non-domination than by the notion of equality itself.  
Shapiro is right about the limitations of the ideal of equality taken on its own. 
However, the concept of non-domination – no matter how broadly it is construed – 
seems unable to perform all the crucial work that the norm of political equality does 
within NMD. First and foremost, as Shapiro recognises, the degree of domination is 
open to debate and hard to pin down. The only way we can find out about domination is 
by looking at power hierarchies.97 On most instances, grievances voiced by one of the 
sides involved in a relationship of power will be the best guide on the existence of 
domination. Perhaps the ideal solution would be always to decide on the basis of these 
subjective accounts of domination. But often there will be competing claims as to 
whether a certain move represents an act of domination or not. Shapiro seems to 
recognise this when he suggests that there is no prima facie case for eliminating all 
hierarchies – some hierarchies that serve a democratic purpose do not represent 
domination in the democratic sense of the term. Simply saying that those hierarchies or 
impositions that are not dominating satisfy the conditions of non-domination would be 
quite absurd. The truth is, even impositions that appear crucial for the proper-
functioning of democracy can be perceived as gravely dominating by some people. 
Here, egalitarian benchmarks come to the rescue, and save the concept of non-
domination from circularity. This is not to say that equality defines non-domination; the 
relationship between the two components is more complex and symbiotic than this. Just 
as domination rescues equality from becoming paralysis in the face of a series of 
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technically correct applications that do not add up to a democratically acceptable 
picture, equality rescues the principle of non-domination from a potential stalemate.   
 This helps clarify how NMD has to mediate between agreement and 
disagreement. Democratic society is a kind of society where the contours of acceptable 
political arrangements must by definition remain open to reshaping and cannot be 
subject to constraints other than those mandated by the inner logic of the democratic 
ideal.98 Recognition of such fluidity or indeterminacy, one may think, is more 
compatible with the norm of non-domination than the norm of equality, because the 
former is a norm that is based on the importance of disagreement. This would be a hasty 
conclusion, because the inner logic mandates that the meaning of equality be subject to 
the same reshaping that all the laws are subject to. What are kept outside of this 
reshaping, again as far as the equalitarian dimension is concerned, are those principles 
that make such re-evaluation and reform possible.99 For this reason, I tried to focus on 
those elements in whose absence it makes less sense to speak of these concepts in an 
intelligible way, let alone expect them to perform the role with which they are charged. 
The aforementioned point, however, does not mean that the right approach to 
theorizing democratic equality is always to narrow it down. The case of economic 
inequalities and their relation to political equality is a telling example of how broader 
notions of political equality that include its economic prerequisites could be important 
to democratic equality. It is almost axiomatic that effective exercise of political equality 
depends on certain social and material conditions: in the presence of vast social and 
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economic inequalities, it would be difficult to speak of meaningful political equality. 
Empirical research, too, suggests that there is a clear correlation between levels of 
economic development and democratic stability, and the link between political equality 
and its social and economic prerequisites is hard to dismiss.100 Although democratic 
institutions are designed in ways that take economic inequalities for granted, their 
spillage into the democratically inacceptable inequalities or forms of domination could 
result in serious legitimacy problems. Such spillage could (and does) take place 
relatively disguised from public (e.g., large donations to political campaigns by special 
interests) or could take more public forms (e.g., different levels of access to mass 
media).101 Then, it would be wrong to read the argument of this chapter as trying to 
downgrade the importance of political equality’s, and to that extent democracy’s, social 
and economic prerequisites.  
Finally, what role does the justificatory character emphasized by Beitz play in 
this picture? Coming to terms with the fact that democracy has two normal outcomes 
(agreement and disagreement) rather than one helps us vindicate the expressive function 
of equality without having to take Beitz’s route. Because it recognizes the validity of 
two outcomes, NMD does not make promises about full justification that it cannot fulfil. 
The crucial point is that it need not make any such promises since the kind of 
justification that Beitz talks about is ruled out by recognition of the role of 
disagreement. With political equality and tools of non-domination in their hands, 
citizens can try to change whatever aspect of political life that they do not like. Because 
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no such aspect, other than the very essential rules of the game –  the values and norms, 
which are as internal to democratic theory as the procedures that they give rise to, 
provide direction for its reform and evaluation – is kept outside this process of change, 
there is not much that a debate about justification can add to this.102 
3.4 NMD as a Distinctive Theory of Democracy 
 
The main objective of Part One has been to give an outline of the democratic theory 
that will be used to evaluate the normative interplay of democracy and 
multiculturalism. Normatively sound minimalist democracy (NMD) will continue to 
emerge more fully in Part Two and Part Three, as I go on to explicate what the 
theory implies with regard to the philosophical concerns of multiculturalism. By 
now, it should be clear how NMD differs from the consensualist democratic theories 
on the one hand, and the minimalist democracy propounded in Joseph Schumpeter's 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (including its more contemporary variants 
defended by Samuel Huntington, Giuseppe Di Palma, and others) on the other.103 The 
features of NMD that have been clarified so far, however, may lead one to associate 
it with two other strands of democratic theory – (a) contestatory democracy, which 
espouses many of the institutional devices of minimalist democracy, and (b) agonistic 
democracy, which grows out of a radical critique of liberal consensualism. I will 
conclude Part One by considering how NMD differs from agonistic and contestatory 
democratic theories, which are normatively richer than Schumpeterianism, and more 
cognizant of the role of disagreement than the consensualist variants of democracy. 
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3.4.1 In Relation to Agonistic Democracy 
Agonistic democrats argue that "conflict and division are inherent to politics and 
that there is no place where reconciliation could be definitively achieved".104 Because 
"social objectivity is constituted through acts of power" and "any political order is the 
expression of a hegemony", agonistic democrats hold that the political cannot be 
explained in the language of an inclusive and rational consensus.105 Therefore, the 
consensualist character of liberal conceptions of democracy – e.g., their focus on 
public reason and rational justification  –  ends  up  disregarding  the  constitutive 
role  of  disagreement  in  the democratic order, and displacing politics.106 Chantal 
Mouffe, for instance, argues that the theories of democracy that emphasise some 
combination of individual rights and representative institutions operating with a 
mixture of deliberation and bargaining are not only erroneous for being based on 
inapplicable ideals or relying on a faulty social ontology, but also are not conceptually 
democratic at all.107 On Mouffe's account, liberal theorists mistakenly assume that 
liberal democracy is a straightforward reconciliation of the democratic emphasis on 
the exercise of popular sovereignty and the liberal emphasis on the idea of human 
rights. For Mouffe, liberal democracy can at best be conceived as a paradoxical co-
existence of the two, and for the amalgam to count as democratic, one has to recognise 
that the very practice of democracy is based on the discriminatory and 
exclusionary exercise of power.108 The agonistic democrat's answer is to bring power 
                                                            
104
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 15-16. 
105
 Ibid., 99-100. 
106
 See Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox; Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. 
107
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 113-118. 
108
 Ibid., 42-45. 
 
Ch. 3 – Why Equality and Difference Matter? Limits and Value of Consensus and Dissensus 
111 
 
and exclusion  "to  the  fore,  making  them  visible  so  that  they  can  enter  the  
terrain  of contestation."109 
The fact that NMD criticises the consensualist strand of democratic theory 
does not make it a variant of agonistic democracy. Let us consider some of the crucial 
differences between NMD and the agonistic democratic view summarized above. First, 
NMD and agonistic democracy diverge on their conceptions of disagreement and 
political conflict. In contrast to agonistic democratic theory's tendency to emphasize 
ineliminable exclusion, hegemony, and conflict, NMD operates with a different 
understanding of democratic politics, where winner-takes-all is usually not the case. 
Those who win often win only partial victories, and those on the losing side suffer 
partial losses. For this reason, disagreement in a polity structured along the lines 
suggested by NMD will also often be more partial than agonistic democrats can 
appreciate. Disagreeing parties will frequently  find  themselves  in  agreement  on  
some  other  range  of  political  issues. Moreover, continuous departures from this 
model – e.g., some groups finding themselves in disagreement with majorities on many 
issues and over multiple electoral cycles– imply the urgency of reassessing the 
situation to ensure that the normative conditions of non- domination, competitiveness, 
etc. are met. 
Second, NMD disagrees with agonistic democracy's attempts to dissociate 
democracy from the notion of limits by defining democratic equality primarily in terms 
of the collective exercise of sovereignty and in direct opposition to the concern with 
expressing individuals' equal standing and agency.  Agonistic democrats try to 
artificially divide modern democracy, and isolate or weaken the aspects of it that they 
consider to be liberal inventions. The idea of limited sovereignty is presented as 
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undemocratic – something that renders democracy more paradoxical – in the same 
way that we saw in Schumpeter's famous thought experiment concerning Jews and 
heretics. But NMD views the idea of democracy sans limits as contradictory for reasons 
that have been explained in Part One. The norms of equal concern and non-domination 
impose a limit on what transient majorities can demand from their respective 
minorities, and NMD accepts these limits as an integral part of how democratic 
decisions ought to be made. 
NMD and agonistic democracy also differ conspicuously in their approaches to 
politics. Agonistic democracy tends to valorize and celebrate politics as a 
transformative activity. For instance, on Bonnie Honig's argument that draws on 
Nietzsche and Arendt, partaking in the political transforms individuals – partly making 
up for their incompleteness through their engagement in the processes of political 
creation, amendment, and augmentation.110 To be sure, Honig tries to qualify this 
celebration of political participation: 
The perpetuity of contest is not easy to celebrate. My own affirmation of 
it is animated, not by teleological belief that politically active lives are 
necessarily fuller or more meaningful than their alternatives, but by 
my conviction that the displacement of politics with law or 
administration engenders remainders that could disempower and perhaps 
even undermine democratic institutions and citizens.111 
That the political is celebrated due to the irreducible role it plays in making democracy 
possible rather than for being more meaningful than, say, poetry, however, does not 
alter the  fact  that  this  view  of  politics  risks  derailing  the  egalitarian  
individualism  that underlies NMD. While agonistic democracy is primarily concerned 
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with undermining "closures" and fighting "hegemonies", it is reluctant to spell out even 
minimal constraints on what contesting groups can do to each other, lest these 
constraints turn into permanent closures and undermine the Nietzschean "politics of 
self-overcoming".112 The practice of protecting individuals against instances of 
inequality and domination through democratic rights perhaps does not completely fade 
away, but it certainly lacks the lustre of the larger concern with the proliferation and 
augmentation of political activity, and the overturning of existing closures. Not only 
are there no protections in place for those who do not want to  contest,  but  "the  
human,  all-too-human yearning  for  a  freedom  from  politics  or contest" is 
identified, according to Nietzsche, with death.113 Any acknowledgement of the 
democratic potential of some minimal closure, entrenching some of the rules of the 
game, is followed by a caveat that renders the acknowledgement inconsequential: 
"Sometimes they enable a democratic politics, but their sedimentations also have 
disempowering effects that are not easily overcome or challenged."114 
To be sure, NMD views citizen apathy as an undesirable condition; and, as 
we saw in Chapter 2, it holds democratic regeneration to be an important objective. 
Yet, NMD does not subscribe to the views that represent politics as part of the human 
good, or the fulfilment or aspiration to alleviate the incompleteness of the self.  
The goal of regenerating democratic activity is important, but it cannot be espoused in 
isolation from other normative considerations such as non-domination  and  individual  
equality.  In contrast to agonistic democracy's assessment of democratic rights and 
constraints as an attempt to drive out disagreement or to displace the political, NMD 
views these as the rules of the game that have to be in place for democracy to make 
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sense as a system of government tied to the notions of equal concern and non-
domination. Hence, the unacceptability of using tools that express inequality and 
asymmetry in order to advance the goal of a more lively, heroic, or extraordinary 
politics. 
3.4.2 In Relation to Contestatory Democracy 
Contestatory democratic theories are often sceptical of the consensualist position, 
and draw attention to the role of competitive elections, institutionalized oppositions, and 
other non-consensualist devices in carrying out democratic governance. NMD accepts 
the normative significance of democratic disagreement and non-domination 
emphasized by contestatory democratic theorists such as Jeremy Waldron, Ian Shapiro, 
and Philip Pettit. Despite these similarities, there are important differences between 
NMD and contestatory democratic theory that have to do, mostly, with the minimalism 
of the former. 
The most general difference between NMD and contestatory democracy is that 
the latter can combine various minimalist devices with thicker notions of common 
good, and even retain consensualism as a value while objecting to the adoption of 
consensualist procedures for decision making. In other words, a democratic theory that 
espouses certain aspects of Schumpeter's minimalism can continue to put these devices 
to the service of some other wider project not directly related to what is minimally 
required for political processes to count as democratic. For instance, NMD's dimension 
of non-domination draws on Ian Shapiro's work on the same concept. But the two 
views of democracy diverge to an important extent, because despite Shapiro's espousal 
of various elements of the minimalist approach (e.g., electoral competition and the 
importance of democratic oppositions) his theory expands significantly beyond 
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minimalism.115 As we see in Democratic Justice and his other writings, Shapiro's 
theory is “simultaneously concerned with many domains of civil society.”116 His 
“aspiration [is] to articulate ... a view of democracy that can be justice-
promoting.”117 
This doesn't merely have to do with Shapiro's theory offering a more 
comprehensive view of democracy, but is linked to the meaning of democracy on 
his account. For Shapiro, democracy is a subordinate good whose appeal ultimately 
rests on the way it relates to other values and people's superordinate goods.118 
Therefore understanding democracy requires analyzing how democracy relates to the 
value of social justice, and similar values that govern human activities involving other 
superordinate goods. NMD, however, is primarily interested in understanding the 
normative underpinnings of contemporary democratic practices. Although Shapiro tries 
to build the "anti-vanguardist" features into his theory, and tries to take into account 
the normative importance of dissensus, ultimately his theory could subsume a greater 
amount of disagreement under a thicker notion of common good. Shapiro tries to 
compensate for this by emphasizing the context-specific nature of democratic norms, 
and the norm that prioritizes insiders' wisdom.119 Democracy on this account is much 
more pervasive, but Shapiro tries to make it less invasive by emphasizing the context-
sensitivity and reliance on insider's wisdom. NMD, however, accepts minimalism – 
therefore picturing a less pervasive theory – while also accepting the egalitarian-
individualist core of that minimalism in a less ambiguous way. 
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A related difference is that contestatory democratic theory is still compatible 
with opposition to, or wariness of, the involvement of ethno-religious groups and 
interest groups in political processes, which leaves the door wide open for the use 
of political institutions to suppress or control undesirable differences. For instance, 
Philip Pettit argues for depoliticizing differences when they begin to challenge aspects 
of the common good. Pettit writes that “there are novel areas too where electoral 
interests are likely to militate against the deliberative quality of democratic decision-
making, depriving considerations  of  the  common  good  of  the  weight  they  are  
properly  given.”120 Depoliticizing contentious issues could lead to a more coolheaded 
search for the common good by keeping political passions and special interests at bay. 
One could prevent minorities that are disproportionally disadvantaged by a certain 
proposal, and feel more intensely about it, from organizing more effectively to avert 
that proposal.121 Also, while suppressing undesirable differences is one side of the 
coin, promoting the more desirable ones is the other. 
Finally, contestatory democracy and NMD differ also on the issue on which 
they appear more in agreement – their recognition of dissensus and what should 
follow from it. Contestatory democratic theories generally recognise dissensus, but 
tend to overlook the implications of dissensus for the need to build functional 
agreements. Recognising disagreement as a ubiquitous feature of politics, however, 
does not on its own settle the respective limits of consensus and dissensus. For 
instance, on Jeremy Waldron's account, the majority rule satisfies the normative 
conditions associated with democracy, including those concerning respect for 
disagreement.122 
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To be sure, Waldron accepts some limited notion of equality as the 
normative basis for majoritarianism, but his argument for the fairness of 
majoritarianism stops there, and seems to downplay the (very real) possibility that day-
to-day majoritarian decisions may depart not just from some substantive notion of 
equal respect (e.g., Beitz's complex equality), but also the far more minimal notions of 
expressing equal status and equal concern for the interests of all governed. Voting that 
expresses equal respect in the two senses that Waldron upholds and NMD 
unwaveringly accepts – factoring in one's voice at equal worth and  recording people's 
dissent123 – can  still  express contempt for  some minority's way of life, cripple the 
minimal sense of agency, form inescapable categories of permanent electoral   
marginalization,  and   commit   other   wrongs   that   violate democracy's egalitarian 
individualist norms. Moreover, Waldron's critique of the arguments that raise 
concerns over social engineering and rationalist projects, coupled with his focus on 
the merits of majoritarianism in enabling collective self-determination suggests that 
Waldron's contestatory democracy does not fully appreciate the internal democratic 
limits on what majorities of the day can do.124 
On the other hand, NMD accepts the importance of majoritarianism to 
democratic theory, but is also seriously concerned with its normative limitations. 
When the link between  majoritarianism  (or  other  contestatory  elements  of  
democracy)  and  equal concern is not clarified and espoused, the idea of democracy 
risks either becoming paralyzed or gradually mutating into something contradictory. 
Merely recognizing the fact of disagreement is not sufficient for rendering majority 
rule a legitimate and fair decision procedure. For there will continue to be electoral 
scenarios that depart from the expressive function of equality even when the fact of 
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disagreement is registered in the most respectful sense. For instance, some people will 
find themselves constantly on the losing side, and will turn into disenchanted, 
alienated, and most troublingly, permanent minorities. Once these scenarios have 
materialized, it is not enough as an expression of respect simply to take a count of 
those in disagreement. Thus, NMD takes the normative relationship between dissensus 
and consensus seriously as the present chapter has argued, and also, as the remainder of 
the dissertation will show, tries to account for it in a distinctive  way  by  accepting  a  
negative  theory  of  groups,  and  an  egalitarian  re-interpretation of interest-group 
pluralism. 
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Chapter 4: Democratic Pretensions of Multiculturalists 
Multiculturalists and their critics alike summon up democratic ideals to support their 
respective views. They have democratic pretensions insofar as they claim that the 
demands of democratic legitimacy definitively support their, as opposed to their rivals', 
views on multiculturalism. The following two chapters will attempt to sort out genuine 
implications of democracy for multiculturalism from pretensions to democratic 
legitimacy that we see in the writings of both multiculturalists and their critics. In this 
chapter I take up the multiculturalist position, while the next chapter looks into the 
democratic pretensions of the critics of multiculturalism.  
The chapter begins by outlining a certain approach to multiculturalism. In the 
first section I address the issue of multiple definitions and side with the claim that 
philosophical multiculturalism is better conceived of as an umbrella term, or a contested 
concept, with various related normative components, rather than as a full-fledged 
theory. I pick three groups of, not always easily cohering, claims that stand out in this 
normative amalgam, each representing a certain 'democratic' challenge to the political 
status quo. These are recognition, self-rule and inclusion. The overall point this chapter 
makes is that some important components of the multiculturalist challenges are either 
unrelated to core democratic principles or are undemocratic.  
1. Multiculturalism as an Umbrella Concept 
In a nutshell, multiculturalism taken in its philosophical – rather than political or 
sociological – sense is an umbrella term for various normative claims about principles 
that should underlie the relationship of governmental power and ethno-cultural 
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plurality.1 I refer to multiculturalism as an umbrella term for two related reasons. First, 
proponents of multiculturalism in this philosophical sense make various normative 
claims about reforming existing political structures and creating new types in order to 
bring about a political-legal order that does justice to their concerns. As one recent 
contribution to the debate points out, multiculturalism is best seen as “an interrelated set 
of political ideas” rather than an internally homogenous theoretical project.2 In other 
words, any theoretical project associated with the term multiculturalism makes a diverse 
set of claims, and rests on a number of normative principles rather than being reducible 
to one claim or one underlying normative concern.  
The second related reason for viewing multiculturalism as an umbrella notion 
has to do with the way the term has evolved and developed over time. What comes 
under the umbrella of multiculturalism is a list of themes or concepts that different 
theorists making important contributions to the multiculturalism literature have 
developed and used interchangeably with the term multiculturalism – “the politics of 
cultural recognition,” politics of difference, politics of cultural accommodation, etc. 
Given the influence that such concepts have had over our thinking on multiculturalism, 
any theoretical project that intends to contribute to the debate would require conceptual 
resources to assess these various normative ideals and adjudicate different claims that 
they give rise to.  Hence, another important advantage of referring to multiculturalism 
as an umbrella term – in addition to recognizing the term’s internal diversity – is that 
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 The sociological term simply states the fact of cultural diversity, while in its political sense the term 
multiculturalism could refer to a number of different sets of legislation enacted by different jurisdictions. 
Canadian multiculturalism, in its sociological sense will bring up the fact that Canada is an immigrant 
nation made of different ethno-cultural components. It will not tell us much about the relationship 
between these components and between components and various levels of government. Political sense of 
the term will offer a more detailed view but will lack conceptual resources for evaluating the existing 
legal enterprise concerning multiculturalism. One sense in which the political term would allow us 
evaluate multiculturalism would be pointing out differences and similarities between, say, Canadian and 
German or British multiculturalism. Normative multiculturalism, on the other hand, offers a set of 
principles that should guide policy-making and reform of existing institutions.  
2
 Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, 19. 
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one retains conceptual resources to draw distinctions between different combinations of 
these. So the best way to conceptualize multiculturalism is to identify these concerns 
and principles that motivate it, before making any attempt to determine whether these 
add up to a full-fledged theory or not, or also whether these show internal consistency 
or not.  
The taxonomy offered in this chapter focuses on three broadly-defined themes. I 
group normative principles of multiculturalism into the categories of 1) cultural 
recognition, 2) inclusion, and 3) self-rule. Other important concerns such as cultural 
integrity and representation can be treated under one or several of these three categories. 
However, theorists of multiculturalism usually attempt to justify the latter types of 
multiculturalist concerns by drawing on one of these three overarching normative 
categories. For example, representation comes up as an issue because existing forms of 
representation fail to recognize difference, or are not sufficiently inclusive. Before we 
move to evaluate each category's relation to democratic theory, let us briefly consider 
their relationship with one another – how they differ from one another and how they are 
related. 
The first point to note about these categories is that they are not just 
multicultural catchphrases as each represents a certain normative concern in theory. 
Recognition appeals to equality of status – however differently this could be 
understood. Self-rule appeals to various ideals of freedom. And inclusion appeals 
primarily to the fact of one overarching community, no matter how heterogeneous, 
dispersed, and diverse that community is envisaged to be.  
Among these categories, recognition and self-rule are often thought to refer to 
similar claims. However, recognition does not yet involve a definitive self-rule claim 
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and it does not have to directly appeal to various freedom-related norms. It is primarily 
concerned with status. The main demand is that equality of different ways of social 
interaction be recognized. A recognition claim, to be sure, could also contain a demand 
for a certain degree and type of self-rule, which shows that the two principles are 
closely related. One can argue that recognition of a certain identity will tend to 
empower that identity and result in an increase in the extent of self-government for the 
group that makes the recognition claim. This conclusion, however, depends on how 
self-government is defined: If self-government is narrowly defined to include having 
full, unshared, sovereignty over internal affairs of the group, it could be at least 
unsustainable, from a conceptual point of view, to expect recognition to involve equal 
self-government. What Jacob Levy observes about recognition could be helpful in 
understanding differences between the two concepts. Although he writes with a specific 
meaning of recognition in mind – recognition of customary laws – his observation seem 
to hold true in the case of recognition construed more broadly to include other identity 
matters and not just customary laws. In Levy’s words, “granting 
recognition/enforcement claims does not necessarily give members of the group any 
special standing in the determination of their laws; often, it is up to courts of the general 
society to decide when customary law has or has not been followed.” Levy adds that 
because such claims made by minority groups often involve “gaining recognition from 
the general legal system (for the group’s marriages, property laws, and so on) outsiders 
may be given more power over the group in a very real sense, hardly what one expects 
from self-government.”3 Then, recognition and self-government, despite their 
interrelatedness, do not collapse into one category.  
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Likewise, inclusion and self-government may look similar, and they do have a 
lot in common; but each has a distinct concern. No matter how interrelated their claims 
appear, it is important to differentiate them because, as we will see in the remainder of 
this chapter, they spring from different normative considerations and vary in terms of 
their political recommendations. Self-government in the context of multiculturalism 
tends to push for diversity, while inclusion invokes the idea of one public, 
notwithstanding how heterogeneously that public is conceived. 
Another point to note about this classification of multiculturalist principles is 
that different strands of multiculturalism attach varying degrees of significance to each 
of these three normative categories. All prominent theorists of multiculturalism have 
something important to say on each of these normative categories, but everyone familiar 
with the debate will quickly notice that each category evokes some theorists of 
multiculturalism rather than others. This has to do with the fact that assigning more 
importance to one of the three normative concerns over the other two gives the theory a 
different shape, resulting in different compatibilities and incompatibilities with the 
democratic ideals. In this chapter I evaluate the works of mainly three theorists who 
make interrelated claims about the relationship of multiculturalism and democratic 
ideals. Each theorist places a higher degree of significance on one of the three ideals. 
In light of this taxonomy of multicultural principles and concerns, we can try to 
provide a better definition. Multiculturalism is about challenging one conception of 
unity with a different one because the former fails to accord respect to the central 
principles of liberal democracy – equality and self-rule. This however does not prove 
the compatibility of multiculturalism and liberal democracy because there are questions 
such as equality of what and self-rule by and over whom that remain open to 
interpretation.  
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As a result, along the axes of recognition, self-rule, and inclusion, substantially 
different theories of multiculturalism have emerged. These theories seek different types 
of recognition for different groups, but they are all committed to the view that cultural 
plurality is an ineliminable feature of social life to which laws cannot remain oblivious. 
Similarly, despite pervasive disagreement over the degrees of self-rule appropriate to 
different groups, multiculturalism theories generally emphasize the normative weight of 
this idea. Inclusion is perhaps the least visible of the three threads, but it is the most 
pervasive one. Without it pluralism and self-rule would not resemble multiculturalism, 
which, at least in its current shape implies the idea of one state. My aim in 
differentiating these three categories is to bring to light how complex a concept 
philosophical multiculturalism is; namely, philosophical multiculturalism, like 
democracy, is an essentially contested concept. When we try to maximize one element, 
let us say self-government, we make another element, inclusion, less attainable. 
Similarly mutuality of recognition represents a limit on what one can argue in the name 
of self-government.  
2. The Recognition Challenge 
One of the claims at the core of multiculturalism literature is that liberal neutrality fails 
to extend adequate recognition to socio-cultural diversity. Recognition, of course, 
means different things to different writers. For example, some writers such as Iris 
Young claim that nothing short of public affirmation of positive value can satisfy the 
requirement of recognition, while others are more sceptical about the necessity of 
affirming equal worth and limit their arguments to acknowledging the temporary 
significance of difference in overcoming present inequalities.4 But a generally accepted 
point among proponents of multiculturalism is that the failure to recognise different 
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cultures making up the political unit amounts to an undeserved disadvantage for some 
ways of life. As one famous contributor to the debate points out “the idea that the 
government could be neutral with respect to ethnic and national groups is patently 
false.”5 What these writers commonly agree on is the claim that recognition is needed to 
stop majority biases from appearing neutral under the guise of progressive universalism.  
Charles Taylor’s essay, ‘Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition’ 
(hereafter, ‘MPR’) is probably the best place to begin to understand the centrality of the 
notion of recognition to the multiculturalism debates because, in addition to being by far 
the most influential piece of work on this question, it is informed by Taylor’s rich 
scholarship on philosophical issues underpinning recognition.6 In one of the most 
quoted passages of ‘MPR’, Taylor writes that “misrecognition shows not just a lack of 
due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-
hatred.” Taylor goes on to define recognition as a “vital human need” rather than a mere 
“courtesy we owe people”.7 Without spending any more time summarizing Taylor’s 
well-known argument, I want to focus on his specific claim that the challenge of 
recognition is a particularly democratic one. Let me rephrase this so that we can more 
fully appreciate the significance of the claim Taylor makes. In Taylor’s view, social and 
political democratization is what makes recognition an important human good whose 
denial to some can amount to “a grievous wound”.  Taylor asserts a necessary 
connection between recognition and democracy, which is for our purposes something 
that must be closely examined. Although in what follows I mainly focus on Taylor, the 
aim of that engagement is to scrutinize the link between recognition and democracy 
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liberalism, individualism and secularism. E.g., see Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity. 
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rather than grapple specifically with Taylor’s political theory of multiculturalism; and I 
expect my conclusions to apply to other views that appeal to recognition as a 
democratic challenge to the status quo.  
Although he does not present recognition as an invention of modernity, Taylor 
deems two changes in human relations coinciding with that period – the rejection of 
social hierarchies and the acceptance of universal human potential – responsible for 
problematizing recognition.8 With the disintegration of social hierarchies that 
distributed honour unequally, and in doing so settled the recognition question, came the 
age that made the promise of equal recognition.9 What makes recognition in this new 
age more fragile is the second related change induced by democratization. In Taylor’s 
view, the human equality that democracies recognize is the “equal human potential” to 
decide one’s place in society and determine one’s own identity. Identity-formation in 
this novel democratic sense, however, Taylor adds, is not as self-centred or 
“monological” as some authors presuppose. The necessity that in the democratic age 
identities be authentic does not entail their being formed in isolation from others. 
Because persons “negotiate” their identities “through dialogue, partly overt, partly 
internal, with others”, and one’s “identity crucially depends on [one’s] dialogical 
relations with others”, recognition gains an important political dimension that it lacked 
in the previous ages.10  
The two norms underlying these changes that democratised human relations do 
not go hand in hand. In a multicultural democracy, the norm of universal equal dignity, 
and the norm of recognizing the authentic particularity press conflicting claims, giving 
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 In his Bound by Recognition, Patchen Markell casts doubt on Taylor’s suggestion that recognition was 
problematised in the post-Enlightenment period. 
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rise to the politics of recognition. In this new regime, misrecognition, Taylor claims, 
stands out as a more perilous wrong. Tensions arise between these two norms when the 
norm of equal recognition prescribes uniform treatment and the norm of authenticity 
mandates being true to one’s particularity and difference: “Where the politics of 
universal dignity fought for forms of nondiscrimination that were quite “blind” to the 
ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines 
nondiscrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential 
treatment.”11 It is policies such as those that grant specific rights to Aboriginals, or 
rights to exclude others for the sake of maintaining cultural integrity granted to other 
minority cultures that anger and disappoint those who place more emphasis on equal 
dignity. On the other hand, proponents of the politics of difference claim that the 
principle of equal dignity is guilty of homogenizing societies and suppressing difference 
under the pretext of upholding universal values, which are in reality nothing more than 
the particular viewpoint of the dominant.12  
The weight NMD places on equality of status and other aspects of expressive 
equality will rightly lead one to think that some form of the recognition challenge has to 
find itself room in the democratic perspective. It is not difficult to see how political 
institutions and less formal structures of societal interaction can cast people in a 
negative light and play a role in their vilification hence resulting in a shortfall of 
recognition. What Taylor says about the two changes resulting from consolidation of 
democracy and the role they play in problematizing recognition is not alien to NMD. 
The poor that find themselves shut out of social mobility and effectively confined to 
crumbling inner city neighbourhoods will rightly feel like the rules of the game do not 
express equal concern for them. Similarly, it makes sense to claim that a cultural 
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minority whose practices are cast by governments or mainstream cultures as repressive, 
or unworthy of human attachment, and who find themselves vilified in many aspects of 
everyday life, will not think highly of what I tried to explain as the core of democracy’s 
egalitarian dimension, particularly the claim of expressing equal status. If 
misrecognition is to be interpreted as a denial of equal human potential and an 
expression of disdain rather than equal status, NMD leaves us no choice but to accept 
recognition as a vital democratic good.  
However, the story is more complicated than this. As a result, recognition 
supported by multiculturalists may prove a thicker concept than NMD can fully 
espouse. The thicker notion is not just an attack against intolerance, social contempt, 
and other wrongs that violate modern democracy’s egalitarian principles. It is also, 
partially, a condemnation of things that, to a large extent, make modern democracy 
distinctive. The thicker notion of recognition sees individual rights as, at least, partly 
responsible for our modern predicament.13 To be sure, on this thicker model, 
recognition is still, albeit partially, about respecting equal human potential, and 
authenticity of the individual. But it is also underpinned by an authenticity of a different 
kind, in whose absence the term does a poor job of capturing social facts about us. 
Drawing on Herder, Taylor sums up this related aspect of authenticity in the following 
way: “Just like individuals, a Volk should be true to itself, that is, its own culture.”14 
Then misrecognition will occur not only when our fellow humans’ individuality is 
disrespected, but also when one fails to accept that “moral accent” does not have to be 
placed uniformly on the inner voice of an atomistic individual.15 There are goods that 
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 In his Massey Lectures, Taylor depicts individualism as one of three major contributors to our modern 
predicament together with the "primacy of instrumental reason" and their political ramifications in the 
form of "soft despotism". (The Malaise of Modernity, 2-12)  
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individuals can attain and enjoy only in community, and collective provision of these 
goods requires that communities’ and cultures’ rights to survival be recognized.16 When 
approached from this vantage point, persons’ authenticity is not thwarted only when 
they are treated unequally as persons. A similar wrong can occur when their collective 
identity is thwarted by a state that is unwaveringly committed to individualism in its 
legal and political discourse. To give an example, I suffer not only when as, say, a 
French Canadian I am denied social and economic opportunities, but also when my 
group is precluded from taking the necessary measures to perpetuate its way of life, 
which is a distinctive source of good, even in the face of significant opposition from 
within.  
This thicker concept of recognition not only casts culture as a source of meaning 
and good, but also ties it to what it means to function in a fully human way. In Isaiah 
Berlin’s words, it is a teleological view that presumes belonging to an organic culture to 
be part of “the human essence”.17 Denying humans a right to thrive in their cultural 
environment, e.g., expecting them to integrate into a majority’s way of life in order to 
prosper or withholding resources necessary to secure the integrity of their culture, is 
akin to forcing them into poverty.18 The culture of a group, on this view, has a 
normative weight that is not reducible to, or explainable in terms of, the instrumental 
worth that liberal theories often recognise. It is characteristic of the flawed logic of 
liberal proceduralism to try to reduce this weight to the instrumental benefit that group 
life or a certain cultural practice has in terms of individual wellbeing. Aggregating 
individual benefits does not account for the holistic phenomena of collectively 
producing and enjoying these goods. In Taylor’s words, “just adding these monological 
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18
 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 86. 
Chapter 4: Democratic Pretensions of Multiculturalists 
 
130 
 
states does not get us the dialogic condition where things are for us.”19 Generalizing 
from this, Taylor thinks that the conception of political community as “merely 
convergent I-Identities” lacks “viability”.20 What follows from this is that because we 
need culture to function in a fully human way, we owe a degree of deference to culture 
that requires us not to hold its survival hostage to our petty interests.21 
In light of the above exposition, it should not be difficult to see how recognition 
of a collective good such as culture is in tension with individualist precepts of liberalism 
and democracy. The first source of the tension is the homogenizing dispositions of 
individualism. Taylor regards Rousseau as an exemplary offender with respect to “the 
charge of imposing a false homogeneity”.22 Rousseau’s claim that the absence of a 
cohesive general will and departures from uniform treatment will lead to dependency – 
the opposite of liberty –gives way to homogenizing policies.23 Decoupling Rousseau’s 
version of liberalism from its most apparently homogenizing features such as the 
general will or its proscription of “differentiated roles”, does not, according to Taylor, 
in itself acquit liberalism of the foregoing charge. Taylor considers the variants of 
liberalism influenced by Kant’s emphasis on autonomy – the view that “understands 
human dignity to consist largely in autonomy” – to commit a similar error to the extent 
that they “(a) [insist] on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without 
exception, and (b) [are] suspicious of collective goals.”24 Taylor’s claim seems to be 
that (b) follows naturally from (a), namely, an understanding of rights that turns a blind 
eye to all contextual variations that arise from the fact of cultural diversity is bound to 
be inhospitable towards distinct collective goals of different cultures making up a 
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diverse society. So if one wants to prevent such a Rousseauian homogenization it is 
insufficient to decouple liberalism from a cohesive general will. One has to go even 
further and ensure that equal rights and equal respect are not understood in a restrictive 
fashion that rules out contextual adjustments. He sides with other critics of the 
inflexible focus on autonomy and rights such as Michael Sandel in holding these 
procedural models of liberalism inappropriate to a democratic society. In Taylor’s view, 
these models of – he uses Sandel’s phrase – the “procedural republic” vest powers in the 
hands of an unelected judiciary and obstruct democratic majorities’ attempts to pursue 
legitimate collective aspirations.25  
Despite the wideness of the philosophical gap between this view of the 
normative significance of culture and views that put the normative emphasis on the 
individual, Taylor thinks the two views can be brought together. He writes that “[a] 
society with strong collective goals can be liberal”. The key is to be able to make the 
following distinction: “One has to distinguish the fundamental liberties, those that 
should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched, on one 
hand, from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be revoked or 
restricted for reasons of public policy—although one would need a strong reason to do 
this—on the other.”26 Taylor employs the example of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and the decades-long controversies surrounding it to explain the point. In 
Taylor’s view the fuss over the “distinct society” clause – its absence from the Charter, 
and attempts to introduce it in the form of a constitutional amendment in the following 
decade – represented the showdown between these two visions of rights. Namely, those 
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that it never be lost?” (40) 
26MPR, 59. 
Chapter 4: Democratic Pretensions of Multiculturalists 
 
132 
 
who saw Quebec as a distinct society within Canada demanded a break from the 
Charter’s unified applications in those matters that they considered vital to the Quebec 
society’s survival as distinct.27 On the other hand, those who held to a vision of uniform 
rights applied across the board without sensitivity to diversity, are guilty of not offering 
due recognition to members of the Quebec society.  
The above discussion artificially divided Taylor’s account of recognition into 
two parts in order to test the strength of the connection between the two democratic 
changes and the notion of recognition as a democratic challenge. The upshot of the first 
part of the discussion was that recognising equal human potential and authenticity are 
indeed connected to democratic norms. For the generic (thin) version of recognition 
draws on familiar democratic ideals such as respect for equal human potential. Thus, the 
critical question is whether or not the thicker interpretation of recognition that draws on 
complicated ontological claims regarding collective goals (e.g., how meanings are 
articulated and attached to various instances of life) is as central to democracy as the 
thin notion of recognition discussed above. If yes, the kind of delineation outlined by 
Taylor in the previous paragraph is necessary. Namely, individual rights, especially the 
ones that are not ‘fundamental’ have to be curtailed to pave the way for a satisfactory 
degree of recognition for those aspects of collective life that provide crucial social 
goods and meanings.  
However, distinguishing between the two kinds of recognition helps one see that 
one is more straightforwardly democratic than the other. As we saw earlier, the 
connection between the first kind of recognition and democratic principles is hard to 
miss. But we cannot claim the same about the second kind of recognition that, building 
on the idea of dialogical identity formation, introduces the Herderian dimension of 
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being true to one’s volk. Although the second kind of recognition is not unequivocally 
undemocratic, it is not a requirement of democracy either. It is not hard to see that 
historical contingencies will decide the degree to which the thick notion of recognition 
will depart from the model of democracy presented in the previous two chapters, and 
even from any model of democracy that can meaningfully lay claim to democraticness. 
Taylor is probably right that it is possible to accept his teleological theory and remain a 
liberal or democrat. But this does not make his teleology liberal or democratic. Unlike 
in the case of the relationship between democratic principles (e.g., egalitarian aspects of 
democracy) and the thinner notion of recognition, the degree to which the thicker notion 
of recognition is compatible with democratic principles hinges on not the principled 
connection between thick recognition and democracy, but on contingent qualities of the 
object of recognition – the good espoused by a particular (often, segment of a) 
community. If the community happens to embrace values and practices that are 
amicable to the individualist-egalitarian core of democracy (e.g., affirmation of 
individualism and some scepticism of political authority), the separateness of the two 
entities will be hardly noticed. That is, there will appear to be a strong link between 
democracy on the one hand and culture and its recognition on the other. However, if the 
community happens to have more collectivist characteristics (e.g., valuation of the 
community life over and above the individual wellbeing or recognition of a rightful 
authority in the form of a caste, king or an elderly clan leader), then it will be harder to 
defend the claim of connectedness between thick recognition and democratic principles. 
Whether the link appears to be strong or weak, the two remain conceptually distinct and 
with very little principled connection. Then it is a mistake to deploy the thick concept of 
recognition in the name of a more genuine democracy. Multiculturalists mistakenly 
think that there is a direct principled relationship between culture and democracy, 
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whereas, in reality, the relation is one of contingency rather than logical or normative 
entailment.  
Now the last statement has to be qualified in anticipation of the multiculturalist 
counterargument that takes issue with the fallacies of atomism. Because culture is such 
a broad notion, NMD has to acknowledge that some aspects of it are connected to 
democratic principles in the genuine way that we saw with the thinner notion of 
recognition that takes establishing equal respect for persons as its goal. To see this more 
clearly, we need to consider another clarificatory distinction between broad and narrow 
senses of culture, which maps onto the distinction between the two senses of 
recognition. 
In the multiculturalism debates, we can see a tendency to distinguish culture in 
its strictly ethno-linguistic sense (e.g., French Canadian or Aboriginal Haida culture) 
from a generic sense of the term that is used much more broadly in order to group 
together and describe an eclectic range of social phenomena (e.g., capitalist culture, 
queer culture, police culture). Will Kymlicka’s use of the term societal culture is in this 
regard paradigmatic. Kymlicka’s societal culture “provides its members with 
meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and 
private spheres.”28 Kymlicka goes on to add that “these cultures tend to be territorially 
concentrated, and based on a shared language”, and are “almost invariably” connected 
to some nation.29 The distinction that helps single out societal culture as the focus of the 
political theory of multiculturalism is important for the following reason. It forms an 
important part of the link between the official multiculturalism as practiced or 
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advocated today and the philosophical idea of choice-enhancing aspects of culture that 
we see in the writings of Kymlicka, Taylor, Raz and others. It directs public policy to 
recognise culture in the ethno-linguistic sense rather than leading in the direction of 
more individual-centred solutions. Because Kymlicka places autonomy in the form of 
making individual choices at the heart of his theory and making meaningful choices 
requires a cultural background that gives value to one’s available options, he argues that 
equality requires protection of societal cultures. The distinction continues to play a role 
even when one moves away from choice towards less individualistic criteria such as 
sources of good or meaning. 
But this distinction is not nuanced enough to justify the link presumed to exist 
between culture as the medium of choice or precondition of authenticity and ethno-
linguistic (sometimes with religious additions) cultures because it overestimates the 
rigidity and distinctness of cultures (or underestimates their porousness). A distinction 
between broad and narrow senses of culture has more explanatory power in this context. 
The broad sense corresponds more closely to the choice-enabling aspect of culture that 
Raz and Kymlicka emphasize.30 It is closer to Waldron’s cultural kaleidoscope than 
Kymlicka finds acceptable.31 This sense of culture is very porous and does not lend 
much support to the politics of recognition outlined in the writings of multiculturalists 
like Kymlicka and Taylor. On the other hand, culture in the narrow sense – with its 
strictly particularistic connotations – is not directly tied to autonomy or identity other 
than in contingent and ever-changing ways. This does not mean the narrow sense of 
culture is totally useless. My claim is much more limited than this; its use in the 
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political theory of multiculturalism is not as extensive as Kymlicka and Taylor 
assume.32  
The above should not be interpreted as a dismissal of the thick recognition’s 
relevance to democracy. What is being challenged is the presence of a necessary, 
permanent link between the two concepts. Actual thick recognition itself may not be 
directly connected to democracy, but the democratic struggle, even, for thick 
recognition that revolves around the narrow sense of culture is indirectly supported by 
principles of democracy. Groups may not have a positive right to cultural continuity and 
integrity, but the following chapters will build the case that as aggregates of individuals 
they do have many negative rights such as the right to resist assimilation – overall 
amounting to a social order which is not less group-friendly than the one exalted by the 
multiculturalists.  
Although from the perspective of multiculturalists like Charles Taylor and Will 
Kymlicka, the foregoing point about contingency of the link between the thicker 
recognition and democracy may be perceived as a disadvantage to their theories, from 
the perspective of NMD, the contingency does not pose any problems. The fact that 
certain groups gain the thicker recognition for some aspects of their identity while 
certain others do not falls in line with democracy’s indeterminacy and fluidity as a 
system of government. Just as who gets what cannot be determined in advance of 
politics, the question of which aspects of the cultural phenomena get more recognition 
than others cannot be resolved prior to a democratic process. Then what NMD objects 
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 The question that Kymlicka cannot offer a good answer to is how appropriate is it to place excessive 
normative weight on a contingent relationship? One's conclusions, Kymlicka accepts, will change 
according to how narrow or broad definitions of culture one employs. The more localized definitions will 
reveal multiculturalism even in the world's most homogenous states, while definitions that concentrate on 
wider patterns will group together all Western democracies. (MC, 18) Furthermore, Kymlicka recognizes 
the fact of contingency when he writes that societal cultures are largely creations of modernity. (MC, 
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to is not the concept of recognition, not even its tentative thickness. It is the ultimate 
stability and permanence accorded to it by some theorists of multiculturalism, and their 
underlying claim that these characteristics follow from democratic norms and 
principles.  
3. The Self-Government Challenge 
Having discussed the challenge of recognition, in this section I turn to consider a 
different, but closely related multiculturalist challenge that also claims to speak from the 
perspective of democratic theory. This challenge originates in another promise often 
attributed to democracy – that of self-rule. It is a widely held view that democracy has a 
normatively significant collective dimension, which is neatly supported by the 
etymology of the term – a rule of the people or of the relevant demos. Scholars who 
make the self-government challenge in the context of multiculturalism allude to the 
democratic ideal of being self-ruling – governing one’s polity with the laws authored 
jointly by the members of that polity rather than laws imposed from above or outside. 
The critical claim made by the authors who make this challenge is that in turning a blind 
eye to other sub-communities’ distinctive ways of relating to each other, and imposing 
on them uniform laws representing the will of the culturally distinct majority, liberal 
democracies violate the crucial promise of self-rule. Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and 
other noted voices in the multiculturalist side of the debate deploy some version of this 
argument to advocate self-rule for some, if not all, minority groups. But it is in the work 
of James Tully that we get a sophisticated philosophical account to back the alleged 
connection between democracy and the self rule challenge. Therefore, I will try to cash 
out democratic pretensions of this challenge mostly by considering Tully’s arguments.  
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Tully places the notion of self-rule at the centre of his study of democratic 
multiculturalism. In his words, “demands for cultural recognition are aspirations for 
appropriate forms of self government.”33 Problems of recognition are rampant in the 
modern age because constitutions of our time do not live up to their democratic 
promise. Instead of laying out the terms of coexistence to which all culturally diverse 
parties can freely agree, modern constitutionalism, to use Tully’s phrase, represents “an 
imperial yoke, galling the necks of the culturally diverse citizenry”.34 Thus, nothing 
short of a constitutional makeover can satisfy the demands for recognition.  
The solution is to democratize constitutions – remove imperialistic, and, in 
Tully’s opinion, anti-democratic, elements – “by means of an intercultural dialogue in 
which [citizens’] culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting are mutually 
recognised.”35 Tully identifies three components to a democratic constitution suitable to 
the conditions of cultural diversity. These three guiding principles – “mutual 
recognition, consent, and cultural continuity” – together mark a sharp departure from 
the dominant theories of constitutionalism that currently, on his account, thwart freedom 
and suppress difference.36 Before we turn to examine what is particularly democratic 
about these criteria and whether Tully’s alternative constitutionalism is genuinely 
democratic, let us expand on what he thinks is wrong with modern constitutionalism.  
Whether they view citizens as equal in the strictly formalistic sense of being 
bound by a uniform system of laws (as is the case with liberalism) or as part of a more 
substantive community of values (e.g., communitarianism), “authoritative” schools of 
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34SM, 5. 
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 SM, 28-29. 
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modern constitutionalism37 “presuppose the uniformity of a nation state with a 
centralized and unitary system of legal and political institutions.”38 This – in Tully’s 
view, spurious – connection between uniform institutions and democratic governance 
predetermines answers that modern constitutionalism can offer to the question of how to 
deal with the diverse others whose institutions and practices do not resemble the 
asserted standards. In identifying a well-functioning state with a “centralised and 
uniform system of legal and political authority, or clear subordination of authorities, to 
which all citizens are subject in the same way, and from which all authority derives”, 
modern constitutionalism makes a normative case for assimilation of already-existing 
practices and institutions of diverse others into society’s dominant institutions and 
practices.39 In this, Tully thinks, lies the error of most contemporary theories of political 
constitution as far as the question of diversity is concerned; namely, all major theories 
of political constitution are similarly flawed insofar as they ignore diverse institutions 
and practices that precede them. In Tully’s words, “The independent institutions and 
traditions of the Aboriginal nations, which pre-exist Rawls’ authoritative institutions 
and traditions by hundreds of years, are either ignored or, at best, imperiously discussed 
with the very uncosmopolitan institutions and conventions that have been forged to 
assimilate them.”40 
The most fundamental undemocratic consequence of the aforementioned 
mistake of modern constitutionalism is that the political order it creates fails to satisfy 
very important democratic norms – consent and self-rule.41 It is not the case that it no 
longer matters if members of a particular community find a certain rule oppressive or 
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 SM, 63-64. 
38SM, 9. 
39SM, 83. 
40SM, 82. 
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 In his later work, drawing on Habermas, Tully writes that in his definition of democratic citizenship the 
principle of self-rule is coequal with the principle of rule of law. (Public Philosophy in a New Key, vol. 1, 
163-164) 
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inimical to their way of life, but these questions become relevant only in the context of 
institutions and practices of modern constitutionalism. If these concerns can be voiced 
in terms specified by the dominant assimilationist institutions, they can be debated and 
settled. In other circumstances, where these concerns do not fit the framework of 
uniform constitutionalism, in Tully’s words, “[t]he responsibility of listening to others is 
also bypassed”.42 In all of this, the acceptability of the assimilationist framework to the 
diverse others whose consent it bypasses is not debatable.43  
Modern constitutionalism often justifies this silencing of debate by alluding to 
the ideal of democracy. Tully draws two famous examples from the North American 
context– Trudeau government’s bypassing of Quebec’s consent in the Charter debates 
of 1982 and the abandoning of the Articles of Confederation in the U.S. Constitution of 
1787. In both cases, constitution-making disregarded existing arrangements and “the 
ancient convention of consent was reduced to an expendable means”.44 It no longer 
mattered if some of the thirteen colonies or the province of Quebec disagreed with their 
respective majorities at moments of constitution-making: “Once the people are seen in 
this unconstituted light, then it is undemocratic not to proceed when the convention had 
the consent of nine of the thirteen states with a majority of the population, or to consider 
‘the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve states to the perverseness or corruption of 
a thirteenth’.”45  
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 SM, 131. 
43
 “The question of a federation capable of accommodating the diverse ways citizens are already 
culturally constituted by means of a variety of legal and political institutions is either beyond the pale of 
Rawls’ ‘reasonable pluralism’, which must converge on a uniform legal and political order, or an 
unfortunate deviation from the norm of uniformity. In either case, the norm of uniformity remains 
unexamined, whereas its presumed impartiality is exactly what interculturalists are attempting to call into 
question.” (SM , 55-56) 
44
 SM, 156. 
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 SM, 157. 
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In all of this, Tully wonders how the liberal principle of consent – “the most 
fundamental constitutional convention”, ubiquitous in the works of prominent liberal 
thinkers such as Locke – has been dislocated. Also absent from the modern 
constitutionalism is the derivative thesis of cultural continuity. While the convention of 
consent proscribes making a new constitution or amending an existing one without 
gaining consent of those who will be affected by the constitutional acts, the convention 
of continuity states that constitutional practices hold as long as people do not explicitly 
withdraw their consent.46 For Tully, this transformation appears staggering when one 
juxtaposes it with the ancient constitutionalism. The latter for centuries had allowed 
members of different cultures to politically interact on peaceful terms without affirming 
a uniform and homogenous legal-political system that the writings of Hobbes, 
Pufendorf and their modern followers exalt as precondition of a functioning government 
or “the essence of a state”.47 Because the ancient constitutionalism recognises “how the 
people are already constituted by the assemblage of fundamental laws, institutions and 
customs”, even dramatic transformations do not in themselves justify modifying or 
overriding constitutions without gaining the consent of those who are affected. 48 Much 
of the self-rule challenge draws profusely on the stark contrast between the ancient 
constitutionalism and the modern modes of constitution that expect everyone living 
within the state's boundaries to accept the unquestionable primacy of the homogenizing 
state.  
Is the self-government challenge right in claiming for itself democratic 
credentials? Are modern democracies susceptible to the charge of colonialism if they 
fail to grant ‘quod omnes tangit’ – the ancient principle of 'what touches all should be 
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agreed by all –  and its corollary right to cultural continuity, to all constituent groups 
that make such claims?  There is certainly a good amount of historical and 
contemporary evidence to back Tully’s observation that modern states, including the 
most democratic ones, are guilty of assimilation and other offences against minority 
groups – often committed in the name of democracy and progress. In the previous two 
chapters we saw that democratic norms require laws to express equal concern for all 
citizens as well as to deem peoples’ coercion into lives that they do not want to live as 
unacceptable totalizing acts. Although what NMD suggests and what the self 
government challenge claims bear resemblance and may lead to an even more important 
degree of convergence in practice – something that we will more extensively discuss in 
part three of the thesis – the multiculturalist challenge, similar to the one we examined 
in the previous section, operates with important presuppositions that are either 
undemocratic or unsupported by democratic principles. This challenge, similar to the 
recognition challenge, is too quick in drawing connections between certain ideals and 
democratic norms. To see this, we only need to take a closer look at the notions of self-
government, consent, and culture that bear much of the normative weight of this 
challenge.  
The overarching point to note is that most of the dissimilarities between NMD 
and the self-rule challenge have to do with the collectivist undertones of the latter. The 
multiculturalists that we have considered so far and some that we will go on to study in 
sections and chapters to come are reluctant to espouse this contrast. Tully, for instance, 
thinks that the distinction between individualist and collectivist theories is not useful 
when trying to classify his own theory.49 Taylor, in a similarly vague way, holds that 
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individualism at the level of advocacy can be separated from that at the level of 
ontology.50 However, one’s reluctance to accept the collectivism that lurks in this 
particular multiculturalist challenge does not change the fact that it not only exists but 
also alters the role concepts such as self rule, consent, and culture play in our 
understandings of democracy.  
We can see how the notion of consent and self-government perform a different 
role in this multiculturalist challenge than they normally do in democratic theory by 
considering how Tully conceives of freedom in political society. On Tully’s account, 
freedom in political society consists of two intertwined aspects; free people and free 
citizenship. A people is considered free if it can impose on itself the two coequal values 
of the rule of law and self-government. A citizen, on the other hand, is considered free if 
he/she can participate in the governance of society and make his/her views count.51 It is 
obvious that this twofold conception of political freedom contains various democratic 
elements. However, the presence of these elements should not conceal the collective 
ethos lurking in this twofold notion.  
To be sure, Tully thinks both of these aspects are essential for the complete 
experience of freedom. Hence, a multiculturalist could raise the objection that there is 
little reason to be concerned that the notion of free peoplehood will result in the 
suppression of the individual. That is, to the extent that the individualist aspect of 
freedom is cast as a coequal component of the concept of freedom, the more collectivist 
element of freedom, the abstract idea of a free people, should appear harmless from the 
perspective of democracy. In other words, to the multiculturalist, this combination could 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
pupil in geography bringing a mass of falsely simplified ideas about the course and connections of the 
routes of rivers and mountain chains." (SM, 173) 
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 See Taylor, "Cross Purposes," in Philosophical Arguments. 
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 Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Democracy and Civic Freedom, vol. 1, 161. 
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appear to strike the ideal balance between the important values of individual and 
community. It is only when we juxtapose the ideal of free peoplehood with concrete 
situations that it is expected to mediate, and also consider it in conjunction with Tully’s 
cultural continuity thesis, that we develop a better sense of its ambiguities. Particularly, 
open to an array of collectivist interpretations is the second of the two coequal values 
whose realization renders a people free – the notion of self-rule. My main concern is 
that the notion of self-rule, when it is applied in the context of already “constituted” 
peoples, performs a role different from the one it would play if it were to apply in a 
democratic society implied by Tully’s second sense of being free. Namely, a people that 
comes to constitutional negotiations itself pre-constituted by its own culture and forms 
of governance, all of which cannot be discontinued without the “consent” of those 
whom such discontinuation touches poses a paradox that Tully’s theory is unable to 
resolve.  
The paradox is that the principles of consent and continuity seem to bring 
multiplicity to an abrupt stop at a ‘strange’ place. Tully emphasizes multiplicity of ways 
of life and conceptions of the good in open societies such as Canada. But giving the 
metaphorical wolf and bear a place around the table is an indicator of homogeneity, as 
well as it is a sign of diversity. To reject this, Tully claims that his conception of culture 
is different from the paradigmatic “billiard ball” notions, and hence it bypasses the 
problems of essentialism.52 But the substance of his theory, insofar as its collectivist 
undertones are concerned, tells otherwise. After all, those in the black canoe represent 
the dominant majorities of their own groups. Majorities can use the principles of 
continuity and consent (mainly the withholding of it) to negotiate with other groups, in 
terms that are in their interest, and to the detriment of their internal dissenting 
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minorities. The fact that identities being debated in the black canoe are aspectival rather 
than self-contained or essentialist, to be sure, is an improvement, but in the absence of 
effective guarantees against the internal minorities being silenced or treated as less than 
equal, it may offer little consolation to the dispersed dissenters.  
Tully himself is aware of this difficulty but chooses to gloss over it by 
emphasizing the graveness of the problem that he is trying to solve – the problem of 
colonialism and neo-colonialism. It is important to point out, as Tully does, the 
normative weight of the concept of self-government in addressing the multicultural 
questions. However, it is also important to differentiate between democratic and non-
democratic meanings of the concept of self-government, and then to explain if the 
present use falls under the democratic or non-democratic category. For instance, it is 
one thing to criticize the inflexibility of existing modes of constitutionalism with regard 
to non-western types of rule, as Tully does, but quite another to explain whether these 
non-western types and their justification in terms of self-rule reveal a democratic 
character. Doing the former, and even showing a good deal of bias on the part of 
modern constitutionalism, does not tell us much about the democratic merits of non-
western types of rule. This is clear from the response that Tully offers to the objection 
that weakening modern constitutionalism can strengthen local despots. He recognizes 
that this logic of sovereignty can place so much power in the hands of local elites that 
members of such communities “may not be able to control them.”53 But the answer 
Tully has to offer simply restates the position that gave rise to this objection in the first 
place. Even his passing suggestion that the three norms of democratic constitutionalism 
have to apply across the board is overshadowed by the forcefulness of the following 
disclaimer: “The presumption that non-Aboriginal people may sit in judgement, from 
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the unquestioned superiority of their constitutions and traditions of interpretation, and 
guard the transition of the Aboriginal peoples from colonialism to self government 
smacks of the imperial attitude that contemporary constitutionalism aims to dislodge.”54  
The argument developed in Strange Multiplicity cannot offer a solution to this 
problem insofar as the author is unwilling to qualify the collectivist ontology on which 
it rests. Critical voices from within and outside may have to yield to existing customs, 
traditions, and ways of life because groups come to constitutional negotiations already 
constituted by these practices. On this view, cultures matter independently of their 
benefits to individuals and cultural belonging is considered an intrinsic good.55 Of 
course, given the history of abuse that Aboriginal peoples of North America, Tully’s 
primary case study, have lived through, the case he makes for self-rule is forceful. But 
this does not obviate the task of elucidating complex normative considerations 
surrounding democratic exercise of self-rule. In other words, the democratic credentials 
of Tully’s argument hinge on this latter question that Tully almost completely ignores 
more than it does on the former question about the history of an abusive imperial 
relationship. In order to reconceptualise the constitution in a way that engenders a 
democratic multilogue in which different groups making up diverse societies such as 
Canada can cooperate freely in a post-imperial and democratic way, Tully will have to 
qualify the collectivist notion of consent that seems to be doing lots of work in his 
argument and accept some minimal universalizing norms of democracy, particularly its 
individualistic core, as legitimate. 
                                                            
54
 SM, 191. 
55
 In contrasting the viewpoint defended in Strange Multiplicity to liberalism, Tully writes: 
“Consequently, although liberals place no value on cultures in their own right, they are now classified as a 
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To be sure, the acceptance of such universalizing claims of democracy – 
notwithstanding the fact that they represent a minimalist conception – would constrain 
the ‘fluidity’ of the multilogue and the shape that intergroup relations can take. The 
changes could result in terms that may not please one or the other party at any given 
time, but this seems to be the most straightforward way Tully’s theory can lay a claim to 
democraticness in the modern sense of the term, where the focus is more on individual-
centred considerations such as rights and welfare than collectivist goals such as 
communal greatness or pride.56  The upshot is that Tully’s black canoe could symbolize 
peaceful coexistence, but to represent a democratic coexistence the author will have to 
clarify and espouse the universalizing core of democratic norms. This will probably 
require accepting that it is democratic for groups to have varying levels of influence 
depending on their electoral strength. Otherwise, one would be overlooking the 
competitive nature of modern democracy, which accounts for a great part of its 
normative appeal and its stability.  
There is still an important caveat to be made. The self-government challenge 
does identify an important problem. It is easy for individualist political theories to fail to 
recognise the collective dimension of democracy. For example, when we say that 
persons have the individual freedom to cast a ballot, there are implications of this at the 
collective level (e.g., drawing electoral boundaries, etc.) that have to be clarified and 
espoused, which can easily slip out of sight in the case of individualist theories of 
liberalism and democracy. This is an important reminder, but recognising the 
normatively important collective aspect of democracy does not require a commitment to 
collectivism.  
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4. The Inclusion Challenge 
Another important theme from the political theory of multiculturalism is concerned with 
the terms in which multicultural societies should include their minorities. Most theorists 
favourable to multiculturalism at some point draw on the notion of inclusion. The 
commonly voiced concern is that the liberal democracies of our time show exclusionary 
tendencies with respect to their cultural minorities. This often manifests itself in 
underrepresentation of minorities in formal socio-political structures and/or their lack of 
influence over key policy areas (e.g., cultural and other socioeconomic rights) even 
when they approach numerical representation. Inclusion is an important concept and any 
principled stance on multiculturalism that does not discuss it remains incomplete for the 
following reason. It is not sufficient to recognize cultural difference or cultural 
minorities’ entitlement to various degrees of self-rule. Although the preceding two 
themes of self-government and recognition tell us more about the positioning of cultural 
minorities in a multicultural society, the theme of inclusion is more directly concerned 
with the relational aspects of such positioning. Hence, in exploring inclusion we gain 
more insight into power relations between minorities on the one hand and majorities and 
the democratic system on the other. To be sure, the terms of inclusion, to a great extent, 
are determined by the kind of recognition that multicultural groups obtain and the kind 
of self-rule that they demand. But to stop here is to miss the point that multiculturalism 
is also concerned with the adjustments that the rest of the society has to make and also 
the features of the multicultural polity that emerges as a result of such changes. In other 
words, talking exclusively about what minorities should have in terms of rights and 
privileges ignores the bigger picture of what the body politic should look like.  
Below, I examine a particular formulation of this challenge by Iris Young, who 
was among the first proponents of multiculturalism and developed ideas that have had a 
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lasting impact on the literature. Young’s formulation of the inclusion challenge makes 
the unqualified claim that the politics of difference not only is compatible with 
democracy, but it is also an outright requirement of democracy. The necessary 
connection Young draws between the two ideas rests on a familiar conception of 
democracy, which, however, is rendered peculiar by its attachment to certain 
ontological and epistemological claims about how persons relate to each other. 
Democracy, for Young, despite its intrinsic merits is primarily valuable for an 
instrumental reason; that is, for its capacity to produce just results.57 Just decisions 
materialize when democracy “includes all equally in the process that leads to decisions 
[for] all those who will be affected by them.”58 For Young, “what counts as a just result 
is what participants would arrive at under ideal conditions”.59 However, the obvious 
logical circularity of this view of democratic justice – justice is what ideal democratic 
procedures produce, and ideal democratic procedures are the ones that produce just 
results – in Young’s view, necessitates fixing some of the ideals of justice. Because the 
primary forms of injustice that characterize modern democracies are oppression and 
domination, and the two corresponding ideals of self-determination and self-
development are in Young’s view quite uncontroversial principles, she chooses these as 
her starting point.60 Then, for Young, democratic justice will be about minimizing 
oppression and domination, and hence, advancing self-determination and self-
development. This, among other things, “involves a reconception of the meaning of 
equality.”61 In the inclusive democracy, equality is no longer limited to the procedural 
sense of the term that requires mechanisms of collective decision-making to stand in 
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equal distance to all citizen interests, but is cast as a substantive principle that will 
ensure “full participation and inclusion of everyone in a society’s major institutions”, 
which in turn requires providing everyone with conditions “to develop and exercise 
their capacities and realize their choices.”62 
At first, Young’s move to make inclusion the guiding principle of her redefined 
conception of democracy may not look like she is advocating a radical break from 
contemporary democratic theory, because the ideal of inclusion has featured 
prominently in the writings of many twentieth century democratic theorists.63 The same 
could be claimed about her calls for deeper democracy and redefinition of equality, 
which have been recurrent themes in the normative theory of democracy.64 This 
impression of familiarity, however, does not survive a close scrutiny of Young’s 
conception of democracy and its central notion of inclusion.  
Young’s redefinition of equality requires divorcing the latter from its modern 
dimensions of neutrality and impartiality. Because current terms of inclusion are 
dictated by an exclusionary moral language, an inclusionary democracy has to find itself 
new guiding principles. The Enlightenment language of impartiality, which according to 
Young remains as the foremost legitimizing idea in political theory, stands as a huge 
obstacle to this reformulation.65 It is an undemocratic force that allows the portrayal of 
upper-class bourgeois biases as the general interest.66 As I mentioned in the introduction 
to the section, a complex epistemological and ontological argument underlies this 
formulation of the inclusion challenge. Let us take a look at the complicated picture 
before elaborating on its claims to being democratic.  
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First, on the ontological argument. Young rejects what she calls atomism of the 
distributive paradigm in favour of the view of social groups that underlines relations 
between individuals as matters of social justice.67 Most political theories, according to 
Young, often disregard these relations and do not have conceptual resources to account 
for them because they operate with an individualist methodology. The most common 
understandings of groups – the aggregate model and the association model fail to 
capture the social, cultural, and political significance of groups for persons’ identities. 
Social groups are important because they partly constitute our identities: “A person’s 
particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of 
reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling are constituted partly by her or his group 
affinities.”68 Given this, Young thinks it is wrong to subscribe to an ontology that views 
individuals as prior to groups. Individuals despite not being prior to groups, remain as 
agents capable of choosing from the available sets of options.69 Thus, Young views her 
conception of social groups as an anti-essentialist one. Namely, what justifies grouping 
people together under some banner is not a set of common attributes that can be found 
among all members of that group, but the social relationships in which group members 
stand to one another.70  
Despite, its avowed anti-essentialism, Young’s challenge does not shy away 
from placing culture at the normative core of inclusion.71 In Young’s definition, culture 
encompasses “all aspects of social life from the point of view of their linguistic, 
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symbolic, affective, and embodied norms and practices.”72 Because these unreflective 
meanings that people attach to one another’s persons, actions, and their values and 
norms comprise “the background and medium of action,” they “often significantly 
affect the social standing of persons and their opportunities.”73 Given this fact about 
human interaction, Young holds that, bringing about equality of persons and their 
opportunities requires “politicizing culture”.74 Moreover, this has the urgency of being a 
matter of social justice because in modern democratic societies oppression often takes 
place through, and disguises itself behind, cultural forms. Oppression takes different 
shapes from open violence towards certain cultural forms to visibly less hostile but still 
unjust forms such as marginalization and assignment of inferior meanings to other 
groups’ norms and practices by the dominant groups that “have exclusive or primary 
access to what Nancy Fraser calls the means of interpretation and communication in a 
society.”75 In this latter shape, discussed by Young under the title of “cultural 
imperialism”, dominant groups not only inflict direct harm on those they dub anomalous 
and inferior in various ways, but also cause the oppressed groups to internalize these 
negative images, resulting in the development of “double consciousness”.76 “Double 
consciousness” or the more visible kinds of disadvantage associated with cultural 
imperialism are not always results of exercising cultural hegemony through derogatory 
and openly hostile language and gestures, but can emerge from norms and practices that 
are widely presumed to be egalitarian. The norm of impartiality, being the cornerstone 
of liberal-egalitarian justice theories, is one such norm that, Young thinks, contributes to 
cultural imperialism by denying that subjects occupy different social positions and 
hence experience social life differently. In reducing such diversity into unity, 
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impartiality often unreflectively registers the dominant group’s particularity as the 
universal. 77 
The contours of Young’s argument against impartiality are by now becoming 
clear.  Impartiality justifies the idea of a homogenous public, which in turn sweeps most 
instances of domination and oppression under the carpet for being private differences 
unworthy of public attention. The inclusive democracy has to decouple itself from these 
deceptive elements that create the false impression of equality and embrace a 
conception of communicative politics that allows persons to participate in a truly equal 
way characteristic of the ideal of inclusive equality.78  
Part of the strategy for achieving such deep equality has to do with changing the 
terms of participation for everyone by recognizing forms of political communication 
that are not restricted to the dominant forms of argumentation.79 Although the rationale 
behind this move, to eradicate the disadvantage of groups currently struggling from 
structural inequality, is targeted at specific groups, this expansion can still be interpreted 
as falling in line with the universal core of normative democracy. The other part of the 
response to structural inequality, however, seems to depart radically from the ideal of 
equality that we saw in the previous chapter. In Young’s own words, “equality as the 
participation and inclusion of all groups sometimes requires different treatment for 
oppressed or disadvantaged groups. To promote social justice, I argue, social policy 
should sometimes accord special treatment to groups.”80 Before we discuss the 
democratic credentials of this claim of special treatment, we have to briefly consider the 
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related epistemological argument that underlies Young’s particular conception of 
democracy.  
The ontological argument about groups and structural inequality operates in 
conjunction with an epistemological argument. The epistemological claim is that the 
“heterogeneous public, in which persons stand forth with their differences 
acknowledged and respected”81 is better qualified to make just decisions because it 
boasts a better pool of social knowledge.82 Knowledge at issue in this argument is not 
just the subjective understanding of other people’s disadvantage, but an “an objective 
understanding of the society, a comprehensive account of its relations and structured 
processes”.83 Social difference in this model becomes a resource rather than an 
impediment to justice because it provides an access to this objective knowledge. In 
addition to assuming that affirming other people’s differences produces a better 
knowledge pool, the argument, of course, operates with the assumption that the 
availability of such knowledge will dispose “participants in political debate to transform 
their claims from mere expression of self-regarding interest to appeals to justice”.84 The 
shame of appearing unjust will motivate the advantaged participants to become more 
cooperative.  
 Of the three challenges that I have considered so far, the inclusion challenge 
may appear the most unproblematically democratic since it seems to avoid some 
intractable difficulties that we see in the multiculturalist claims for recognition and self-
rule. Unlike Tully’s anti-colonialism, Young’s difference-friendly pluralism does not 
rest on the cultural continuity thesis whose democratic credentials are highly 
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controversial. Unlike Taylor, Young is more hesitant about conceptualizing deep 
disagreement as a consequence of multicultural plurality and differences in basic world-
views. She thinks many of these disagreements represent structural inequalities rather 
than more intractable cultural disagreements. More specifically, most relevant social 
differences, on Young’s account, emerge from variances in people’s social perspectives. 
Also, Young notes that she disagrees with Taylor and others who claim “that 
misrecognition is usually a political problem independent of other forms of inequality 
and oppression.”85  
 Furthermore, many other elements of the inclusion challenge are supported by 
principles underlying NMD. At the most general level, Young’s claim that inclusion is a 
core democratic value is something that normatively sound minimalist democracy has to 
accept. For as we saw in chapter three, inclusion is an idea that follows directly from 
NMD’s egalitarian core. Also, Young’s specific goal of making political exchange more 
receptive towards needs of minority groups, and what she says about the social reality 
of groups, are commitments that NMD has to take seriously for reasons that chapters six 
and seven will discuss in detail. I want to leave these similarities aside for now, and 
focus on important differences between NMD and the inclusion challenge. 
Young’s account rests on important misinterpretations and overstatements of 
what democracy can, and ought to, do with respect to pluralism and difference. Not 
surprisingly, it is when considering the inclusion challenge that we can more clearly see 
the dangers associated with over-ambitious, transformative projects advocated in the 
name of democracy, and how these carry the risk of undermining even minimal, core 
democratic principles.  
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The ideal of deep democracy at work in the inclusion challenge operates with a 
distorted picture of the normative standing of the individual. NMD agrees with Young’s 
suggestion that a fuller account of democracy has to take relations between individuals 
into account. However, it disagrees with Young’s claim that inclusion of relationality 
has to come at the expense of democratic theory’s commitment to individualism. In 
JPD, Young writes that her theory “promotes a notion of group solidarity against the 
individualism of liberal humanism.”86 To be sure, Young does not uphold the ideal of 
community in quite the same way that Tully and Taylor do. Despite being inspired by 
Sandel’s critique of Rawls, particularly the former’s views on the embeddedness of 
persons and criticisms of the view from nowhere87, Young criticizes the standard 
communitarian account for remaining a homogenizing ideal – one that continues to 
“exhibit the logic of identity”.88 Therefore, she advocates a different kind of community 
– one that shares many characteristics with the communal life of a city– that is not 
subject to similar homogenizing impulses. In the city, culture, solidarity, and other 
communal attachments can survive without being subject to the totalizing, and 
assimilating, urge of achieving familiarity or clarity through identifying all as 
symmetrical parts of the whole that Young attributes to communitarians like Sandel.89  
One could grant that the above are factors that mitigate Young’s critique of 
individualism. Nonetheless, this does not change the fact that in Young’s theory there 
remain important elements that elevate community and depreciate the individual. The 
first thing to note is that many cities still comprise a community. There are some 
notable exceptions to this claim; some cities are conglomerations of historically and 
culturally independent communities that have been brought together in recent decades 
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for reasons such as bureaucratic efficiency. But in those cases, the city is literally made 
of several sizeable cities, which in their own right comprise more or less homogenizing 
communities.90 Indeed, the reason why Young chooses the city as her desirable model 
of politics is that it allows more local solidarities to flourish. In Young’s own words, the 
city “bring[s] differently identified groups together without suppressing or subsuming 
the differences.”91 Young may ultimately wish to eliminate the juxtaposition of 
individual and community in a dialectic symbiosis that recognizes the connectedness of 
the two, but in this alternative (Young calls it a “third way”), important elements of 
individualism – e.g., assertion of rights, the desire to press one’s own interests – still 
remain reprehensible. We can recall from the previous two chapters, how democratic 
theory would be rendered less coherent when collective entities are bestowed with 
characteristics that are more properly attributed to individuals such as will and rights or 
when individualist characteristics of democracy such as its competitive dimension or 
equality of status are undermined.  
Young is not completely unaware of the risks associated with the normative 
devaluation of individual. There are sporadic comments scattered through her writings 
affirming a belief, albeit reluctantly, in the importance of the individual. My point here 
is not to cast these comments as attempts by a critic of liberal democracy to mitigate the 
harshness of her critique in order for her theory to appear more palatable. After all, the 
aim in Young’s case is to eradicate oppression and domination which is ultimately 
suffered by individuals.92 Her theory has emancipatory objectives; and given her claim 
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that groups are not ontologically real, the objects of emancipation are ultimately 
individual members of groups. Perhaps the spirit behind her radical argument is given 
the best articulation in the following passage from another distinguished voice in the 
debate on the politics of difference. “Caution is of course the watchword of the moment, 
and the more likely danger for the immediate future lies less in the risk of non-
democratic alternatives to liberal democracy than in the complacency of those who feel 
they have reclaimed the political agenda.”93  Young, like many other voices in the 
debate who side with differentiated citizenship, is not scared of social experimentation. 
She seems to think that the repulsiveness of injustice in modern liberal democratic 
societies outpaces the risks of a carefully designed social experimentation going wrong. 
Given this background of injustice, to quote from Phillips again, “it would be a sorry 
outcome for democracy in general if the extraordinary political events of the 1980s and 
1990s ushered in a period of unquestioning celebration of the limited democracy we 
currently enjoy.”94 The problem in all of this is that many of the solutions advocated in 
the name of the deeper democracy are not very democratic. The ultimate goals of 
Young’s project, when taken in their abstract form, may prove compatible with 
democratic goals outlined in the previous two chapters. But for us to find consolation in 
this fact, we would have to overlook the spatiality and temporality of actual politics – 
something that Young wants political theory to take very seriously, and criticises 
liberalism and communitarianism for failing to do so.95  
The inclusion challenge also helps us cash out the consensualist and 
transformative utopia. (Let us recall that I defined normatively sound minimalist 
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democracy partly in its opposition to the two.) In this case, the consensualist utopia 
takes a rather strange form. The inclusion model accepts all the diversity and pluralism 
(something NMD upholds) that other consensualist theories disregard and abstract away 
in order to make consensus more attainable, but goes on to assume an even stronger, 
more comprehensive consensus. Young’s consensualism manifests itself in her 
principled opposition to majoritarianism and other competitive elements of 
democracy.96 The consensus to which the inclusion challenge aspires is more 
comprehensive in the sense that no stone that is related to oppression and domination is 
left unturned.97 Let us rephrase the above in order to fully appreciate how perplexing it 
is. We are going to affirm all the differences among a large number of groups, and at the 
same time expect to end up in a politics where the common and quite substantive 
purpose of a justice is served. The transformative utopia helps explain this rather 
optimistic view. Young thinks a social revolution, taking place mainly at the level of 
civil society, will transform citizens into deliberative individuals who will have a 
motivation to do justice to their fellows. I do not want to question the practicality of this 
motivation – people need to have to have a sense of justice, and probably a motivation 
to help publicly achieve what they perceive as just. I also think what the inclusion 
challenge says about the need to affirm particular experiences is not as problematic as 
many liberals would regard. This may indeed be the right way of achieving justice in a 
society where deep structural differences render the universalist moral language not 
nuanced enough, and less useful by itself. My main problem is with Young’s optimism 
that such pooling of particular knowledge will somehow result in deliberative outcomes 
that satisfy all different points of view. There seem to be no good reasons to presuppose 
that asserting the parochial knowledge will result in a more enlightened commitment to 
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some kind of, albeit heterogeneous,  universal truth. This looks very similar to the 
consensualist presuppositions of liberal social contract theory.  
The above scenario points not just in an unlikely, utopian direction, but takes its 
toll on democracy. There is the very real risk that the transformative project will run 
amok, not only deploying undemocratic means, but also undermining the real gains 
made by the expansion of liberal democracy. For what is supposed to keep such grand 
scale transformation in check – constraints like individual rights and competition 
between partially self-interested factions – have already been devalued by the inclusion 
challenge. As we will see in the next two chapters, the worry of the transformative 
picture is not just an instance of reactionary conservatism, or put mildly, a wariness of 
social change. There are normative reasons built into the idea of a sustainable 
democracy that militate against large-scale blueprints of the kind espoused by the 
inclusion challenge.  
On the culture side of the equation, NMD shows signs of agreement with Young 
on her point that politicizing cultures may not, after all,  be as dreadful a possibility as 
critics of multiculturalism suggest. However, as we will see in the following chapters, 
particularly when discussing the unacceptability of politicizing motives, NMD operates 
with a definition of culture quite different from Young’s. Finally, Young’s critique of 
difference-blind impartiality is convincing when she deploys it against liberal 
egalitarianism’s propensity to take individuals’ different social positions as fixed rather 
than relational. However, her culturalism, by presupposing fixed and unchanging value 
of culture and group affinity for personal identity, seems to do precisely what her logic 
of relational justice argues against.  
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As far as Young’s ontological argument is concerned, NMD denies that 
individualism commits democratic theory to atomism or impoverishes its capacity to 
explain social reality. Many liberals have long articulated coherent criticisms of the 
psychological atomism of Mill or similar claims in Hobbes without having to affirm any 
positive value for groups.98 The individualism that underlies various theories of 
liberalism and democracy has no difficulty in accounting for complex social relations. 
Even the most individualist thinkers of the twentieth century were critical of atomism 
and had no problems accepting the claim that “the whole is more than the mere sum of 
its parts”.99 For instance, Hayek holds that “The overall order of actions in a group is 
[...] more than the totality of regularities observable in the actions of the individuals and 
cannot be wholly reduced to them” because “these elements are related to each other in 
a particular manner.”100  Hayek goes on to add that “the existence of those relations 
which are essential for the existence of the whole cannot be accounted for wholly by the 
interaction of the parts but only by their interaction with an outside world both of the 
individual parts and the whole.”101 Similarly, Popper’s rejection of atomism can be 
summed up in the following statement: “That it is unwarranted is shown by the need for 
a theory of the unintended social repercussions of our actions, and by the need for what 
I have described as a logic of social situations.”102 What Popper means by this, among 
other things, is that an explanation of individual human action, let alone more complex 
actions involving a far greater number of individuals, cannot be reduced to the 
                                                            
98
 See Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 87-92. 
99
 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, 70-1. 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Ibid. 
102
 Popper, 92. 
Chapter 4: Democratic Pretensions of Multiculturalists 
 
162 
 
explanation of psychological or behaviourist terms, for individuals act in an 
“environment [that] is very largely of a social nature”.103 
5. Conclusion: Multiculturalist Pretensions and the Way Forward 
Some clear conclusions emerge from the above analysis of the three multiculturalist 
claims made in the name of democracy.  Each challenge identifies important issues with 
the ways in which modern democratic societies respond to questions of diversity. 
Examination of these challenges, in turn, reveals certain misconceptions that affect the 
multiculturalists' judgment – which often lead to exaggerated diagnoses concerning the 
gap between existing and genuinely multicultural conditions. Had their diagnoses been 
accurate, NMD could be more sympathetic to what these authors claim about the 
relation of democracy and multiculturalism. But the diagnoses these authors put forward 
are often far-fetched as they draw on some conceptions of democracy that have little 
foothold in contemporary political conditions or conceptions that are normatively 
unattractive insofar as they recklessly run the risk of undermining what makes 
democracy a coherent system of government. And unsurprisingly when diagnoses are 
off the mark, the chances of arriving at satisfactory solutions are also slim. However, 
this should not be a reason to overlook important problems that multiculturalists 
identify for democratic theory. And the full force of what is genuinely democratic in 
these challenges, can only be appreciated after the respective anti-multiculturalist 
responses are evaluated in the next chapter.  
 For now, we can safely sum up that the three core concepts multiculturalists are 
operating with are not completely foreign to the type of democratic theory proposed in 
this work. In all three cases, especially if we are to think of the three challenges together 
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rather than in isolation, what sets NMD and multiculturalism apart has to do more with 
nuanced interpretation of the three concepts than an outright incompatibility between 
them and the core democratic principles. For example, as we saw in section 2, 
recognition per se does not place multiculturalism in conflict with NMD; it is certain 
features of the concept as developed by Taylor that causes tensions. The same applies to 
the other two challenges as well.  
 There are some singular threads that run through all three charges, and form the 
fault lines between multiculturalists and their critics that we began to see in this chapter. 
One has to do with the place of individualism in democratic theory and whether it shuts 
out groups from claiming any normative significance or not. Another related thread has 
to do with the place of culture in politics. The work done in this chapter gives us a good 
idea of where NMD stands on these contentious issues, but a more accurate and 
complete picture will emerge only after we have examined the mistakes of anti-
multiculturalists. For if rejection of multiculturalism produces equally bad or even 
worse outcomes for democracy, our conclusions concerning the degree to which the two 
are compatible will have to reflect this fact.  
A crucial point to keep in mind when moving forward is that these are not 
mutually-exclusive or self-standing normative ideals, but always remain related to each 
other in a myriad of ways. Moreover, their interrelations are also normatively significant 
in addition to being important for reasons of conceptual clarity. At critical junctions 
where normative theory is being tested with hard cases that involve the violation of 
certain democratic commitments, and when answers offered by anti-multiculturalists are 
not satisfactory either, examining internal tensions within multiculturalism will provide 
us with a better understanding of what democratically acceptable resolutions have to 
look like. 
164 
 
Chapter 5: Democratic Aspirations of Anti-Multiculturalists –  
  Is Multiculturalism Bad for Democracy? 
The last chapter tried to elucidate the democratic pretensions of multiculturalists – the 
way supporters of multiculturalism draw on democratic ideals, often unsuccessfully, in 
order to make their theories more normatively appealing. The singular thread that ran 
through all arguments examined in the previous chapter was that not only is 
multiculturalism good for democracy, it directly follows from some very important 
democratic principles. There, I identified several flaws in the multiculturalists’ attempts 
at explaining democracy and multiculturalism as necessarily connected. In this chapter, 
I turn to examine the opposing view that multiculturalism is bad for democracy or that it 
is ruled out by several core democratic principles. Theorists who fall into this camp 
usually claim that multiculturalism and democracy are two incompatible and 
contradictory projects. For instance, a democrat’s commitment to the defining elements 
of democratic theory such as individualism and egalitarianism contradict the collectivist 
spirit of multiculturalism. Although from the last chapter we know that the link between 
multiculturalism and democracy is not as strong as multiculturalists argue, largely for 
reasons that we will see anti-multiculturalists invoke in this chapter, we should not rush 
to embrace the anti-multiculturalists’ side of the story either. Subjecting the latter’s 
arguments to a similar scrutiny reveals how these theorists deploy democratic principles 
in support of their case in a similarly erroneous way, and thus also have democratic 
pretensions.  
1. Anti-Multiculturalist Arguments 
In chapter four, we saw the role the triad of recognition, inclusion, and self-rule 
plays in the multiculturalists’ answers to the guiding question of the dissertation. 
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Coincidentally, another – this time, a much more familiar – trichotomy bears the 
normative weight of the anti-multiculturalist arguments. Freedom, equality, and 
solidarity are the three main concepts in the arsenal of anti-multiculturalists. Together, 
the three ideas encapsulate the philosophical opposition to multiculturalism that we see 
among writers who consider themselves liberal egalitarians. At the nexus of this new 
triad, we can identify three distinct clusters of arguments that animate the political 
thought of multiculturalism’s critics. These are (a) the more familiar liberal egalitarian 
equal rights argument, (b) the solidarity argument, and (c) the arguments that combine a 
more historical and holistic perspective about the shape of liberal democracy with some 
normative elements of (a) and (b). Here I will mainly focus on (a) and (b), but will 
include a brief discussion of (c) to ensure that I am not leaving out something 
conceptually relevant. Unlike in the last chapter where the three themes – despite being 
interrelated – were easily distinguishable, and keeping them conceptually distinct could 
have some normative significance, specifically for allowing one to adjudicate a 
multicultural concern, in this chapter keeping the three anti-multiculturalist arguments 
separate does not serve the same kind of clear-cut purpose. Therefore, I will present 
these three challenges in the first part and evaluate them together in the second part of 
the chapter.  
A. The Equal Rights Argument 
In several articles published in the late 1990s, Will Kymlicka assesses the trajectory of 
“the multiculturalism wars”1 and notes that “the multiculturalists have won the day” 
because “few thoughtful people continue to think that justice can simply be defined in 
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terms of difference-blind rules or institutions.”2 While in the late 90s many including 
Kymlicka began to celebrate the success multiculturalists have had in “punctur[ing] the 
complacency with which liberals used to dismiss claims for minority rights”3, others 
continued to question the philosophical foundations of multiculturalism.4 Just as the 
claims of equal rights and freedoms played a pivotal role in what some now regard as 
the premature or transient5 success of the multiculturalist arguments, in critiques the 
claim that multiculturalism undermines equal rights is at the fore.  
Brian Barry’s passionate and comprehensive anti-multiculturalist treatise 
Culture and Equality and Susan Okin’s essay “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” 
are eminent examples of the equal rights challenge against multiculturalism.6 Barry’s 
arguments are particularly relevant because he presents anti-multiculturalism as a 
corollary of one’s commitment to liberal democracy. Barry regards principles and 
concerns associated with multiculturalism as a threat to the fundamental tenets of liberal 
democracy and its Enlightenment foundations. Because Barry’s work has already 
generated some excellent reviews and responses, I want to limit my engagement with it, 
just as I did with other thinkers in the previous chapter, to identifying his democratic 
pretensions. But first let us identify what the democratic challenge is.  
To Barry, principles underlying multiculturalism, and the demands that they 
make on society at large, undermine the egalitarian essence of liberal democracy in 
several important ways. One of the crucial arguments Culture and Equality makes 
against multiculturalism in order to weaken the latter’s illusive egalitarian appeal takes 
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issue with the introduction of group rights. In Barry’s view, claiming, as 
multiculturalists do, that – in addition to individual rights – there are certain rights that 
can be attributed to cultures, undermines liberal democracy’s commitment to individual 
rights. Barry regards the arguments for cultural rights made by political theorists such as 
Kymlicka and Tully as “perversion[s] of common sense” because “[c]ultures are simply 
not the kind of entity to which rights can properly be ascribed.”7 In Barry’s words, 
elevating “cultural survival ... to the status of an end in itself” turns individuals into 
“mere cyphers, to be mobilized as instruments of a transcendent goal.”8 Hence Barry 
dismisses Taylor’s suggestion that the survival of Quebecois culture can provide a 
justification for overriding some of the non-fundamental rights of the English Canadian 
minority living in the province of Quebec.  
Not only cultures are not the kinds of entities to which rights can be attributed, 
but they also cannot stand as a special source of justification for our actions.9 Barry 
writes that “[t]he defining feature of a liberal is, I suggest, that it is someone who holds 
that there are certain rights against oppression, exploitation and injury to which every 
single human being is entitled to lay claim, and that appeals to ‘cultural diversity’ and 
pluralism under no circumstances trump the value of basic liberties and rights.”10 
Whether “assault, battery and false imprisonment” are done for cultural reasons or 
reasons that liberals regard as criminal or sadistic does not change the fact that these 
actions involve violation of basic rights whose defence, according to Barry, is the 
primary responsibility of liberalism.11 To claim otherwise is to commit oneself to 
cultural relativism, which is a view that not only is incompatible with liberal democracy 
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but also faulty in logic. It is incompatible with liberal democracy in the sense that the 
latter makes universalistic claims about the status of certain normative principles such 
as those concerning equal rights and liberties that the former rules out.12 Value 
pluralism and its offshoot in the context of multiculturalism – equal recognition of 
cultures – are according to Barry logically incongruent in addition to being 
inappropriate to democracy: “The inescapable problem is that cultures have 
propositional content. It is an inevitable aspect of any culture that it will include ideas to 
the effect that some beliefs are true and some false, and that some things are right and 
others wrong.”13 Our societies, according to Barry, are full of cultures that make 
mutually-exclusive claims: such as the evangelical Christians’ aversion to 
homosexuality and homosexuals’ affirmation of homosexuality. Barry regards it absurd 
to think that these can be reconciled in the form of equal mutual recognition of worth 
and affirmation of value demanded by theorists like Young.14 
Barry goes on to point out that this objection to cultural rights does not extend to 
individual rights or entitlements that at any given time disproportionally benefit certain 
groups including some cultural ones (e.g., affirmative action). Barry holds these are not 
cultural rights, for they do not ascribe any rights to a "corporate entity", and they benefit 
individuals qua group members "only as the by-product of a programme that is aimed at 
increasing the opportunities of individuals."15 To be sure, Barry shows strong scepticism 
towards this latter group of policies for a different reason. Namely, he thinks that the 
group-based system of differentiated entitlements often falls short of its liberal-
egalitarian objective of removing undeserved disadvantage due to being either under-
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inclusive or over-inclusive.16 He, nonetheless, allows for the possibility of group-rights 
of this latter type under circumstances where it is impossible to rectify the disadvantage 
by some other more efficient means. In Barry’s words, “egalitarian liberalism does not 
rule out special treatment for members of certain [disadvantaged] groups”.17 This, 
however, comes with a strong proviso that multiculturalists such as Kymlicka, Taylor, 
Young, and Tully would reject as another evidence of “Enlightenment” liberalism’s 
incapacity to appreciate the role of culture.18 What multiculturalists regard as 
unacceptable assimilationism, Barry regards as “an assimilationist virtuous circle”.19  
In a closely related move, Barry argues against the multiculturalists’ critique of 
impartiality and legal uniformity. The multiculturalists’ reliance on such arguments is, 
for Barry, yet another indication of the inegalitarian nature of their project. In equating 
impartiality with oppression and injustice against cultural minorities, multiculturalists 
undermine legal equality which had been the main achievement of the Enlightenment, 
consequently paving the way for our return to the “Dark Age”.20 Here, the targets of 
Barry’s criticism are thinkers such as Iris Young and James Tully whose theories, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, are critical of the assimilationist tendencies they attribute to 
the norms of impartiality and legal uniformity. Barry’s response to these critics, and 
their post-structuralist forerunners, is to point out that the conceptions of impartiality 
and uniformity at work in multiculturalism are caricatures of liberalism and ignore the 
underlying value of equal concern. First, Barry thinks critics such as Young and Tully 
misunderstand what equal treatment entails. In Barry’s view, impartial treatment and 
legal uniformity are compatible with a system that is sensitive to differences among 
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citizens and takes the appropriate measures to ensure the demands of equal concern are 
fulfilled in the face of these differences. In Barry’s words: “The contrast is not with 
uniformity in the sense that everybody pays the same amount of tax but with uniformity 
in the sense that everybody faces the same tax system. A good deal of anti-
Enlightenment rhetoric depends on systematically confusing these two senses of 
uniformity.”21 Furthermore, Barry points out, in the absence of uniformity of treatment, 
privileges will proliferate.22 
Related to these points is a more pervasive error of judgment. Multiculturalism 
offends the egalitarian moral outlook by operating with a distorted image of individuals 
as moral agents. Barry takes issue with the multiculturalist arguments that criticise 
individualism and exalt the more social aspects of human interaction (e.g., the fallacies 
of atomism arguments that we saw in the last chapter), for such arguments end up 
supporting a political environment in which a person “swerves toward a belief in 
superiority.”23  On multiple occasions Barry draws parallels between principles 
underlying multiculturalism and those that gave rise to reactionary movements such as 
fascism and racism. Here, an obvious target is Taylor, whose sympathies towards the 
Herderian belief “that each Volk has a Geist that is uniquely suited to it”, in Barry’s 
view, gives way to a concern with cultural autonomy or purity, and self-conscious 
resistance to any kind of change in the cultural structures.24 This Barry thinks is a 
particularly “fertile ground” for the growth of reactionary politics, which is anathema to 
the progressivism of liberal political thought. Moreover, some multiculturalists' 
disparagement of civil rights as "worthless in the absence of a 'cultural revolution'" 
weakens resistance to the anti-individualist and totalitarian effects of cultural 
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conservatism. By moving away from a strict commitment to individual rights towards 
an agenda that calls for a complete overhaul of culture, multiculturalists create a milieu 
in which political culture of liberalism can be more boldly attacked by reactionary 
conservatives of the kind that write for the Weekly Standard.25 For radical egalitarians, 
this is an unfortunate by-product of their calls to politicize culture and unleash the 
democratic potential for transformation of social norms and meanings, which are 
currently kept stagnant by liberalism. 
Barry’s final criticism of multiculturalism is that it has made inroads through 
anti-democratic means and its claims are often anti-democratic in principle for being 
counter-majoritarian.26 He writes that “It is not simply that debate on the general 
principles of multiculturalism is strenuously avoided [in Britain]. In addition to that, the 
specific fixes that constitute practical multiculturalism are negotiated behind closed 
doors.”27 On the other hand, Barry conceives multiculturalism and democracy as 
representing contradictory socio-political ideals:  “The ‘politics of difference’ thus rests 
on a rejection of what we may call, in contrast, the politics of solidarity. ... This 
[democratic] way of looking at politics is altogether different from the one characteristic 
of multiculturalists. For them, there is ‘no such things as society’ – not in the sense 
intended by Margaret Thatcher ... but in the sense that a society is to be conceived of as 
a fictitious body whose real constituents are communities.”28 
B. The Solidarity Argument 
Many contemporary liberal egalitarian, communitarian, and republican theories draw on 
the notions of trust and solidarity, but a particularly relevant formulation – because it 
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takes issue, heads on, with multiculturalism – can be found in David Miller’s work. The 
argument revolves around the claim that, in order to function well – that is, to dispense 
duties commonly attributed to modern liberal democratic states – a state needs more 
than a mere commitment to “constitutional patriotism” or other kinds of substantively 
empty formalism that assert the framework but say very little about how it is to be 
achieved.29 This has to do with how “[m]uch state activity involves the furthering of 
goals which cannot be achieved without the voluntary co-operation of citizens.”30 The 
success of these goals that range from supplying basic public goods such as clean air 
and security to deciding and running a complex system of social justice is 
preconditioned on citizens’ cooperating with each other and mutual awareness of such 
cooperative attitudes. In the absence of trust and solidarity, “each sectional group 
jealously guards its own interests” which makes it impossible for communities to 
generate democratic support for income redistribution and other policies that comprise 
our conceptions of welfare state. For citizens lend their support to these policies mostly 
thinking that others will do the same when they happen to be in need of the 
community’s assistance.31  
Miller thinks it is “virtually self-evident” that with “large aggregates of people, 
only a common nationality can provide the sense of solidarity that makes this 
[cooperative environment] possible.”32 Because there are so many distinct communities 
defined along so many axes of difference, in the absence of a shared identity it would 
not be possible for modern states to garner enough solidarity to keep the government 
apparatus moving. Miller presents a careful argument to obviate the charge that his 
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principle of nationality would result in the same kind of repressive and reactionary 
policies known from other examples of nationalism. Miller’s story radically differs from 
its less liberal counterparts insofar as it rejects the centrality of ethno-racial 
characteristics to defining a nation. To be sure, on Miller’s account, “distinct national 
cultures do exist”. However, these common traits do not owe their existence to being 
displayed by all members of a particular nation in a uniform way. Instead, we have to 
recognise them because among groups commonly recognised as nations there is an 
undeniable overlap in terms of cultural traits which holds true even after one has 
considered all the individual and subgroup variations. In other words, it makes sense to 
speak of a common experience of nationality even in places with diverse ethno-racial 
and religious composition, with the important caveat that these groups can come 
together to produce a common narrative of nationality by downplaying the significance 
of their differences and emphasising the importance of what they share.33 For instance, 
it is perfectly consistent with Miller’s principle of nationality that a community partly 
defines itself in relation to its inclusiveness and pluralism: “Right-wing would-be 
defenders of the nation who stress the homogeneity of the British people proper (in 
contrast to the immigrant communities) overlook the deep-seated pluralism that has 
always been a characteristic of Britain as a nation.”34 Thus, Miller’s account of 
nationality is multicultural to an important extent that would dishearten proponents of 
the more right-wing variants of nationalism.  
Although this widely-known principle of nationality is radically more 
progressive and egalitarian than its less liberal counterparts, it continues to draw amply 
on the idea of cultural unity, which brings it into tension with multiculturalism. To be 
sure, it is not necessary for the solidarity argument to have a strict anti-multiculturalist 
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ethos, but it is not hard to see that the argument is animated by scepticism and even 
wariness of cultural pluralism. Often, in the context of modern liberal democratic states, 
the sheer multiplicity of identities mitigates this tension, as the chances of any single 
identity becoming decisive on its own are significantly reduced. But the difficult issues 
of ethnicity and religion reveal the inherent tension between cultural pluralism and the 
principle of nationality.35 They help explain why from even a liberal nationalist 
perspective, the underlying assumption that the more (particularly, cultural) unity, the 
better it is remains crucial. Everything else being equal, cultural homogeneity is 
preferable to cultural heterogeneity, because the former is going to produce more 
solidarity and hence carry a potential for greater social justice and democratic 
deliberation.36  
Miller singles out what he calls ‘radical multiculturalism’ as ‘[t]he version of 
multiculturalism that poses the most direct challenge to the principle of nationality’.37 
On Miller’s account, radical multiculturalism is characterised by its commitment to 
public affirmation of equal worth and respect for all cultures. This, Miller finds 
incompatible with the principle of nationality, because it turns a blind eye to the costs of 
such public affirmation in terms of erosion of nationality. A nation, if it wants to remain 
socially just and democratic, has to find ways of transcending divisions that risk 
undermining solidarity and trust among constitutive groups. Miller recognises that this 
is never a one-way street and emphasizes the importance of integration. He favours 
thinking of the issue of multiculturalism more as a question of getting the balance right 
rather than whether multiculturalism is good or bad. Of course, one’s response to 
pluralism is confined by other important liberal values such as tolerance and non-
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discrimination.38 However, Miller thinks that this does not make it principally unjust to 
expect minorities to reciprocate by doing their ‘fair share’ of integrating into a national 
identity.39   
C. The Holist Arguments 
There is another type of argument against multiculturalism that draws attention to its 
supposedly anti-democratic tendencies. The sense of democracy that this argument 
employs differs in an important way from an immediate concern with enactment of a 
highly unpopular decision that we see Brian Barry invoke time after time in discussing 
issues such as religious slaughter or other cultural exemptions or violation of individual 
rights. This argument is more directly concerned with the long-term outcomes 
engendered by day-to-day adjustments demanded in the name of multiculturalism. At its 
heart lies the presumption that if people originating in different ‘communities of 
descent’ live their lives in a democratic environment, their intermingling results in a 
different type of diversity that principles of multiculturalism are unable to explain. In 
the words of intellectual historian David Hollinger, we need a view that “accepts the 
formation of new groups as a part of the normal life of a democratic society.”40 
Multiculturalism is unable to accept that in democracies, citizens can hold multiple 
identities, cherish multiple affiliations, and even through their free engagement over-
time can contribute to the formation of new communities of descent: “Not every 
descent-community will retain its members; some of these communities will retain its 
members; some of these communities can be expected, over time, to decrease their role 
in the lives of individuals and of the larger society. New affiliations gradually replace 
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old and eventually come to be called ethnic.”41 This inability of multiculturalism, 
Hollinger thinks is due to the prominence that it gives to cultural pluralism over its 
equally important cosmopolitan foundations. In Hollinger’s words, multiculturalism has 
outgrown itself and is contributing to the same racism and ethnocentrism that it was 
launched to resist because it has embraced a “pluralism [that] is more concerned to 
protect and perpetuate particular existing cultures” and “likely to identify each 
individual with reference to a single, primary community.”42 Moreover, this shift is 
misguided because it is informed by a mistaken social psychology – one that does not fit 
countries with egalitarian and democratic aspirations such as the United States. A social 
psychology usually invoked to justify this kind of pluralism, Hollinger points out, often 
presumes that we are products of our cultures. “A postethnic perspective”, on the other 
hand, “denies neither history nor biology – nor the need for affiliations – but it does 
deny that history and biology provide a set of clear orders for the affiliations we are to 
make.”43 
 A closely related holist point against multiculturalism has to do with whether 
social and political condition of modern western liberal democracies is appropriate for a 
project like multiculturalism or reliance of the latter on social reality of a previous age 
renders it anachronistic. Christian Joppke’s case against multiculturalism, presented in 
his study of citizenship in contemporary North American and European liberal 
democracies, is a combination of these sociological and normative arguments. The 
sociological argument consists in the restatement of the disparity between the claims of 
multiculturalism and realities of contemporary liberal democracies in which these 
claims are made. This disparity manifests itself in what Joppke calls a retreat from 
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multiculturalism in favour of anti-discrimination across the U.S. and Europe. Joppke 
writes that ‘The root of the cooling down on multiculturalism is that liberal states are 
intrinsically geared “to treat the people as individuals rather than as members of a class” 
(Starr 1992: 156), leaving the constitution of social groups to the individuals 
themselves.’44 Joppke concedes that a good deal of group-recognition takes place even 
in the face of this official flight from multiculturalism because “even notionally group-
destroying antidiscrimination cannot but be factually group-making” for the simple 
reason of having to identify a target group.45 However, Joppke goes on to point out, this 
mode of recognition that takes place mainly in conjunction with “the politics of 
reparations” is “a far cry from the principled “politics of recognition” decreed by 
Charles Taylor.” The biggest difference between the two is that the former, the only 
type of politics of recognition that, Joppke’s sociological survey reveals, finds support 
in Europe and the U.S. “is pragmatic, not philosophical”.46 
The more normative strand of Joppke’s argument questions whether 
multiculturalism is what liberal democracies need– or, in an even stronger claim, can 
incorporate –at a time that they increasingly rely on universality even when trying to 
assert their own particularity. The question of ‘multicultural citizenship’, Joppke’s 
answer seems to suggest, is a misconstrued one not only because multiculturalism gives 
the wrong answer to the problem of identity, but also because the problem of identity in 
contemporary liberal democracies is rendered paradoxical and beyond resolution.47 This 
is because the decoupling of nationality and citizenship has already reached an 
irrevocable stage because of the move towards procedural liberalism and mass 
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immigration.48 At this modern stage, any attempt by the state to enforce an identity on 
its citizens ends up becoming oppressive.49 Then, multiculturalism is ruled out if it is 
conceived of as a struggle on the part of groups to institutionalize their identities.50 
Multiculturalism is also an unhelpful ideal in the liberal age, because in existing liberal 
democracies of Europe and North America it is always pursued as a way of generating 
loyalty among immigrants: When society is conceived in multiculturalist terms as made 
of “different groups ... [that] get on well together” one is drawing on an ideal of 
cohesion with strong claims on the identity of citizens that is unavailable in the present 
context.51 In this context, multiculturalism seems only to contribute to deepening the 
paradox faced by modern citizenship.  
2. Response to Anti-Multiculturalists 
2.1 Does the Equal Rights Argument Vindicate Anti-multiculturalism? 
Having seen in the first part of the dissertation that a commitment to equal individual 
rights lies at the heart of a normatively sound minimalist democracy, one cannot but 
recognise that many points Barry raises in defence of equal rights have genuine 
connections to the democratic theory those chapters (and this project as a whole) 
advance. For instance, if we consider one of the cases discussed by Barry, the case of 
Thomas v. Norris that involved the Salish rite of Spirit Dance, democratic principles are 
firmly on the side of Thomas in his struggle to seek legal retribution for incarceration 
and beating by the members of his tribe.52 Treating someone in the way the Salish 
treated Thomas would violate even a very minimal notion of agency that must underpin 
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any meaningfully democratic notion of equal status. Barry is right that the claims of the 
defendants that the assault and kidnapping took place to perform a cultural rite do not 
make these offences against the individual more defensible.53 Similarly, there would be 
a serious breach of democracy’s egalitarian norms if a functioning democracy decided 
to exonerate rapists who would simply offer marriage to their victims.54 For laws have 
to express equal concern for all citizens, and there is not much likelihood that an act that 
renders women vulnerable in such an obvious way could pass any reputable test of 
equal concern. Also, not much can be said from the democratic perspective developed 
in this dissertation in defence of bride capturing, wife beating/killing or divorce laws 
that burden one sex to the benefit of the other.55 NMD clearly rules out such violations 
of individual rights. Barry is also right that multiculturalist demands for exemptions 
sometimes put excessive pressure on the legal-political framework whose main job is to 
protect the wellbeing of individuals as we repeatedly witnessed in chapter four.  
To the extent that this is what multiculturalism stands for, NMD leaves us no 
choice but to take a critical stance. In a technical sense, however, this way of making an 
equal rights argument – contrasting liberal rights with their multicultural violations – 
does not give one a repudiation of multiculturalism on grounds of equal rights. We can 
see how this is the case by considering an interesting mistake that Culture and Equality 
makes. One could well be right in pointing out that there is a shortfall with respect to 
individual right x when a group g is allowed a benefit b (e.g., an exemption) in 
accordance with a multiculturalist demand. But to draw out a grandiose equal rights 
argument from this (or any number of such violations) as Barry does, one would also 
have to seriously consider what the denial of b means in terms of the right x or some 
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other relevant right. The more general point that this seems to support is that Barry’s 
legitimate criticism of multiculturalism does not validate his anti-multiculturalism. If 
individual arguments Barry makes are right, they could convince us that some 
multiculturalist concerns are ruled out by some liberal or democratic concerns. But this 
is a much weaker outcome than what Barry wants to achieve, namely, convince political 
theorists that the multiculturalist theories are not worth the paper they are written on.  
Even if this technical issue were resolved, the equal rights challenge would not 
go all the way to discredit multiculturalism as a perspective – a theoretical approach to 
conceptualising issues of pluralism in modern liberal democratic states. One obvious 
reason for this is that multiculturalism as we saw in the previous chapter stands for more 
than a defence of cultural practices that violate individual rights in the abovementioned 
ways. Many multiculturalists rightly distance themselves from the extreme versions of 
cultural relativism that would justify such practices – which, as many of them have 
convincingly shown, Barry often mistakenly attributes to them – and look for ways of 
addressing these adverse implications in a way consistent with their own multiculturalist 
theories as well as with basic liberal and democratic norms.56 It would be highly 
misleading to read, say Young’s critique of impartiality, as lending support to such 
outright cases of violence against persons because Young makes it quite clear that what 
she writes concerning cultural pluralism should be read in the wider context of her 
emancipatory agenda.57 What underlies such an unjustifiably hostile approach espoused 
by the particular version of the equal rights challenge is the strategy it adopts to 
undermine the foundations of multiculturalism. Namely, it dramatizes many of the 
original problems that multiculturalists grappled with in their own writings, while 
largely ignoring or belittling reasons that pushed multiculturalists in those particular 
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directions, usually away from some formal aspects of liberal democracy. For instance, 
in Culture and Equality we see a rejection of how Iris Young tries to make 
multiculturalism less essentialist and an equally dismissive approach to Tully’s attempts 
to square the freedom of well-defined minority communities with that of society at large 
by ridding the framework of governance (political constitution) of its imperial biases. 
To be sure, there is nothing wrong with criticising these authors for violating 
egalitarian norms of democracy. If there were, what I tried to do in the previous chapter 
would have been equally misguided. This will make more sense if we recall the key 
claim of the argument that the last chapter began to sketch: it was claimed that these 
multiculturalist attempts at identifying policies that are socially just and diversity-
friendly at the same time fail for more nuanced, but not less important, reasons. 
Undermining institutional mechanisms that are supposed to protect persons is probably 
one extremely crucial reason that runs through most of these cases including Young’s 
inclusion challenge, Tully’s anti-colonialism and Taylor’s concern with recognition. But 
unless one has exhausted all institutional options and entertained most possible 
responses, it is hard to deny that the act of recognising a culture and the adverse 
implications that follow from some aspect of that recognition – despite being in some 
kind of causal relationship –  do not have to be necessarily connected. This point is also 
related in an important way to my rejection of theses such as those of cultural stability 
and continuity while accepting the struggle even for thick recognition as compatible 
with democratic politics.58 Thus, what is objectionable in the anti-multiculturalist 
challenge is not the claim that multiculturalism may undermine equal rights but the way 
Barry wants to build a theory by exaggerating these tensions and belittling the risk of 
injustice and oppression identified by multiculturalists. 
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Although Barry sets out to refute the entire project of multiculturalism, and 
views multiculturalism mostly as a romantic interjection to the ongoing mission of the 
Enlightenment, he reluctantly recognises that some of the sources of inspiration for 
multiculturalism have deep roots in the liberal political outlook. As a self-declared 
liberal democrat, Barry has to accept that tolerance and associative diversity are 
important characteristics of a liberal polity that distinguish it from illiberal ones. In a 
rare move that seems to provide some reprieve for the pluralist viewpoint, Barry accepts 
that associations should be left free to define themselves in traditionalist and 
inegalitarian terms, and principles of liberal democracy should not apply to their 
internal organisation as long as they satisfy a test of voluntariness. The test of the latter 
is whether an association imposes unjustified exit costs that make a disgruntled 
member’s exit too costly. If an individual finds breaking his/her ties with an association 
burdensome, according to Barry, there could be a good reason to compel that 
association to liberalize.59 Barry quickly notes that not all costs are objectionable. 
Through his distinction between intrinsic, associative and external costs, Barry tries to 
distinguish legitimate costs from the illegitimate ones.60 This analytic distinction has 
been subject to some convincing criticism, but here I am not concerned with its merits.61 
What matters for the purpose at hand is the larger point that the logic of this argument 
seems to fall in line with the much larger theme of a liberal being a supporter of private 
freedoms and differences, and the role this argument plays in making ERA more 
palatable to liberals. However, the underlying account of privatization cannot stand 
critical examination. 
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2.1.2 The (In)adequacy of Privatization 
Apart from the fact that the equal rights argument does not give us a refutation of 
multiculturalism for technical reasons, the argument also suffers from a crucial 
theoretical weakness. Although the equal rights challenge gains some plausibility within 
the larger pool of egalitarian individualist arguments through its connection to 
individual freedoms and the private/public distinction, shortcomings of the notion of 
privatization on which this challenge rests takes that advantage away.  
As we saw towards the end of chapter three, privatization is an important 
element of democratic non-domination. That chapter argued that together with 
decentralization and contestation, privatization allows democracies to avoid subjecting 
to domination – and expressing less than equal concern and status for – those citizens 
that happen to disagree with a given majority on a given issue. One (I have the 
impression that Barry too)62 may want to think that this is what the equal rights 
challenge is after. However, evidence suggests otherwise.  
On the view that chapter three defended, privatization is implied by the norm of 
democratic non-domination. Non-domination, in turn, is concerned with protecting 
some minimal notion of agency. Then, the main purpose of privatization (similar to 
contestation and decentralization) is to prevent domination of an individual or a 
collective of individuals by other individuals or collectives. Displacing agency from the 
centre of privacy and treating privatization as an end in itself – which I think is largely 
implied by Barry’s suggestion that privatization is a panacea to problems of diversity – 
distorts this purpose. The reason for this is that while privatization may be the most 
agency-protecting solution for some diversity issues, (I can think of an acute case of 
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religious conflict such as those that Barry cites from the Reformation era) in other cases 
not only could there be more agency-protecting solutions but privatization could be 
agency-impinging and stand as a source of domination. Then, we should examine how 
obscuring the link between agency and privatization runs the risk of turning 
privatization from a democratic protection against domination to a potential problem.63 
Two other assumptions implicit in the notion of privatization at work in the 
equal rights argument help explain its inadequacy. First, privatization – unlike what 
Barry’s ERA assumes – is often not a categorical step. Very rarely, that is on very few 
issues, would the public and the private be conceived of as permanently detached, 
without any significant intermingling. As the jurisprudence to which Barry frequently 
appeals shows, privatization is usually a matter of gradation. Some aspects of a 
contentious issue are privatized while some other aspects are left more in the public 
realm. Even in the most recognisably liberal states, very few (if any) issues are regarded 
as fully private or public. Family law is an obvious example that demonstrates how 
liberal states can directly or indirectly give shape to many aspects of the most private 
area of our lives. The more complex a social phenomenon, the more likely it is to be 
subject to such gradation.  
Another related assumption that seems to lurk in Barry’s account is that the 
delineation of the private and the public is somehow free of contention. In reality, 
however, such delineation itself is political and subject to disagreement. People want to 
redefine the present boundaries of the private and public in order to advance their 
interests. Then, privatization itself is a decision that democracies make through a 
contentious political process. To be sure, NMD recognizes the role that the more fixed 
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norms such as non-domination and equal concern as well as more pragmatic 
considerations for democratic regeneration have to play in this process of debating what 
the private consists of substantively. But these conditions are interpreted in the 
minimalist fashion that Part One outlined – they guide the process rather than 
predetermine the outcome.  
Once we restore agency to the centre of the private and take note of its 
gradational and contentious nature, we can see that the private involves a triadic 
relation, which I think is going to prove the ultimate benchmark of how democratically 
the state handles issues of privatization. Privatization in the context of value 
disagreements could be conceptualized as a triadic relation that involves the interests of 
two disagreeing parties as well as concerns for the association, which in turn has to do 
with commonly shared interests of both disagreeing parties. We could have a 
privatization on the basis of associational interests, on the basis of the interests of 
person a, or person b. But each would probably give us a privatization that is 
contestable for its exclusion of one or the other concern. This seems to be the case in 
Barry’s account, where there is an obvious asymmetry that works to the detriment of 
minorities. Unfortunately, Culture and Equality gives us only a partial picture of this 
relationship. If the three groups of interests are represented as A, B, and C, and A is 
taken as the interests of the persons representing a minority, Barry’s account of 
privatization seems to be asymmetrical to the detriment of A. That is, the interests of 
persons belonging to a minority in having an issue privatized are not balanced, or given 
due consideration, against more dominant interests in the community. What this implies 
is that the principles of privatization should give due attention to all the interests 
involved, not that the actual agreement (or a particular act of privatization) should 
satisfy all segments of society or all parties to the conflict. Minorities should feel that 
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their concerns are heard and dealt with in accordance with principles that are not 
inimical to their minority status. That the case does not appear decided even before 
there is a hearing. I will elaborate on this aspect of democratic decision-making in 
section 2.3.  
As we see in the example of Barry’s equal rights argument, the relative absence 
of minority interests (A) and the predominance of the associational and majority 
interests (B and C) in the formula of privatization ends up giving support to policies that 
can leave people with impinged senses of agency and private lives that appear violated 
and interfered with to those who live them. Barry thinks that what certain dominant 
sections of the public (including the scientific public) think about the acceptable levels 
of animal suffering provide us with the last word on religious slaughter, and Jews and 
Muslims should not complain as the option of vegetarianism leaves their private 
freedom of religion unobstructed. The same line of argument justifies many other 
concerns that these minority religious groups currently have in some jurisdictions. 
Namely, one could argue that if the dominant section of the public (including its liberal 
political theorists) feels that particular elements of a particular faith convey support for 
illiberal practices such as indoctrination or subjugation of women, liberal governments 
can accord to these elements reduced presence in the public. For instance, their places of 
worship would not be closed as long as they are left unmarked. Or the places of worship 
could be relocated to areas of a city where they would get a limited public exposure. 
This would not undermine their private freedoms, because the latter are defined in a 
narrow way that allows public interest to trump the narrow self-interests of a group.  
These critical and clarificatory remarks about privatization I think may help us 
correct some anomalies in Barry’s stylized and static account of privatization. On this 
modified picture, the dangers of Barry-like privatization that his equal rights challenge 
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presupposes are laid out before our eyes. It is a permissive system that risks 
undermining individual freedoms in ways quite similar to Iris Young’s, Tully’s, and 
Taylor’s accounts. Barry manages to remain a liberal, only if private is defined as 
having to do with what happens behind the walls of one’s home. But such a distinction 
makes the two assumptions that do not obtain in practice. NMD’s conception of privacy 
can deal better with these issues than Barry’s. Unlike, Barry’s privatization strategy that 
risks further marginalizing members of minorities by pushing them more into more 
reclusive forms of life, NMD can genuinely privatize disputes rather than privatizing 
ways of life, and marginalizing minority groups out of political process.  
The upshot of this discussion is that Barry’s equal rights challenge is at an 
important disadvantage because he is not very serious about exploring the normative 
significance of privatization, and some of the most crucial assumptions with which it 
operates. Had he been more serious about these, his equal rights challenge could 
become normatively more appealing, but then that would also mitigate its anti-
multiculturalism by bridging (although by no means closing) the gap between what 
multiculturalists demand and what democratic principles can accommodate. The above-
discussed asymmetry allows Barry to articulate an anti-multiculturalist political theory, 
albeit while reducing its liberal democratic credentials. Given that Barry proclaims 
himself to be a liberal ultimately concerned with oppression of individuals, this 
deficiency appears even more striking.  
2.2 Is a Plurality of Groups Bad for Democracy? 
The last subsection showed that one cannot justify the comprehensive anti-
multiculturalism we find in Culture and Equality, and also in more qualified forms in 
Susan Okin’s and David Miller’s writings, by dramatizing tensions that arise between 
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individual rights and multiculturalist claims.64 However, that line of argument does not 
rule out that such comprehensive anti-multiculturalism may still be valid. What could 
vindicate it is the relative accuracy and soundness of its underlying principles and 
philosophical worldview. To an extent, by focusing on the question of privatization we 
have begun to look at such macro issues, but more remains to be done mainly on the 
more general attributes of the conceptions of democracy that are at work in these anti-
multiculturalist arguments. A critical exploration of these more holistic claims about 
democracy, however, reveals that they deploy some poorly substantiated views about 
culture, pluralism and individual equality. Hence not only is the equal rights argument 
weak on its own, but the ideas of democracy that underpin it are not quite sound either. 
Three related misconceptions concerning democracy may help us explain the 
anti-mutliculturalists’ scepticism about pluralist politics. The first of these 
misconceptions has to do with the proliferation of groups. The anti-multiculturalists are 
worried that the politics of difference will open a can of worms, and politicize identities 
that would otherwise remain irrelevant. This concern rests on the assumption that there 
is a limit to the amount of pluralism a democracy can function with, and one has to 
worry that multiculturalism will jeopardize democracy by surpassing that limit. The 
second concern relates to the way democracies make decisions. Anti-multiculturalists 
fear multiculturalism will lead to a decision-making impasse or to suboptimal decisions 
due to erosion of trust and solidarity among members of different cultures. As what 
citizens share in common begins to lose significance compared to what sets them in 
conflict through their newly politicized identities, trust gives way to mistrust, and 
cooperation to confrontation. The third is a more general characteristic shared by the 
anti-multiculturalists’ views on democracy that arises largely in response to the first two 
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concerns. To prevent the proliferation of groups and avoid an impasse or shortage of 
trust, dismissing multiculturalism is not sufficient; the state has to take a more proactive 
role to achieve a manageable level of pluralism and sufficient levels of solidarity. This 
latter presumption manifests itself in Barry’s anxiety over control. Notwithstanding the 
fact that it draws on some important liberal ideas such as the notion of privatization, this 
conception of democracy aspires to a great, and often unrealistic, deal of control by the 
state. By exposing these mistakes we will be able to dissipate doubts that may arise as a 
result of the solidarity and holist arguments that were introduced earlier in the chapter. 
Let us begin by elaborating on why it is wrong to presume, as multiculturalists do, that 
democracy and pluralism are conflicting goods.  
The view that takes multiplicity of self-defined groups as an impediment to 
democracy was famously presented by Rousseau: “The will of these particular societies 
always has two relations: for the members of the association, it is a general will; for the 
large society, it is a private will, which is very often found to be upright in the first 
respect and vicious in the latter.”65 Rousseau, like many eighteenth century rationalists 
believed in the presence of a transparent volonté générale.66 Contemporary democratic 
theory largely dismisses this view with respect to a majority of groups. At a time when 
the theory of democracy places non-negotiable significance on inclusiveness and 
equality, the suggestion that certain economic, ideological and professional interests are 
to be discounted has lost the intuitive appeal that it might have enjoyed in earlier ages 
when suffrage was more exclusive and formal inequalities were more common. The 
only noticeable exception seems to be the case of multicultural groups brought up 
constantly by critics of multiculturalism such as Barry. These critiques hardly specify 
what is so special about religious or ethno-cultural interests as opposed to other interests 
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that revolve around, say, political ideology and economics that justifies the exclusion of 
the former from the ambit of democratic discussion. To be sure, they do often speculate 
about the risks of culture or religion inciting violence and division based on some 
historical and modern examples, but they do not offer any reasons as to why cultural 
interest is to be viewed as inherently dangerous from the perspective of democracy. 
Then what one would expect to accompany Barry’s, and other similar variants of, anti-
multiculturalism is a theory about the incompatibility of culture and democracy that 
takes into account not only the scant empirical evidence but also the counterevidence, 
and not just the dangers of including culture but also the pragmatic and normative 
problems that arise from excluding it. What these critics offer, however, is a list of 
historical anecdotes to which a contrary list can almost always be offered.  
 Egalitarian anti-multiculturalism that also claims to show democratic credentials 
misinterprets the link between democracy and pluralism. It seems to be an improvement 
over previous doctrines that waged an outright war against pluralism, but in its essence 
it remains incapable of understanding the limits within which democracy can and 
should respond to the fact of diversity. In understanding these limits, the contrast 
between the ways two prominent voices of French political thought interpreted 
democracy can be instructive. Against Rousseau’s blatant attack on “partial societies” 
that I quoted in the preceding paragraph, Tocqueville wrote that “There are no countries 
in which associations are more needed, to prevent the despotism of faction or the 
arbitrary power of a prince, than those which are democratically constituted.”67 But as 
Dahl notes, the contrast between the views of these two theorists goes beyond a stark 
ideological divergence and has more to do with the kinds of worlds that they idealize.68 
The world idealized by Rousseau in his Social Contract is the eighteenth century 
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Geneva – a city-state resembling Athens in many respects. Tocqueville’s views are set 
in the context of the 19th century America– a society more plural in its composition than 
the European societies of Rousseau’s time, let alone Rousseau’s favourite example of 
Geneva, where “the bonds of blood as well as the laws unite almost all [citizens]”.69  
In a world like ours – more similar in terms of pluralism to Tocqueville’s 
America than Rousseau’s Geneva – pluralism and democracy are no longer an optional, 
nice-to-have, coupling of two ideals. In the words of one prominent theorist of 
democracy, Norberto Bobbio “[w]hat follows from this fact [of undeniable pluralism] is 
simply that, unlike what happened in democracies in the ancient world, democracies in 
the modern world have to come to terms with pluralism.”70 Pluralism of the type that 
Barry dreads– a multiplicity of “groups which represent various political movements 
which contend with each other for the temporary and peaceful exercise of power” 71 – is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition of legitimacy in modern representative 
democracy. 72  
Pluralism is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of modern democratic 
power because in modern democracy the rulers and the ruled do not overlap. This 
absence of overlap, however, does not mean rulers and the ruled are two different 
classes of people. Many aspects of modern democratic practice such as the democratic 
rule of law, political equality, and the fact that all rulers finish their terms in power and 
resume their lives as private citizens while other private citizens go on to fill those 
vacancies, show that the rulers and the ruled are not two distinct classes. The proper 
way to conceptualize the lack of identity between the two is to acknowledge that 
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political power – despite being delegated by individual citizens – is not exercised by 
them directly. Because those who exercise political power and those over whom power 
gets exercised are not always the same, the bottom-up control can be effective only up 
to a point.73 It can be effective only when there are other groups competing for political 
legitimacy. Accumulation of all political power in the hands of a government would 
make the survival of modern representative democracy very difficult. Citizens, on a 
representative model of democracy, can exercise effective control only when there are 
alternatives to choose from and alternative sources of power that compete against each 
other. For this reason, modern democracy cannot aspire to singular projects and unity of 
will, as this would diminish its democratic potential.  
The upshot is that as a matter of principle the argument the anti-multiculturalists 
rely on is not one that brings democratic advantage. If it is to be used, one has to note 
that it takes away from the quality of democracy rather than adding to it. Just as martial 
law would limit some crucial individual liberties to avoid a greater, more immediate 
harm, this argument would limit some aspects of democracy in order to prevent a grave 
harm to it. Under circumstances of extreme conflict such proposals could make sense, 
but denoting them democratic would be a mistake. Instead, resisting such attempts at 
finding some room these measures within definitions of democracy has normative 
importance. Separating the issue of democracy in times of conflict from democracy in 
times of peace has the important benefit of keeping these non-democratic instruments 
from the hands of overzealous theorists and minimizing the damage that could be done 
through irresponsible and untimely invocation of these principles.  
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2.3 How Democracies Make Decisions 
There is also another crucial reason why diversity need not be a problem from the 
viewpoint of democracy. This is related to the second misconception lying at the heart 
of the anti-multiculturalists’ scepticism towards pluralism, which has to do with the way 
democracies normally reach decisions. As we saw in Part One of the dissertation, 
democracy has an undeniable contestational and non-consensual dimension, which 
limits both the scope and depth of agreement that democracies may try to reach. Anti-
multiculturalists misconceive democracy to the extent that they are preoccupied with 
agreement and disregard the normative significance of disagreement.  
To be sure, one may think that because Barry repeatedly draws attention to the 
majoritarian aspects of democracy, he cannot be criticised for having the pro-consensus 
bias, which is probably more obvious in the case of Miller because of the latter’s focus 
on deliberative democracy. It is true that Barry does not set consensus as a goal or 
procedure, but he still works within the consensualist framework that remains oblivious 
to the normative significance of political disagreement. This manifests itself in Barry’s 
attempts to compensate for the impracticality of consensus by significantly shrinking 
the domain of decision-making to those issues on which more enduring agreement 
might materialize, while many issues are “disregarded” through privatization. 
Moreover, Barry’s repeated references to the majoritarian aspects of democracy should 
not mislead us into thinking that he has come to terms with the normative limits of the 
consensualist model. Let us recall that multiculturalism on his account would be bad 
even if there were majority support for it. Indeed, all but one of Barry’s arguments that 
we saw in the preceding section remain unaffected by any possible change in public 
opinion towards multiculturalism. Namely, on Barry’s account, recognising groups or 
accepting some sort of legal pluralism is bad for democracy irrespective of what 
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majority of citizens happen to think. Only the last argument that accuses 
multiculturalism of undermining democracy through back-room deals is overturned by 
actual political disposition of the public towards multiculturalism. In other words, had 
Barry given more consideration to the uncertainty of democratic outcomes, his 
arguments against multiculturalism would have been harder to reject from the 
perspective of democratic theory.74 
It is true that there is some important sense in which non-unanimous resolutions 
still have to be acceptable to all parties. Otherwise, violence and chaos would replace 
the relative order and civility of democratic politics or the state would have to recourse 
to the use of excessive force to maintain order. However, this sense of agreeableness has 
to be different from the sense that pictures an agreeable decision as one that all parties 
would vote for. It is in the nature of electoral systems to produce winners and losers and 
any electoral loss registers a democratic disagreement between a majority and 
corresponding minorities. Given this fact of life, the latter type of agreement is rare and 
cannot serve as a realistic aim. But the claim that in order to be democratically 
agreeable a resolution cannot aspire to consensus is not specific enough about what 
democratic agreement has to look like.  
Positive and normative political theorists have offered different views on what 
democratic agreement has to look like. Those in the positive theory tradition have 
tended to neglect the normative commitments that foreground their own understanding 
of democracy, while normative theorists have tried to abstract away from the dissensus 
that characterizes the democratic practice. In Chapter two I tried to develop the 
argument that the proper theory of democracy has to try to balance the pragmatic 
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considerations and the normative concerns that guide our ways of thinking about the 
pragmatics of democratic politics. 
One argument from the positive strand of democratic theory comes close to 
explaining agreeability in the democratic sense as opposed to the practically 
unattainable and normatively undesirable requirement of consensus. The central thesis 
of that argument (also known as the thesis of “institutionalized uncertainty”) firmly in 
line with the Schumpeterian conception of competitive democracy is that “Political 
forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the institutional framework 
that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to advance their interests in 
the future.”75 The claim that potential future gains motivate those on the losing side of a 
particular vote to choose compliance over noncompliance rests on an important 
observation about political processes in consolidated democracies. That is, particular 
defeats, whether in a legislature or on an election day, very rarely represent, or are 
perceived as, death of a political party or an ideology; political life often continues as 
usual, or sometimes groups reorganize under a new banner and around slightly new 
interpretations of their old ideals and continue their work guided by the belief that 
today’s opposition will form tomorrow’s government, or the present minority will be 
part of a future winning coalition. The “prospect of future gain” is kept strong because 
“democracy generates the appearance of uncertainty” through its institutional 
framework.76 On this account, however, legitimacy is mostly an empirical condition that 
is satisfied as long as the equilibrium of democracy remains undisturbed; that is, as long 
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as “the cumulative value” of compliance for losers remains greater than the perceived 
immediate and future gains of subversion.77 
Przeworski’s thesis of democracy as equilibrium and institutionalized 
uncertainty sheds light on an important aspect of democratic decision-making by 
helping us understand why democracies remain so stable and functional despite high 
levels of disagreement. It comes close to offering us the alternative, democratic, 
conception of agreement that can serve as a benchmark in judging whether certain 
aspects of multiculturalism are compatible with democracy or may end up subverting it. 
But the lessons we learn from discussing the Schumpeterian and normative aspects of 
democracy in Part One also apply to Przeworski’s thesis. Przeworski’s thesis is 
rendered deficient insofar as it fails to take note of the normative presuppositions that 
underlie the notions of competition, uncertainty, and fairness.78 Przeworski, when he 
writes that “to evoke compliance, to be consolidated, democratic institutions must to 
some extent be fair and to a complementary degree effective”79, is committing the very 
same error that Schumpeter commits when he specifies his list of apparently normative 
conditions required for his democratic method to come true. What has to supplement the 
institutional and pragmatic measures of acceptability and legitimacy is an account of 
normative commitments that give meaning and coherence to those institutions. The 
upshot is that in democracies losing can be a perfectly acceptable outcome for an 
interest group, political party, or any other relevant group as long as the conditions 
associated with acceptability and their normative underpinnings are satisfied.  
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The above gives us an overview of the framework within which multicultural 
issues can be decided in a democratic way. For sustainable agreements to obtain, the 
majority has to feel that it is not being unduly burdened by a certain democratic 
resolution and the system is discernibly responsive to the electoral dynamics of the 
polity. In a functioning democracy where the requirements of NMD are largely satisfied 
(e.g., competition is not curtailed, equal concern and status is extended to all persons, 
etc.), for the most part, electoral outcomes are on their own likely to produce this feeling 
of contentment for majorities. On the other hand, for such equilibrium to obtain, certain 
conditions have to be met with respect to minorities as well. Minorities have to feel that 
their concerns are being addressed, voices heard, and interests not left out or excluded. 
Moreover, those who are currently on the losing side of a particular debate have to find 
the view that they can in the future regain some of the ground they have lost in the 
recent past not vacuously optimistic. 
In the non-ideal world, however, there is a major obstacle that the above 
stipulated conditions of sustainable agreement (mainly that of institutionalized 
uncertainty) commonly face – the problem of permanent minorities. What is 
problematic from the perspective of democratic equality is not that some people end up 
losing in a particular vote, but that those same people could be stuck in an electoral 
setting in which they have lost all or most of the votes to the present, and likely, will 
continue to lose in the future.  
This could indicate several problems for the particular democracy in which such 
marginalization occurs. First, it reveals a pattern of determinacy, which is in tension 
with the democrat’s commitment to, and reliance on, competition and indeterminacy. 
This could also indicate that there are entrenched power relations that prevent certain 
policy options from gaining competitiveness. Here, we should remember the discussion 
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in chapter two of how even informal status hierarchies could result in determining what 
issues gain political prominence.80 The formation of such status hierarchies makes the 
problem of permanent minorities more relevant to democratic equality. A related 
concern has to do with the expressive function of citizenship discussed in detail in 
chapter 3. It is hard to think that democratic procedures continue to express equal status 
for those who are constantly at the losing end of the democratic politics. In order to be 
effective, this expressive function would have to entail, at a minimum, a degree of 
affinity towards democratic process on the part of all citizens.81 For a democratic theory 
with strong procedural undertones, such concerns with political outcomes may sound a 
bit unconventional. This confusion, however, is bound to dissipate as soon as one 
realizes that in actual democracies, rather than ideal theoretical situations, what one is 
dealing with are not merely different policy alternatives but citizens with complex 
psychological attachments to those policy options. Some concern with outcomes 
becomes essential not because a particular distribution of outcomes is important in 
itself, but because certain patterns are likely to disrupt the expressive function of 
democratic equality.  
If failing to take account of the normative importance of uncertainty and 
disagreement is a blind spot in the anti-multiculturalists’ conception of democracy, 
remaining insensitive to the problem of permanent minorities is the harmful outcome of 
that blind-spot. Anti-multiculturalism is rendered more philosophically lacking 
precisely because it disregards this kind of electoral marginalization. For denying the 
political significance of culture makes it impossible to properly detect the problem, let 
alone deal with it in an adequate way. Given that whether or not sustainable agreements 
persist could ultimately be decided by the success a particular democracy has in dealing 
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with the issue of permanent minorities, it is important to expand on how anti-
multiculturalists fail in a conspicuous way with respect to this issue. 
The problem is that neither the traditional solution to the issue of permanent 
minorities (including its less radical nonetheless still harmful forms) nor the more 
reformed solutions that the next two chapters will argue for are permitted by the staunch 
rejection of culture that we see in the anti-multiculturalist position. Let us first take a 
brief look at what these solutions are before we conclude the section by expounding 
how anti-multiculturalists fail with respect to these responses.  
The traditional response to the problem of permanent minorities was based on 
the hypothesis of “cross-cutting cleavages,”82 which claims that pluralist democracies 
will be stable to the extent that citizens associate with multiple groups whose political 
interests do not pull in the same direction.83 Such stability will arise because citizens 
who have conflicting loyalties as a result of the cross-cutting cleavages will feel a 
stronger need to compromise and much less anger over losing a particular vote.84 David 
Truman gave an example of the theory’s compromise-generating effects: “the leaders of 
a Parent-Teacher Association must take some account of the fact that their proposals 
must be acceptable to members who also belong to the local taxpayers’ league, to the 
local Chamber of Commerce, and to the Catholic Church.”85 There is empirical 
evidence to hold that much friction in pluralistic democracies (that is to say all western 
liberal democracies) can be eliminated by the cross-cutting nature of cleavages. Hence, 
this can be taken as a mitigating factor. However, the contemporary multiculturalism 
literature has brought to our attention the fact that some cleavages can stand out even in 
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the face of many other cleavages intersecting with, and offsetting, each other. The thesis 
of cross-cutting cleavages cannot explain away the problem of permanent minorities, 
because it already assumes a degree of integration into the political system and concern 
with a similar set of issues. Although the assumptions of the thesis remain quite realistic 
and plausible, in order to minimize the risk of domination and status inequality that 
arise in the cases that multiculturalists focus on, we need to supplement it with other 
measures that are supported by NMD. These are measures like decentralization and 
devolution that are intended to ease preference clustering, as well as those aimed at 
improving the contestational capacity of citizens (and their groups) and protecting their 
agency through privatization. 
We study these measures more systematically in the next two chapters, 
particularly by placing them in the context of a negative theory of groups. For now, I 
want to emphasise that attempts to purge politics of cultural claims do not just end up 
undermining the logically flawed demand for equal affirmation of all cultural practices 
by the state;86 but they also make it hard to tackle problems such as that of permanent 
minorities, which have to be dealt with if democracies are to restore equal status to 
those currently marginalized. To be sure, egalitarian anti-multiculturalists do offer ways 
out of marginality. On these views that rely mostly on assimilation, dissociating oneself 
from those practices that result in marginalization is often considered to be sufficient to 
avoid the negative circumstances that multiculturalists complain about.87 Whenever 
groups cannot undergo such assimilation on their own, they may legitimately expect 
some assistance from the rest of society in the form of differentiated treatment until 
their differences become unrecognizable and disappear as grounds for discrimination.88 
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However such assimilationist solutions are not satisfactory from a democratic vantage 
point, because in the process of protecting citizens against rights violations they risk 
engaging in violations that are equally or even more serious. Barry thinks this should 
cause no concern; just as the side-effects of chemotherapy are to be tolerated if a patient 
wants to be cancer-free, assimilation should be embraced despite its side-effects because 
it contributes to the greater good of liberal justice.89  
This is a dangerous line of thinking, as we saw at the end of the last subsection. 
But as far as the issue of democratic decision-making is concerned, what matters most is 
that anti-multiculturalism`s rejection of the political relevance of culture and groups 
comes at a hefty cost. Sustainable agreements (those that balance the normative 
significance of disagreement and agreement) have a great deal to do with the dynamics 
of minority-majority relations. One cannot simply assume away the importance of the 
group dynamics of democratic politics as anti-multiculturalists do. Independent of how 
much liberals want to think of a political community exclusively in terms of right-
bearing individuals and reject the relevance of groups, groups will continue to play an 
important role in shaping the dynamics of democratic politics, and ultimately making or 
breaking these sustainable agreements. Similarly, communitarians may feel committed 
to the centrality of the narratives of community, but the fact of interest-based group-
making and breaking will play a role not only with respect to mundane questions but 
also will go on to shape those very identities that communitarians most exalt. To assume 
that a liberal democratic state can manage such disputes without coming to terms with 
the group dynamics of these relations and the role played by culture in defining these 
lines of tension does not change the impact these have on such important democratic 
considerations as non-domination, equality of status, regeneration or responsiveness. 
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This brings us to an important distinction that a more properly democratic response to 
multiculturalism has to make. The recognition of the role culture inevitably plays in 
pluralist politics and the implications of this role for the resolution of multicultural 
disputes is not tantamount to the acceptance of the demands for thick recognition and 
affirmation of particular beliefs and practices that some groups occasionally make, often 
in response to stigmatization. An across-the-board dismissal of all demands for 
recognition because of a fear that it would eventually boil down to a logically 
incoherent cultural relativism is an answer that democratic theory cannot endorse. 
2.4 How Justified are Concerns with Solidarity and other Holistic issues? 
In the preceding two subsections our evaluation of the arguments anti-multiculturalists 
make in the name of democracy focused on NMD's link to pluralism and democratic 
decision-making. As a result, we are now in a position to see more clearly that the 
claims of incompatibility between multiculturalism and democracy are not as 
convincing as these authors claim; many of their arguments either rest on 
misconceptions concerning how democracies function or misrepresent the importance 
of certain principles to normal democratic functioning.  
 A relevant question that we have not discussed so far has to do with what would 
go wrong from a democratic perspective if we were to accept rather than reject the two 
misconceptions discussed above. An anti-multiculturalist could argue that existing 
democracies may show these minimalist characteristics, whereby dissensus, 
competition, and uncertainty appear as unproblematic characteristics, but a deeper, a 
more ideal, democracy would not have to view such characteristics as normal (one 
could say would have to reject them). It is on this view of a more genuinely egalitarian 
democracy that, the critic could argue, the citizenry needs to show more virtuous 
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dispositions (e.g., higher levels of goodwill, cooperation, rationality) than the ones 
NMD considers normal (e.g., scepticism of authority and more limited trust and 
solidarity). An acceptance of the first two misconceptions would commit us to a third 
problem that besets the anti-multiculturalist arguments, ironically in quite similar ways 
to those of their multiculturalist opponents. Just as satisfying some of the 
multiculturalist concerns requires giving governments so much unqualified power that 
compromises democratic qualities, rejecting some other multiculturalist views in favour 
of their anti-multiculturalist counterparts seems to do precisely the same.  
 Arguments concerning solidarity and social unity are of this nature. Namely, 
they will become more urgent and demanding if our expectations of democracy are 
similar to those we saw in the two misconceptions examined in the earlier subsections. 
The putative relation between solidarity and diversity is as follows: the more consensus 
over singular projects becomes the aim of a polity, the more solidarity and trust that 
polity will need to achieve these goals.90 As a polity becomes accepting of more plural 
and tentative agreements its needs for solidarity and trust change as well. It is not hard 
to see that sustainable agreements discussed in the previous subsection rely on a 
substantially different degree of trust and solidarity than ideals of hypothetical or actual 
agreement that animate many radical egalitarian views on democracy. This is not to say 
that goodwill or trust no longer plays an important role in the minimalist conception of 
democracy. It certainly does; but because plurality and heterogeneity (as opposed to the 
idea of transparent and homogenous general will that we saw Schumpeter criticise in 
chapter 2) are important characteristics of any vision of common good that gains 
support under NMD, we are looking at more room for disagreement and variableness.  
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 Because their citizens maintain certain relations of trust and solidarity, 
sustainable agreements are part of day-to-day life in established democracies. We may 
be unsatisfied with these relations and may try to reformulate them. However, one's 
dissatisfaction with what seems achievable under existing levels of trust does not justify 
ignoring the problems that would arise if states were to amplify their existing supplies. 
The conceptions of trust and solidarity that promise to engender deeper democracy lead 
us in a direction of a theory of governance whose holistic attributes are at odds not only 
with the principles of NMD but also with those of any theory that takes human 
fallibility and the abuse of power seriously.  
 Having seen how the variants of multiculturalism examined in chapter 4 risk 
placing too much power in the hands of groups to the detriment of individuals, we are 
now able to recognise a similar threat in the holistic arguments made by anti-
multiculturalists. Anti-multiculturalism too runs the same kind of risk by placing too 
much power in the institutions of the community at large rather than in those of its 
subgroups. Barry, Okin, Miller and others sceptical of multiculturalism try to convince 
us that this option is to be preferred because a liberal and/or social democratic state has 
at least the prospect of acting more justly than illiberal groups that have not even shown 
interest in liberal egalitarian values.  
 Finally, in response to NMD’s apprehensions about power abuse, an anti-
multiculturalist could point out that a good liberal egalitarian theory can cater to the 
sceptics' concerns through the promise that once conditions of justice are secure, 
everyone will do their utmost to respect difference and disagreement. But this promise 
strikes us as insufficient once we remember a crucial lesson from Part One: the concern 
with disagreement is not just a sceptical interruption to an otherwise well-defined theory 
of social consensus – a healthy thing for a democrat to engage in and (settle by some 
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balancing acts) before decisions are made. As chapter 3 argued disagreement is a value 
built into NMD in no less important a sense than the value of agreement. The job of 
balancing the two values is too important a job to be left merely to the goodwill of the 
parties involved in the democratic process. It requires that the importance of 
disagreement be recognised in theory-building as well as institutional design in ways 
comparable to the recognition of the value of agreement through the acceptance of 
principles and mechanisms that are intended to facilitate agreement. 
 This leaves us with the job of engaging in a more constructive theoretical 
exercise – that of articulating a theory of groups and recognition that, as much as 
possible, abstains from repeating the errors of both multiculturalists and their critics. If 
such a theory manages to steer clear of the two sides' mistakes, it would not only stand 
as a more democratic alternative to these two sides, but could also offer a more 
genuinely democratic perspective on multiculturalism. The next two chapters take on 
this challenge. The first of these chapters spells out an alternative view of groups and 
their engagement in democratic politics on basis of lessons we learned in the first two 
parts of the dissertation. The last chapter expands our understanding of what NMD's 
approach to multiculturalism implies by defending it against objections from the 
multiculturalists and anti-multiculturalists.  
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CHAPTER 6: Individualist Overtones of NMD and a  
  Negative Theory of Groups 
There is a voluminous political science literature that studies the dynamic relationship 
between groups and democratic policy-making, and treats the former as a fact of life 
in advanced democracies. In contrast, most political theorists approach the topic of 
groups with, to put it mildly, a great deal of suspicion. When the topic comes up in the 
theories of liberalism and democracy, it tends to carry negative connotations. In recent 
decades an exception has been made by proponents of the politics of difference for 
ascriptive groups.1 This latter term was coined to separate a strand of group politics 
that seems to further the goals of liberal democratic justice from other types of group 
politics that are claimed to subvert the liberal project. Awareness of ascriptive groups 
allows society to set right injustices inflicted on certain segments of the population on 
the basis of their minority status from other democratically subversive strands that are 
perceived to have little to do with justice. The distinction allows many political 
theorists of liberal and/or democratic persuasion to continue to associate the 
remaining (interest) groups with assertiveness and self-seeking behaviour – vices that 
undermine the democratic virtues of cooperation, common good and fairness.  
This ‘destructive’ aspect of groups, as we saw in the previous two chapters, 
featured prominently in the writings of both egalitarian multiculturalists and their 
liberal egalitarian critics. Having seen that the arguments on both sides often operate 
with pretensions to democratic legitimacy and their connection to democratic 
principles is not as strong as their authors assert, we need an alternative approach to 
groups that will steer clear of such mistakes. The general parameters of NMD’s 
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answer to the question of groups should now be clear. For instance, NMD – due to its 
qualified acceptance of Schumpeter's critique of general will – does not share 
prominent democratic theories’ mistrust of groups and holds that groups do not have 
to represent only the cynical face of politics. Similarly, in the last chapter we saw the 
importance of pluralism to the normal functioning of democracies. The current 
chapter will build on these, by now, familiar aspects of normatively sound minimalist 
democracy to offer a more detailed picture of the alternative, democratic theory of 
groups.  
The overarching claim made in this chapter is that NMD’s argument for 
acknowledging the role of groups is primarily a negative one. NMD does not deny 
that groups under certain circumstances can bring additional democratic benefits; 
however, it is mainly concerned with the immediate effects of shutting out groups 
from democratic politics. It draws attention to how, under reasonable conditions of 
minimalism, democratic politics without groups is hard to conceive, let alone enact, at 
the same time that it shows how little support these principles provide for a shift 
towards more positive and substantive views of groups.  
But first we need to systematize the reasons that NMD presents for taking 
groups seriously. Given that previous chapters have been resolute in their 
commitment to the value of individualism, why not continue to tackle the issues of 
multiculturalism within the same individualist framework? We have to make the extra 
effort to show that the need for an alternative approach to groups is connected to 
individualism in a principled way. Hence, the chapter starts by exploring the 
individualistic presuppositions of normative minimalist democracy and how they 
leave room for a democratic theory of groups to emerge. The discussion of the role of 
individualism in democratic theory draws on George Kateb’s influential account of 
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democratic individualism. Critical engagement with Kateb's democratic thought 
confirms that democratic theory presupposes a commitment to individualism, but this 
individualism does not commit democratic theory to declaring groups irrelevant. 
Consequently, there is room for a theory of groups that does not undermine the 
individualistic commitments of NMD. Section two elaborates on democratic reasons 
we have for constructing such a theory, which further delineates the shape the theory 
will take. Section three expands this conception of groups by defending it against an 
influential argument that portrays it as inadequate in the context of the politics of 
difference. There I respond to Melissa Williams’ critique of interest groups and her 
defence of a substantive theory of intergroup equality as the democratic remedy for 
permanent electoral marginalization.   
6.1 Democratic Individualism 
In the course of discussing the anti-multiculturalists' democratic pretensions, the last 
chapter also dwelt on the relationship between pluralism and democracy. This chapter 
starts by elaborating on a different social disposition whose abundance is also vital for 
democracy. The earlier parts of the thesis have already alluded to the idea that 
democratic theory at minimum has to take a certain type and degree of individualism 
for granted. Here, this relationship will be more systematically examined. In 
explicating this relationship, the best place to start is with the democratic thought of 
George Kateb, whose views on individualism and democracy are rendered especially 
relevant to this project due to their affinity to democratic ideals that I gathered under 
the rubric of normatively sound minimalism. Kateb’s account provides important 
answers to the question concerning the place of individualism in democratic theory. 
Nonetheless, certain elements of Kateb’s individualism such as his opposition to 
identity groups suggest that his analysis is at times unnecessarily timid about 
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acknowledging some immediate conclusions that follow from his philosophical 
commitments. Taking a closer look at this tension in Kateb's thought not only helps 
clarify the place of individualism in democratic theory, but also casts light on the 
question of how to respond to the reality of multicultural groups.  
Let us start by elaborating on the centrality of individualism to Kateb's 
democratic theory. Kateb writes that “democratic individuality, when practiced, 
guards and fulfils” constitutional democracy.2 It fulfils the idea of rights-based 
democracy by “impress[ing] the meaning of rights on the psyche”.3 It transforms 
citizens into a new type – one that demands rights, shows a critical, and even 
sceptical, attitude towards authority. Before I go on to say more about these 
characteristics of the democratic individual, I should elaborate on how this new 
character is formed. On Kateb’s account, it is not particular laws that lead to 
democratic individuality. That is, democratic individuality is rarely achieved through 
deliberate attempts to create citizens. It derives most of its thrust from the attributes of 
modern democracy such as the rotation or circulation of leaders, the contestational 
nature of the day-to-day politics, and the simple fact of having one’s vote counted 
equally.4 These apparently formal features of democratic practice create what Kateb 
calls “the tentativeness of even rightful authority.”5 It is also important to note that 
democratic individuality and democracy itself are mutually reinforcing. Democratic 
individuality is an outgrowth of democracy. Democratic culture takes hold when 
rights-based democracy takes hold in society. But the rights-based democracy takes 
hold only to the extent that democratic individuality is pervasive. In other words, 
Kateb observes a symbiotic and coterminous relationship between the two. 
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What are the characteristics of this new type of citizen? Kateb places emphasis 
on certain traits of democratic individuality. One of the foremost characteristics of 
democratic individuals, on Kateb’s account, is their “systemic suspicion of authority” 
which “teaches every individual to worry not only about authority exercised over 
oneself but also about the authority one exercises.”6 That is why democratic 
individuals do not view politics as a “ritual” aimed at bringing out the best in people. 
Instead, they view politics as a “game” that does not require “the best human 
qualities,” but tries to compensate for the relative mix of virtues and vices of political 
participants with the greatness of the democratic process itself.7 The search for the 
best, on Kateb’s account, is the search for “personal or impersonal authorities”.8 What 
ensues from the quest for the best usually is not more or better civic engagement, but 
docility. When citizens do not see themselves as individuals, they make it easier for 
governments to oppress their citizens quietly, and enlist them in various collective 
projects.9  
Another trait that Kateb’s democratic individuals share is their common 
tolerance of each other’s ways of life, motives, and decisions. Kateb’s democratic 
citizens address their fellows with these words: “When I cannot celebrate your 
distinctive personality, I will nevertheless let nothing affect my underlying attachment 
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 IO, 164. 
7
 IO, 103-104. 
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 “The communitarian critics want people to be led by, and thus to be more deferential toward, either 
personal or impersonal authorities. Their views can suggest only that they want people to be made 
happy and useful by being made more docile.” (IO, 229) 
9
 Of course, there is more to Kateb’s rich account of individuality than democratic minimalism can 
expect from citizens in ordinary life. A large part of it dwells on existential questions because Kateb 
wants to challenge the tendency of modern thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida, and Sartre to portray 
individuals as being in an inescapable radical dependency. (IO, 99) He holds, together with Emerson, 
Whitman, and Thoreau, that democratic individuality offers the self a chance to transcend dependency 
and see the true worth of separating oneself from modern preoccupations such as the pursuit of wealth 
and even political ambitions. Perhaps out of the three aspects of individuality that Kateb describes, the 
negative aspect is most suitable as a minimal level of individuality for NMD. The negative dimension 
covers mainly the critical attitude towards authority that democratic individuality instils in citizens. It 
encourages “dissent, unorthodoxy, no-saying.” (IO, 89) 
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to your humanness.”10 As democracy becomes more pervasive, even those who find 
each other’s moral views “repellent” or “abrasive” mitigate their respective negative 
judgements through their acknowledgement of each other’s individuality.11  Such 
tolerance is further supported by the recognition that the proper functioning of the 
system rests on the availability of contestation, since the absence of opposition would 
lead to docility.  
Underlying these characteristics, however, is the systemic and dynamic 
relationship between pluralism and individuality, or “moral identity” and difference. 
Kateb recognizes that the difference required for this individuality to survive is 
present only in a milieu of pluralism, which in turn can exist when individuals belong 
to different temporary, non-exclusive, changing groups.12 The Emersonian “moral 
identity” of persons, the idea that attaches primacy to the moral sameness or common 
humanness, nonetheless, does not overshadow their diversity.  On Kateb’s, as well as 
Emerson’s, account, the acceptance of moral identity is intertwined with the 
acceptance of moral difference: “Obviously, morally identical persons are diverse; 
they are individuals. Yet to accept them as equals by what is held to be the most 
important standard (the moral-political) is already to accept them as individuals in 
their differences. Belief in moral identity is the very source of the tolerance of 
otherness."13  
All of this suggests that Kateb should not be a critic of groups.  His account of 
individuality, after all, seems to presuppose the kind of human diversity that can exist 
only in presence of pluralism. However, his aversion to groups is evident when he 
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writes that “if ever greater numbers of individuals stop thinking of themselves as 
individuals and, instead, retribalize in ethnic or other sorts of fixed-identity groups, 
the normal level of democratic individuality would grow weaker.”14 Kateb goes on to 
blame groups for much of political evil that has taken place in the world: “My 
contention is that much of political evil on a large scale is intimately connected to 
deep belief in the group and its identity.”15 Kateb finds “the idea of strong group 
identity” dangerous. Moreover, he seems to be particularly averse to multicultural 
politics as far as the multiculturalists’ valuation of culture is concerned.   
 The easy escape from this conundrum appears to be, as Kateb at times makes 
it clear, to hold that he is opposed only to certain kinds of groups, namely the ones 
characterized by “the [dangerous] idea of strong group identity”. But it is difficult to 
make such categorical distinctions between groups. His account of the relationship 
between pluralism and individuality, and the ensuing minimalism concerning state 
authority, are too nuanced to allow such an outright and simple dismissal of 
multiculturalism. This complexity also rules out a related explanation. A careless 
reading may push one to explain Kateb's rejection of identity groups as having to do 
with how he takes individualism to be the primary value underlying democracy at the 
expense of relegating other democratic concerns. Kateb's individualism is supposed to 
encapsulate the apparent tensions between difference and identity rather than try to 
resolve it in favour of one or the other side.  
Two related thoughts can help us see why Kateb’s rejection of (some) groups 
does not find much support within his account of democratic individuality. The first 
has to do with the essentialism concern, while the second is more directly related to 
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features of Kateb’s own account of individuality. First, as already mentioned, Kateb is 
not against groups per se, but groups with “strong identities”. He writes that  
I cannot imagine human life without some measure of group identity, 
but I also cannot imagine a comparatively decent life (at least 
internationally) unless group identity is mitigated considerably by the 
doctrine of individual human rights – by the conviction, that is, that 
other people are as real to themselves as I am to myself or we are to 
ourselves. ... If groups are imagined too vividly, individuals lose sight 
of themselves and are lost sight of. Ordinary persons thus cooperate 
with their undoing and the victimization of other ordinary persons.16 
Most multicultural groups are not fixed identity groups of the sort that Kateb 
fears will undermine democracy by submerging democratic individuality. Kateb is 
aware of this when he acknowledges that often multiculturalism is a reaction to 
attempts on the part of dominant groups to thwart individuality of those on the less 
fortunate side of the power imbalance.17 I plan to discuss how multicultural groups 
can play a non-essentialized role in democracies in more detail in the remainder of 
this chapter, as well as in the next one. Here, I want only to add that the essentialism 
challenge cannot be used as a prima facie argument against multiculturalism since it 
is possible that even non-ethnic and non-religious identities – class and party being 
the most obvious two cases – can stratify people in fixed identities no less effectively 
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 “There is a commendable individualism in the will to stop being ashamed of one’s arbitrary or 
unchosen characteristics, either the most superficial (like skin color) or the most tenacious (like desire) 
or the most culturally variable (like one’s place in the sexual division of roles). ... Feminism, gay rights, 
certain racial assertions, and other social movements are faithful to the spirit of rights-based 
individualism, precisely because the will to end shame is more important than any further ideal 
aspiration. The group affirmation is an act of resistance to stigmatized identities and functions more 
than it is a claim to positive virtue or value. ... If, therefore, liberal individualism may, in some 
respects, cooperate with these forces, it holds within itself large resources to resist docility.” (IO, 238) 
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than ethnicity and religion. So the problem seems to be a function of how an identity 
thwarts democracy rather than the content of a particular identity. Then, similarly, the 
solution has to focus more on relations between a particular identity claim and the 
rights or wellbeing of individuals rather than on the content of the identity in its 
comprehensive form. The preceding pessimistic evaluation of groups rests on, perhaps 
not an exaggeration of the evil of which groups are capable, but an overstatement of 
such threat in the context of democratic societies.  
Second, it is important to point out how Kateb’s individualism is different 
from Barry’s individualism. Kateb is not worried about the attenuation of the common 
good as a result of the pervasiveness of democratic individuality in a maturing 
democracy. Not only does he acknowledge that the aversion to authority is 
responsible for the thinning out of common good, but he wholeheartedly accepts this 
as the only solution to the problem of docility. Kateb’s individuality, being immersed 
in pluralism, is then a more flexible concept. Barry, on the other hand, as we saw in 
the last chapter, works with a more predefined account of individual. The individual 
citizen we see in Barry’s theory has a much more constrained set to choose from. The 
big difference between the two is that many more ways of life that offend the latter 
individualism will not upset the former.  
What do Kateb’s views on individualism and his scepticism of 
multiculturalism teach us concerning how normative democratic theory should relate 
to pluralism, particularly to groups? The symbiotic relationship between democratic 
individuality (sameness) and difference lucidly captured by Kateb reveals the 
unacceptability of a state that tries to give shape to its individual citizens. Kateb 
rightly identifies attempts on the part of the state to break up the individual’s 
resistance and turn her into a subject complacent in the exercise of authority as a 
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source of great concern for the democratic tradition. It is in light of this aspect of 
Kateb’s democratic thought that the deployment of the state apparatus to remove the 
repugnant diversity through assimilative measures begins to appear as a less appealing 
option. Moreover, what makes groups repugnant in Kateb’s philosophy is not their 
assertion of difference but their tendency to claim normative priority over the interests 
of the individual. In the preceding passages I tried to demonstrate that one easy 
option, allowing some groups while shunning others, is not easily available to Kateb. 
Thus, what Kateb, and individualist democratic theory including NMD needs, is 
another meaningful criterion to separate the benefits of groups from their potentially 
destructive effects. Probably there is no hermetic standard for successfully separating 
these two aspects of group politics in an uncontroversial way. But the negative theory 
of groups seems to offer a successful enough standard. The success of the negative 
theory is based on its resolute commitment to not reducing the two aims of 
democracy, commitment to equality of all citizens and to the importance of non-
domination or disagreement, to one another. Of course, there will be times when 
making tradeoffs between these two democratic goals will be unavoidable. But the 
key difference between the negative theory of groups and other approaches to 
multiculturalism that lay claim to being democratic is that it tries to incorporate both 
of these goals as core democratic commitments – neither is an extension or corollary 
of, or supplementary to, the other.  
6.2 What role can groups play in the picture of individualist democracy?  
As we saw in the preceding section, the individualism to which democratic theory is 
committed does not reject groups. It simply denies that they can have normative 
primacy over individuals. It points out the implausibility and undesirability of 
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attributing to groups intrinsic value over and above the value that they may have in 
the eyes of their members.  
Democracy recognizes and accepts in an ineliminable way different kinds of 
groups and collectives. At its most basic, the demos in a democracy stands as the 
agent of democratic action. There are other corporate agents of lesser order such as 
various branches of government, various levels of legislatures, political parties, etc., 
to which certain rights and responsibilities are attributed. More importantly, rights 
that we often think of as individual rights – “the rights to freedom of the press and 
assembly, or the right to a jury trial” – “have important “collective” elements.”18 The 
reach of the collective dimension extends deeper than this and is exemplified by the 
representational character of modern democracy.  The most fundamental act of 
democracy – voting – groups citizens into various categories – on the basis of 
interests, constituencies, and electoral outcomes, to name the most significant three. 
In other words, it is not difficult to show that many rights inextricably associated with 
democracy have a group dimension.  
Perhaps the individualism of democratic theory does not produce a theory that 
actively promotes affirmative recognition for groups – a theory that many 
multiculturalists base on the intrinsic valuation of culture. However, this view of 
democratic individualism is still consistent with quite a robust theory of groups. One 
may call this a negative theory of groups, but this theory looks quite potent. In what 
follows, I mainly focus on three clusters of reasons that hint at the necessity of 
constructing such a theory. These reasons are (a) the unacceptability of politicizing 
motives, (b) anti-assimilationist bias, and (c) the collective bases of democratic rights.  
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(a) Impropriety of politicizing motives 
There is a tendency among democratic theorists to divide scholars of democracy into 
two groups – those whose theories advocate expanding democratic participation 
through more direct or deliberative democracy, and those that confine themselves to 
reinterpreting such traditional features of existing liberal democracies as 
representative institutions, interest groups, and preference aggregation.19 Such a 
classification may strike most of us as a gross generalization since many theorists of 
democracy engage in both theoretical exercises. Perhaps the following distinction is 
more nuanced. Some democratic theorists take citizens’ preferences largely as given, 
while others argue that the desirability of motives offers a legitimate basis for 
discriminating between preferences. The theorists falling under the second group 
often find it necessary to identify those institutional practices that cultivate desirable 
motives while discouraging the undesirable ones.   This classification seems to be 
nuanced enough to accommodate the fact that many theorists who value traditional 
institutional embodiments on normative or pragmatic grounds also advocate 
deepening democracy; Dahl’s vision of democracy as a journey (that starts from 
polyarchy) is a telling example.20 
The most conspicuous instance of the aforementioned distinction being at 
work is the debate surrounding interest-group pluralism. Opponents of pressure 
groups, ‘partisan bickering’, self-interested voting, and other types of ‘self-centred’ 
political manoeuvring, hold that the ignominious motives that animate the politics of 
interest are the source of the problem; were everyone to act out of a sense of justice 
rather than self-interest, we could have a better and deeper democracy. In the words of 
one of its most persuasive critics, the fact that the self-centred view of democratic 
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theory allows “no criteria for distinguishing the quality of preferences by either 
content, origin, or motive” constitutes one of its biggest shortcomings.21 On Iris 
Young’s account, the failure to distinguish the desirable motives from the undesirable 
ones weakens the intuitive connection between democracy and justice.22 
Advocates of strong democracy often throw multicultural groups into the same 
category as other interest groups whose particularistic agendas allegedly end up 
subverting the common good.23 Incidentally, even theorists generally sympathetic to 
multiculturalism endorse it to the extent that its demands can be couched in a non-
egoistic language. Most theorists opposed to interest-group pluralism are aware of the 
fact that people form groups, or remain in groups that came about in less deliberate 
ways, because of some perceived interest.24 In the case of some groups, the interest at 
issue is a common culture, in others it is economic, and in yet others it is opposition to 
some perceived injustice. The most important reason they favour the distinction 
between noble and ignoble motives is that such a distinction would allow them to 
discriminate between legitimate groups and illegitimate ones, and design institutions 
that minimize the impact of the latter on the political process. To be sure, the only 
preference at stake is not one between self-interest and other-regarding interests. 
Sometimes, we may find certain types of group-interest more tolerable. To give an 
example, institutional design could continue to allow unions and corporate interests to 
compete for political clout, because their activities are considered integral to a 
functional capitalist democracy, but cultural and religious groups could face more 
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institutional barriers in organizing to gain influence because they are moved by more 
parochial, primitive, conflictual – in short, undesirable – motives.  
There are important practical and normative concerns built into the view of 
democracy developed in this work that militate against such a focus on motives. First 
and foremost, as argued in detail in chapter three, political equality in a democracy 
serves a strong expressive function. In a recent contribution to the debate, a group of 
influential deliberative democratic theorists acknowledged that voting – a mode of 
democratic decision-making that takes preferences as given, and assigns equal weight 
to them without assessing the respective justness of motives– can “in important ways” 
turn out to be “more inclusive and egalitarian than deliberation”; for “voting has the 
capacity to bring every full member of the polity into the decision and give that 
member’s “say” an equal weight, at least in the decision as constructed.” 25 However, 
what these writers still continue to deny, in my view without much plausibility, is that 
the inclusive and egalitarian edge that voting has over purely deliberative mechanisms 
has to do precisely with its disposition to avoid discriminating between motives. 
Otherwise, society might develop a proclivity similar to the one lucidly portrayed by 
Elizabeth Anderson in her critique of luck egalitarianism.26 The state and society 
might continually have to make “demeaning judgments” that jeopardize the 
expression of equal agency by political equality.27 Such paternalism with respect to 
motives will likely involve what Anderson, in the context of luck egalitarianism, 
describes as dictating to people “the appropriate uses of their freedom” – in this case 
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their freedom to vote and engage in political activism in the direction of their 
choice.28  
Before I move on to discuss the totalitarian threat lurking behind such 
discrimination, I should acknowledge that there is much to agree with in Young’s 
suggestion that “the more that public life and political decision-making motivate 
political actors to justify their claims and actions and be accountable to their fellow 
citizens, the more the arbitrariness of greed, naked power, or the cynical pursuit of 
self-interest can be exposed and limited.”29 NMD values the transformative role that 
such public debate can have in advancing objectives such as democratic equality and 
non-domination. The regenerative dimension of NMD suggests that democratic 
societies ought to cultivate more responsible citizenship through democratic education 
and better access to public space. However encouraging responsible citizenship is one 
thing, tailoring institutions to discriminate against preferences of certain citizens on 
the basis of their having wrong motives is another.  
A society that turns the motives behind individual choices into matters of 
legislation will be acting in violation of important democratic norms. The schemes of 
politicizing motives – and weighting more heavily the ones that are “decided” to be 
superior– will run into conflict with the two democratic values that NMD deems 
fundamental. These are (a) political equality and (b) the prevention of domination and 
a larger-scale totalitarian control. Even if, we were able to identify some elaborate 
regulative principle of discriminating between motives that satisfy (a), the project 
would still not be acceptable from the democratic perspective laid out in this work. 
For the discrimination between motives would continue to require a highly intrusive 
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scheme of government interference and control. What makes such an intrusive 
scheme even more unacceptable from the perspective of NMD is that it will be hard to 
check through the traditional means of democratic control. The latter issue arises from 
the damage inflicted on the democratic agency of citizens in the process of 
discriminating between motives. Citizens whose motives are deemed inappropriate by 
government to the level of being discounted or only partially counted, could not 
coherently be expected to retain their democratic agency.30  
The upshot is that there is a strong democratic case against constructing 
institutional barriers based on discrimination between motives in order to impede 
individuals’ pursuit of their preferences. What does this show with respect to groups? 
I think one thing that it certainly shows is that we have an egalitarian reason to be 
more suspicious of normative theories trying to discourage certain kinds of group 
activity on the grounds of the disruptive impact these may have on larger societal 
goals.  
(b) Anti-assimilationist bias 
The second cluster of reasons that points in the direction of a negative theory of 
groups has to do with the relationship between democracy and assimilation. In part 
two of the thesis, we saw three different stances on assimilation that pretended to 
speak from a democratic perspective. To sum up those stances, one of them, Barry’s 
view, was that assimilation is required by democracy.31 Tully viewed assimilation as a 
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grave offence against multicultural others.32 On Hollinger’s view, assimilation was 
deemed natural, as democracy over time makes the continued cultivation of certain 
traits less than desirable.33 Which one of these views, if any, is right? I think the 
answer to this question lies in the differences between two kinds of assimilation. The 
two kinds that seem most relevant in this context are (a) assimilation that occurs as a 
result of state coercion – call this artificial or coercive assimilation – and (b) 
assimilation that occurs over time without direct use of coercion to bring forth 
assimilation – call this natural or non-coercive assimilation. The ideal of democracy 
presented in this work appears to have a bias against the former, while not having a 
similar bias against the latter.  
This bias stems from the account of democratic individualism presented in the 
first section, as well as accounts of democratic equality and non-domination examined 
in the part one of the dissertation that foreshadow the argument for democratic 
individualism. Even when existing cultural structures of minority groups seem to 
favour hierarchy over equality, an imposition of a social blueprint to transform 
individuals can be undemocratic.34 There are principled as well as pragmatic 
arguments for avoiding assimilation of the first kind. The principled argument has to 
do with the nature of power relations within democratic societies. Here I think we can 
safely assume that in a democratic society people are by definition formally free and 
equal, and no multiculturalist would find such formal equality morally 
objectionable.35 Given this background condition, the only egalitarian purpose that 
assimilation can be expected to serve in a democratic society is improving the power 
imbalance among those occupying dominant social positions and others.  Assimilation 
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of the first kind, however, often does not result in a more equalitarian power 
relationship. For assimilation in situations resembling the permanent minorities 
scenario discussed in chapter three constitutes a further exercise of coercive power of 
one, dominant, part of the population over another. Even if this power is geared to an 
indisputably democratic cause, its exercise over people who have no power to 
effectively contest it is undemocratic. Thus, paradoxically, outright interventionist 
assimilation looks less legitimate when differences between the dominant group and 
minorities appear sharper and deeper, that is, when anti-multiculturalists perceive a 
more pressing need for assimilation.  
Moreover, the principled case against forced assimilation stems from the need 
to respect individuals’ equal status as agents. Assimilation damages one’s sense of 
agency and results in more incapacity to act as an individual. The person who has 
been coerced not to act in a way that she has always acted, or coerced to act in an 
alien way, does not somehow magically become a new individual. She remains the 
same person with a more impaired agency and reduced sense of self-respect, and 
therefore less likely to be empowered – which goes against the egalitarian purpose of 
assimilation.  
Fortunately, often there is more a government can do in terms of solving the 
problem than engaging in counterproductive large-scale assimilation. Often 
improving access to mainstream institutions is a more effective strategy, for the less 
the minority groups involved in such conflicts resemble the pattern of being a 
permanent minority, the less the defence of democratic equality, and piecemeal 
interventions to achieve it, will resemble assimilation. Leaving aside the forceful 
moral case against assimilation, there are strong pragmatic reasons for avoiding it. As 
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supporters of multiculturalism such as Will Kymlicka have convincingly argued, 
coercive assimilation also undermines stability.36  
On the other hand, assimilation that occurs as a by-product, without direct use 
of coercive apparatus of the state by the dominant group, does not fall under the anti-
assimilation bias. It is neither the fact that people have had to change their ways of 
life, nor that their culture has been transformed without their purposeful decision, that 
makes assimilation a negative from the perspective of democratic norms; for 
democratic theory does not hold culture to have such unconditional value. Culture in 
this narrow sense can matter only for instrumental reasons and one context in which it 
seems to highly matter is the permanent minority situation described in chapter three. 
For what makes assimilation objectionable and worrying from the democratic 
perspective is the presence of certain types of coercion as opposed to the mere fact of 
having to adapt to a new situation. Human beings adapt to countless new situations, 
and cultures undergo change without many people ever complaining about the cruelty 
of assimilation. Much of the change associated with democratic individuality 
discussed above falls under this second type of assimilation. For the universalizing 
effects of democracy are by-products of engagement in the democratic process. 
Now, we can return to the question concerning three different views of the 
relationship between democracy and assimilation. I think neither James Tully’s nor 
Brian Barry’s view is right. That is, assimilation is neither essential for democracy, 
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nor inconsistent with it, because a simple either-or statement fails to take differences 
between the two types of assimilation into account. An argument similar to the one 
made by David Hollinger that draws attention to the naturalness of long-term 
assimilation is more plausible than the other two stances on assimilation.  
(c) The group dynamics in democratic rights 
The third cluster of reasons that hints at the necessity of thinking about a democratic 
theory of groups is that an individual’s political experience is significantly 
transformed by the group dynamics of modern democratic practice. However, from 
acceptance of this fact one should not try to draw any far-reaching conclusions about 
the intrinsic worth of cultures or groups. This thesis does not depart from the 
commitment to democratic individualism that we saw in the previous sections. It does 
not claim that the social and political world can be explained in terms of units other 
than individuals. It simply acknowledges the need to take relations between 
individuals and the structures they create and support into account. In the words of 
Hayek, “It is so not only in the trivial sense in which the whole is more than the mere 
sum of its parts but presupposes also that these elements are related to each other in a 
particular manner.” In the words of Popper, it recognizes the need to take “the logic of 
situation” into account.37  
I would like to return to the suggestion made in the opening paragraph of this 
section that the most fundamental act of democracy, voting, tends to group citizens 
into various categories – on the basis of interests, constituencies, and electoral 
outcomes, to name the most significant three.  
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First, individuals can experience political effectiveness only in connection to 
groups. This statement does not just imply that individuals are more effective in 
attaining their political aims when they coordinate with other like-minded individuals 
than they would have been if they chose to act alone; it also implies that the 
individual’s political engagement in the context of contemporary democracies is 
rendered effective only in the presence of groups. Moreover, political effectiveness 
seems possible only through the kinds of group activity that are contestational.38 It is 
unfeasible and also undesirable, for reasons addressed throughout this dissertation, to 
get rid of the contestational aspects of modern politics. The image of an individual 
citizen, who deliberates on her own about the content of the common good, by itself, 
is a very inadequate characterization of contemporary democratic politics even in its 
most good-willingly cooperative sense. What happens at every stage of politics from 
agenda-setting to the final decision-making stage is that individuals’ political activity 
is mediated through different layers of group activity. In the words of one critic of 
“unmediated” individualism, “the central fact of democratic politics in modern 
societies with universal suffrage and large territories is that individual participation 
can be meaningful only when mediated through organizational forms, whether they be 
political parties, watchdog groups, ideological and economic groups, or others.”39  
Furthermore, not all group activity arises out of a sense of individual choice. It 
is not simply the pervasive awareness of the necessity of groups for political efficacy 
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among individuals that leads to the omnipresence of groups. The modern conception 
of democracy itself unavoidably sorts citizens into groups. The most obvious way in 
which this happens is when even unorganized citizens find themselves grouped 
together as a consequence of voting outcomes in elections or legislative processes. In 
multi-party systems, supporters of the parties that end up on the losing side often gain 
some sort of temporary identity in their concerted opposition to the government, 
despite their prior ideological differences.40 On the other hand, for individual electors, 
political experience is substantially transformed by the mere fact of having associated 
themselves with one set of political options rather than some other – whether one 
happens to be on the winning or losing side of the vote matters to one. This type of 
grouping seems to hold even in non-representational decision procedures such as 
referenda and municipal direct democracy. Citizens find themselves in groups, albeit 
temporary and transient ones, even when they come together without any partisan 
affiliations or sympathies, with the more Rousseauian intention of putting the public 
good first.41 
Also, not only are individuals politically effective only in groups, but it is the 
group-dynamics of democratic politics that, to a significant extent, determines how 
effective they can be. Particularly important in rendering individual political activity 
more or less effective is the unfixable manipulability of democratic procedures. 
Something as rudimentary as the drawing of electoral boundaries can end up largely 
affecting the weight of an individual vote.42 The electoral system of a country, 
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together with the geographic concentration of minority groups and the extent of 
polarized voting, just to cite some common examples, may seriously affect the 
relative weight of a minority vote, and to use the language adopted by American legal 
theorists, end up “diluting” it. 
Vote dilution claims gained attention particularly among American legal 
theorists in the wake of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whose provisions allowed 
civil rights groups to demand that unfair electoral boundaries be redrawn to enable 
African Americans to elect representatives of their choice.43 Before the Supreme 
Court developed its dilution doctrine, American states could gerrymander their 
electoral boundaries for partisan advantage without much interference from the Court. 
However, in the wake of the Voting Rights Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has made 
several landmark decisions.44  
Interestingly, the reverse is also possible. To demonstrate how the rules of the 
game can be bent in various ways to produce different outcomes, we could consider 
an example in which a minority group ends up getting a disproportionate degree of 
political influence. For almost two decades, until their surprising defeat in May 2011 
general election, Bloc Quebecois – Quebec’s separatist party in the federal parliament 
– consistently acquired significantly more seats in the House of Commons than other 
opposition parties that received even a bigger share of the popular vote due to the 
well-known advantages of first-past-the-post for geographically concentrated 
minorities. This is not to argue that a particular constituency configuration is by 
definition just or unjust, for there are many possible configurations, and none that is 
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supposedly neutral with regard to every identifiable vote or voter concern. Therefore, 
it is hard to imagine that vote dilution or inflation claims can be settled in conclusive 
and satisfactory ways. The upshot is to draw attention to how voting procedures in 
particular, and other democratic procedures, in general, can easily produce largely 
varying outcomes, which could be regarded as signs of the manipulability of the 
system. 
Now, one could grant that these are fair observations about representative 
democracy, but ponder why they should carry any normative meaning. In other 
words, “one might argue that a vote is ‘counted at full value’ as long as everyone’s 
vote is given equal weight” as one U.S. Supreme Court justice did.45 As long as, 
dominant groups do not stuff election boxes with extra ballots, and do not engage in 
other sorts of election fraud, a democrat could object, one should not be concerned 
with variations that will continue to exist in one form or another. Of course, the fact of 
manipulability would be an irrelevant fact as far as our present question is concerned, 
like many other ineliminable facts of politics, if it were not for the fact that benefits 
and burdens resulting from manipulation of such rules accrue to individuals on the 
basis of their group affiliations. Although ultimately the harm is done to individuals – 
it is the individual’s right to vote, not the group’s right, since NMD conceptually 
rejects the possibility of a group right to vote – this harm involves group dynamics 
that one cannot remedy while remaining oblivious to the role of groups. In the 
absence of other individuals with similar political dispositions, the wrong committed 
by the electoral system against an individual elector – dilution of that elector’s vote – 
would simply disappear.46 For it is only in relation to other individuals who fall into 
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one’s electoral group, and also those who fall outside it, that a vote is counted at less 
than its “full value”.  If these group-related aspects play a role, which I think is clear 
from several observations made in the preceding paragraphs, the claim that groups 
matter has to be taken more seriously. The cost of neglecting the possibility of such 
manipulation, let alone the fact of manipulation, would be too high because the vote is 
one device that crosscuts all four dimensions of NMD. It plays an irreplaceable role in 
every aspect of normative minimalist democracy from expressing equality and 
registering dissent to ensuring responsiveness and regeneration. 
The point of this discussion is that group dynamics matter in an important way 
because the fact of groups ends up transforming the political experience of 
individuals. In consequence, political theorists such as Melissa Williams and legal 
scholars such as Heather Gerken are right when they point out that “[n]o matter how 
individualistic the premises of a political system, all political representation is group 
representation insofar as legislators represent constituencies and constituencies are 
defined by some shared characteristic, that is, as a group.”47 The important question 
that this conclusion evokes is whether recognizing the place of groups requires 
rethinking the individualistic understanding of the norms underlying minimalist 
democracy or the individualistic understanding has to remain intact.  
6.3 How to Think of Groups: Interest Groups and Democratic Multiculturalism 
Although the concern with inconsistencies that arise when overlooking the role of 
groups in democratic theory is an important part of a coherent approach to the 
interplay of democracy and cultural diversity, I want to maintain that the 
individualistic framework highlighted above is well enough grounded to deal with 
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these issues in ways consistent with democratic principles. To back up this suggestion 
I now turn to examine a particularly relevant formulation of the challenge against the 
individualist framework of democracy – the one made by Melissa Williams in her 
Voice, Trust, and Memory. The shortcomings of this view that calls for more 
substantive equality between groups will help clear away a good part of the 
scepticism towards democratic individualism that the foregoing passages on the group 
dynamics of democratic politics may seem to nourish.  
Although Williams’ account shares an important part of its normative 
concerns with the inclusion challenge developed by Iris Young, the former has some 
important differences which require a new response on behalf of NMD. These have to 
do with Williams’ more careful examination of liberal democratic institutions and her 
seemingly more committed attempt to square liberal democratic norms of 
representation with the group-related views voiced by the proponents of the politics of 
difference. For Williams, what she calls the two strands of liberal democratic 
representation, individual equality in the form of ‘one person, one vote’ and equality 
of opportunity in the form of interest group pluralism, despite their shortcomings, 
belong to the indispensable core of democratic theory.48  The aim is not to supplant 
this individualistic crux of liberal democracy with a different social ontology, but to 
supplement it with substantive norms that allow one to consistently defend the 
intuitions of fairness with regard to marginalized minority groups.49  On this account, 
contra Young, difference is not a positive resource to be accepted for its permanent 
transformative character, but a necessary milestone in the road to difference-blind 
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justice.50  In short, Williams is not in disagreement with the moral ends of liberalism, 
but only with the means of getting there in societies with histories of unequal power 
relations, since that requires balancing the individual-centred procedural notions of 
equality with group-centred, substantive ones.  
The most conspicuous part of Williams’ theory of fair democratic 
representation for marginalized groups rests on her critique of interest groups 
pluralism – particularly, on the argument she develops against discussing the politics 
of difference in terms of interest groups. At the heart of her argument is the claim that 
groups that predominantly figure in the politics of difference – at least the ones that 
have the weightiest claims – are ascriptive groups for whom their distinctive social 
positioning carries a history of marginalization that not only disadvantages them in 
relation to other groups but also constantly deepens and regenerates that disadvantage. 
For Williams, membership in an ascriptive group – to be more precise, “[t]he 
inescapability of the group differences regarded as meaningful by the dominant 
society” – makes it extremely difficult to overcome the disadvantage as long as the 
structures of inequality maintaining the difference are overlooked.51 Theories of 
pluralism preoccupied with the voluntary aspect of groups fall short when it comes to 
bringing about fairness for marginalized ascriptive minorities because they are 
particularly silent on the issue of structural disadvantage.52 On this model that 
Williams criticizes, groups that speak loudest in the public and/or are resource-rich 
are the ones that are able to win favours and secure their desired policy outcomes. In 
short, pluralist theory is overly optimistic, Williams argues, particularly in its 
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expectations that any interest group will be able to mobilize resources when it comes 
to their most intensely held preferences.53  
Moreover, there is the argument from the necessity of trust between legislators 
and their representatives that, Williams thinks, renders liberal pluralism inadequate in 
relation to marginalized groups.54 The point of departure for Williams’ trust argument 
is Hanna Pitkin’s famous definition of representation that comes to terms with, rather 
than attempting to reconcile, the tension between the aspects of representation that 
involve trusteeship and delegation. In her The Concept of Political Representation, 
Pitkin wrote that  
representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a 
manner responsive to them. The representative must act independently; 
his action must involve discretion and judgment; he must be the one 
who acts. The represented must also be (conceived as) capable of 
independent action and judgment, not merely being taken care of. And, 
despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and 
represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not normally 
take place.55 
Pitkin’s definition of representation entails a triadic relationship – one that factors in 
the agency of both the representative and the represented, as well as the normative 
condition of responsiveness that mediates the relationship between the two agents. 
Because the above definition from Pitkin does not subsume the agency of one side 
under that of the other, representation maintains its “fiduciary” character.56 For 
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Williams, this character of representation is doubly important, not only because 
representatives can maintain the trust as long as they remain responsive to the 
discernible interests of the represented but also because political trust makes the 
responsive relationship between the representative and the represented possible. In the 
words of Williams, “Every scheme of representation must offer citizens a rational 
basis of trust in government, a set of reasons why institutions of representation will 
function to make government responsive to their essential interests.”57 Groups come 
into this picture when the patterns of historical tension inescapably reflect on the 
relationship between citizens. When the trust of citizens towards their electors shows 
signs of erosion – largely because the underlying trust among citizens can no longer 
be counted on – the only way of rescuing representative government, according to 
Williams, is to make it possible for citizens to elect those in whom their trust remains 
stronger.58 To return to our question at hand, this is the second reason why the liberal 
democratic theory of representation, with its focus on formal equality and pluralism is 
incapable of doing justice to marginalized groups. Theories of democratic 
representation that are not group-conscious do not have the conceptual resources 
required for consistently defending the self-representation of minorities, supposedly 
the only way of bringing back political trust. 
I do share Williams’ critique of the invisible hand, and agree that an over-
reliance on the self-corrective mechanisms of the market is too optimistic a view for 
democratic societies that have obligations of fairness towards their disadvantaged 
members.59 The classical pluralist view of democratic politics, on its own, is a 
deficient view similar to the classical minimalism of Schumpeter insofar as both 
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ignore the normative underpinnings of contemporary democracy.60 However, 
Williams’ account is marred by numerous problems of its own, and as a result, it is 
not able to offer convincing reasons to upset minimalist democracy’s commitment to 
individualism and a negative theory of groups for which it leaves room. My objection 
to Williams –which I hope will reveal that her view is a less appealing alternative to a 
revised version of the account of pluralism she criticizes – is motivated by two broad 
concerns. First, Williams’ criticism of interest groups seems too shallow insofar as it 
ignores certain democratic realities. On the other hand, her overreliance on legislative 
fairness, and in general on fair outcomes, is too optimistic. Let us now take up both 
concerns in turn.  
In what ways is Williams’ critique of interest groups shallow? One thing not 
to ignore is the extent to which minority groups have been successful in making 
inroads when they organize as pressure groups and mobilize their resources to gain a 
place in wider public and political coalitions. An interest group should not 
immediately be associated with a wealthy corporation funnelling disproportionate 
amounts of money in order to corrupt a given country’s political elites. Unions, civil 
liberty organizations, and other associations that have played an important role in 
progressive politics often operate at least partly on the interest group model. The 
ACLU and NAACP are two illuminating examples from the U.S. In the words of one 
scholar of American politics, “In mid-century, civil rights organizations like the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People did more to represent 
the interests of African-Americans than most elected politicians.”61  In Canada, The 
Assembly of First Nations, a federation of many Aboriginal organisations, has done a 
lot to combat discrimination against the most disadvantaged segment of the Canadian 
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population.62 The interests in question do not have to be self-interested in the narrow 
sense of the term that implies egoistic dispositions.  
Another related aspect of the misconception is that political theorists tend to 
view interest groups, almost exclusively, as powerful national organizations with vast 
resources or histories of successful engagement with political powerhouses. Powerful 
business and civil rights groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 63 and the 
NAACP may neatly fit this model of interest group engagement that focuses on the 
importance of stable policy networks, whereas many other successful pressure 
campaigns do not. In the U.S. the “shift – from a world of policy-making 
characterized by tightly knit policy communities and/or well-structured and stable 
networks, to a more loosely ‘organized’ and therefore less predictable collection of 
stakeholders” dates back to the 1970s.64 Jeremy Richardson notes that in Europe too, 
“[p]olicy making within European states and at the European Union level is often 
much more fluid and unpredictable – and less controllable – than seems to be implied 
by enthusiasts of the network approach.”65 In reality, the system of interest group 
politics at play in most Western democracies is so fluid that even “established insider 
groups” with lots of disposable resources “can eventually lose out” to their less 
connected and resourced rivals.66 
The foregoing scepticism about voluntary groups has to do with a larger 
misunderstanding concerning the proper role of interest groups in a well-functioning 
democracy. I take a particularly broad definition of the term interest group, and use it 
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 For instance, the Assembly together with other First Nations lobby groups featured prominently in 
the process that led to the official apology by the government of Canada in June 2008. See Parliament 
of Canada, “House of Commons Official Report (39th Parliament, 2nd Session).”  
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 The Centre for Responsive Politics (its web project Opensecrets.org), has consistently ranked them 
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to refer to any group/organization that wants to influence any number of policies but 
is not large or comprehensive enough to comprise a political party. It is characteristic 
of open and pluralistic societies that political parties despite their ideological 
flexibility will be neither willing nor able to accommodate all the different 
preferences of citizen groups. To think that parties can organize platforms complex 
enough to obviate the role of interest groups is unrealistic.67 Notwithstanding the 
strength and health of a particular party system, intermediate associations with 
political objectives will continue to exist unless governments specifically outlaw and 
persecute them. Now, in the context of multiculturalism, some groups may happen to 
be large or territorially concentrated enough to seek representation directly in the 
legislature. French Canadians are one pertinent example. African Americans in the 
U.S., although they do not have their own party, have formed the Congressional Black 
Caucus. There are also examples of ethnocultural group involvement in the form of 
parties from the more recent or transitional democracies. But in most of these cases, 
particularly in open societies, this form of politics covers only a relatively small 
subset of the politics of difference. To use a Canadian example, even the Francophone 
Bloc Quebecois, a political party with a clear-cut and relatively homogenous identity, 
is subject to the influence of many internal and external groupings that try to sway 
policy in one direction or another.68 Thus it is a bit simplistic to downplay the 
significance of interest groups in a democratic politics. 
However, Williams, Young and other egalitarian critics of interest groups can 
try to respond to this criticism by pointing out that what they are trying to downplay is 
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 One observer of Canadian politics writes that Bloc's members "may hold similar views on 
sovereignty but range widely on the left–right scale." The author adds that the party's "central focus on 
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not the empirical fact of interest groups but the normative weight that this fact should 
be assigned by theorists of democracy. These writers criticize interest groups for their 
negative impact on the common good, for generating inequality of political influence, 
triggering cronyism, and especially in the context of diversity politics, for militating 
against groups with resource problems.69  Here, my aim is not to overlook these 
important issues, particularly the last one. No doubt, many of these concerns are quite 
well-founded; but it is also the case that these objections apply, to a noteworthy 
extent, to all forms of group engagement in democratic politics except the one that 
assigns to the state the role of constantly (a) determining which groups are relevant, 
(b) coming up with a substantive blueprint of fair boundaries for all relevant groups, 
and (c) implementing the blueprint in a timely fashion. It is clear that all three are 
features of Melissa Williams’ account that puts stress on the ascriptiveness of groups, 
which gets her account off the ground as a preliminary remedy to the negative effects 
of conceptions of group engagement that emphasize the voluntary elements. But what 
is also very clear is that these amount to a totalizing, draconian, and very likely, quite 
undemocratic, remedy, which brings us to the second broad problem with Williams’ 
account.  
Put broadly, the second concern with Williams’ critique of interest groups has 
to do with how she continues to search for a solution to the problem of permanent 
minorities under the guiding principle of representative fairness in the legislature. 
Williams’ position is problematic for several related reasons. First, the focus on 
substantive representation for minority groups may bring about some immediate 
benefits for large groups such as African Americans, but outside of this particular 
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American example, the model is going to have limited applicability, and its benefits 
could be outweighed by its costs in terms of democratic legitimacy (I discuss the latter 
point below). My concern is that when the groups in question are not large enough to 
elect a noticeable number of representatives or do not satisfy Williams’ memory 
condition – as a vast majority of immigrants to the Western Europe and North 
America do not – the approach is going to be very ineffective in helping with the 
perceptions of marginalization that in one way or another motivated both my and 
Williams’ concern with the electoral positioning of minority groups. Williams is 
aware of this problem and quotes Iris Young and Will Kymlicka to draw attention to 
the persuasiveness of the idea that sometimes self-representation for minority groups 
will require some overrepresentation – representation disproportionately larger than 
their share of population.70 At its most basic, this will be too gross a violation of the 
norm of one person, one vote to count as a democratic remedy to the problem of 
permanent minorities. Moreover, this suggestion is too open-ended to take seriously. 
It is not clear what might be the upper limit of how much overrepresentation it may 
require, and it looks like its application could entail a significant distortion of the 
numerical aspect of democratic equality, not just a minor departure from it to secure 
other democratic egalitarian goals. 
As Williams is aware of the difficulties of attaining substantive equality 
among large and small groups, she does not pursue the “over-representation” point 
too far. Instead she places the emphasis on the significance of deliberation as a way 
out of the problem: Williams writes that the more deliberative the legislative process, 
the less one will have to worry about minorities having a numerically weaker 
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presence in decision-making bodies.71 Deliberative democracy demands that concerns 
about injustice voiced by marginalized groups “be heard and responded to, that they 
have an opportunity to affect legislative decisions.”72 It tackles the problem of 
permanent marginalization by making a “sharp” move away from the “bargaining or 
competitive model contained within liberal representation” to a process that requires 
all involved parties to “aim at mutual agreement arrived at through a process of 
rational argumentation.”73 Once the discursive ideal has been embraced, legislative 
debates will no longer overlook the experience of marginalization that minority 
groups bring to the table, “for only what all could consensually agree to be in the best 
interest of each could be accepted as the outcome of this dialogic process.”74 Thus, at 
the heart of this new model of legislative politics intended to deliver fair results to all 
citizens irrespective of their social positioning is the expectation that it will replace 
the politics of self-seeking competition with that of mutual reasoning for a genuinely 
common good.  
This brings us to a related difficulty that arises from Williams’ focus on 
substantive fairness, namely, her exaggeration of deliberative democracy’s potential 
to produce fair outcomes in particular cases and intergroup equality in general. To be 
sure, the “voice” part of Williams’ argument is a view that has democratic merits; 
namely, it is highly important from the perspective of NMD that groups can give 
voice to their grievances and that these voices do not go unheard by the wider public. 
However, the move from the voice argument to an argument for deliberative 
democracy sweeps too many important problems under the carpet. The move is 
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 Here, Williams draws on Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship. But she adds a caveat: “There is a 
limit to this logic, however, for I would not want to go so far as to claim that in a perfectly deliberative 
body a single representative would be sufficient to secure the needs and interests of a marginalized 
group.” (VTM, 226) 
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problematic even from the perspective of the marginalized groups that it is supposed 
to benefit.  
Williams herself is aware of the “limits of the deliberative ideal”. She 
acknowledges that “the aspiration to rise above interest politics” could continue to 
disadvantage permanent minorities:  
To the extent that ideals of deliberative democracy contemplate ruling 
out expressions of self-interest altogether, they hamper marginalized 
group representatives’ capacity to conform to the standards of public 
discourse while also effectively representing their constituents’ 
perspectives and interests.75  
As a solution Williams offers the idea that deliberative democrats should recognize 
the legitimate place of self-interest in political discussions. In her own words, “the 
motive of a common good of justice and the motive of interest are in fact far more 
closely intertwined than prevailing models of deliberative democracy tend to admit.” 
To claim otherwise would be, in Williams’ words, “naively utopian”.  Despite this 
striking recognition of the limits of deliberative democracy, Williams continues to 
hold that “the ideal of a perfectly deliberative legislature remains the appropriate 
aspiration of a conception of political representation that is just toward historically 
marginalized groups”.76 Williams wants to purge deliberative democracy of its 
utopian elements, the “exacting” demands on political actors to shun their self-interest 
for the advancement of the common good. The problem is that she wants to do this in 
a way that does not seem to be less utopian; namely, by adopting “decision rules that 
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move in the direction of consensus or unanimity, as a requirement of legitimate or 
binding political decisions”.77  
Nothing that Williams writes in the last part of her book that deals with the 
question of institutional design suggests one could identify democratically consistent 
electoral and legal mechanisms that will produce substantive fairness for minority 
groups.78 Limiting the scope of the exercise to the groups that satisfy the memory 
condition does not make the task easier either.79 The reason for this is that the 
numerical and deliberative aspects of the problem are not just isolated issues that once 
resolved would leave the view of substantive fairness in line with the logic of 
democracy; to the contrary, they point at a more comprehensive problem with the 
notion of substantively equal representation for minority groups. The notion of 
substantive fairness is problematic, from the viewpoint of NMD, due to being 
oblivious to the essential place of disagreement in any adequate theorization of 
contemporary democracy. Because Williams conceives of the ideal of democratic 
fairness as a consensus that pleases all involved parties equally – similar to other 
voices in the politics of difference debate with pluralistic aspirations – her work 
continues to draw silently on a notion of a harmonious, homogeneous general will. 
The democratic merits of the latter were subject to scrutiny in the first part of this 
dissertation, where I argued that parts of what Schumpeter wrote about general will 
theories of democracy quite accurately underlined an important source of domination 
in contemporary politics. To recall, the idea that NMD wants to reject is that 
contemporary democracies have to make a choice between agreement and 
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 Williams concedes this point when she writes that “these reflections lead to the conclusion that we 
do not yet know what institutional changes would most effectively increase representational fairness; 
they are, rather, an invitation for institutional experimentation.” (VTM, 236) 
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disagreement. One cannot simply wish away disagreement, because it is not a mere 
nuisance to be overcome on the way to a more enlightened agreement. Political 
philosophies that complain about the inability of contemporary democracies to bring 
meaningful common projects to completion because of destabilizing disagreement80 
are grounding their arguments on misinterpretations of democratic norms commonly 
embodied by modern democratic practice. It is not difficult to see how Williams’ view 
also shares these mistaken features. Whether consensus remains in the picture as an 
actual goal or in the form of a “decision rule” as Williams’ revision of deliberative 
democracy to make it less utopian suggests, it undermines the ethical significance of 
disagreement in democratic thought that the earlier chapters highlighted.  
So far I have argued that it would be difficult for Williams’ view to overcome 
the frustration of marginalized groups with the way democratic politics functions, 
even after such groups have gained a presence in the legislature, for reasons that have 
to do with the defects of consensus-inspired views of democracy. But what 
alternatives are there to this model other than the present system – known to produce 
widespread domination – which Williams astutely criticizes? The contours of the 
answer to this question have emerged more visibly in the course of the chapter. The 
alternative to the two views – Williams’ account of substantive fairness and the liberal 
pluralist view criticized by her – that I have named the negative theory of groups can 
be summed up in the following way. Once supplemented by other normative elements 
of NMD, “the strategies that worked well to absorb the political pressures asserted by 
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voluntary associations (or ‘interest groups’)” need not prove “inadequate to answer 
the political claims of ethnic and cultural minorities.”81 
Normative minimalist democracy, and the negative theory of groups for which 
it leaves room, can overcome the marginalization of minority groups in ways 
consistent with democratic norms. Within this framework, interest groups represent a 
particularly promising strategy for overcoming the problems of political 
marginalization. Unlike Williams’ solution, the framework offered by NMD does not 
contradict the openness of democratic governance, and is not subject to the problems 
of essentialism, knowledge (i.e., how to decide what is the appropriate substantive 
recognition?), and power abuse. Moreover, while avoiding the pitfalls of Williams’ 
account, this revised framework also does not turn a blind eye to fairness concerns.  
Let us now expand on these relative advantages of the revised pluralist solution to the 
problems of marginalization.  
First, NMD avoids the pitfalls of essentialism by recognizing that in 
democratic politics groups matter not for their distinctive characteristics but because 
insofar as they shape the political experience of their members, they perform an 
important democratic function. NMD is not committed to the unjustifiably optimistic 
view that subjugating the competitive strand to the substantive considerations of 
fairness will significantly mitigate the need for groups to compete for more political 
clout.82 In a pluralistic polity this simply is impossible; groups are changing in a 
myriad of ways and the competitive tendencies will remain ubiquitous. As a result of 
openness and competition, and the changing group dynamics of the polity, the 
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 Even theorists who urge a shift from procedural fairness towards more substantive protections, end 
their accounts by emphasizing the importance of procedures. Williams, for example, begins to cast 
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character of marginalisation experienced by groups and their sources are bound to 
change as well. Because interest-group pluralism does not fix certain differences as 
sources of marginalisation, it is responsive to the way problems evolve. Consequently, 
interest group pluralism does not run the risk of setting current injustices right at the 
expense of creating new problems for either some present or future minority.     
All of these, however, do not change the fact that Williams and other critics of 
minimalist democracy have identified important problems that were mentioned above. 
One cannot downplay the importance of these problems, and have to search for more 
democratic ways of overcoming or containing them, for the goal of fairness towards 
permanent minorities and others who appear to be at competitive disadvantage is 
wholeheartedly accepted by NMD. As I have argued throughout, some of those 
problems are institutional design questions, while others are ineliminable from any 
theory of the open society. What this negative theory implies with respect to certain 
important multicultural concerns will be explored in more full detail in the next, final 
chapter of the thesis. Here I want to offer a brief sketch of how interest group 
pluralism, coupled with a strong egalitarian commitment to the openness and fluidity 
of the system can go farther to achieve these goals than other alternatives that have 
been put forth.  
The solution that NMD offers eases barriers to competition and removes 
artificial obstacles and outcome-related constraints imposed on the process by the 
dominant parties trying to perpetuate their present unfair advantage. In this regard, 
NMD offers a strictly proceduralist solution to the problem of electoral 
marginalization. On the negative side, it intends to prevent the use of political clout to 
bend rules so that they work to one’s advantage. However, I agree with Williams that 
this is not going to solve the problem completely because the present political 
CHAPTER 6: Democracy’s Individualist Commitments and a Negative Theory of Groups 
246 
 
disadvantage may have deep socioeconomic roots. To correct this, NMD offers a 
solution that could be regarded as less strictly proceduralist; namely, it requires 
strengthening the contestational capacity of those who suffer from permanent 
marginalization. However, the crucial point is that it intends to do this in ways that do 
not distort the procedural openness of democracy. The strict limit on this aspect of the 
democratic role comes from the institutional mechanisms being as resilient to being 
hijacked by any single group as possible no matter how numerically dominant these 
groups are. In theory, this is fully in line with the normative weight of competition 
that NMD borrows from the Schumpeterian conception of democracy. In practice, the 
focus is on amplifying the significance of public funding for open access to media, 
anti-trust laws in politics, etc.  
As a result, the title “the negative theory of groups” does not suggest that 
groups have a merely provisional role in the political life of a democracy, because 
they will continue to matter regardless of how policies change. The negative theory of 
groups recognizes the permanence of groups, and is on guard against competitive 
disadvantage and other kinds of democratic unfairness, that may accrue to different 
groups, while not recognizing the permanence of any actual group interest. This 
seems more in line with the goals of democracy than what more positive theories such 
as Williams’ seek; the latter despite its recognition of the fluidity of group interests 
ends up advocating measures that curtail competition and make it difficult for groups 
to secure their constantly evolving interests.  
6.3.2 Do cultural groups fit into the revised pluralist model?  
One final bit of response to Williams remains to be made. I will conclude this chapter 
by pointing out the importance of, and drawing the contours of my answer to, one 
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question that I leave to the final substantive chapter of this work: to what extent do 
cultural groups fit into the pluralist model? From the beginning of this work, whether 
there are any democratically relevant reasons to treat cultural interests as any different 
from other kinds of interests that individuals can have that motivate them to organize 
into a group has been a question that recurrently emerged. Some potential reasons are 
brought up in the multiculturalism literature. We can divide these into two broad 
groups. The first set of reasons views interest groups as bad from the perspective of 
democratic politics. The second set of reasons is either supportive or agnostic towards 
interest groups, but thinks culture makes a bad object for interest group politics. 
Among the second group, we have views that resist inclusion of culture in the 
competitive model because it is dangerous and unstable, and views that see it as a 
matter of justice, and therefore an inappropriate object of bargaining.  I think the three 
clusters of reasons for groups that I derived from the democratic theory presented in 
the earlier chapters of this work point in a particular direction – they dismiss both 
groups of criticism that we see in the multiculturalism literature, and more broadly 
speaking in normative political theory. Here I would like to add a few more brief 
remarks on these two sets of objections (particularly on the second set), and then point 
out why three reasons that require a negative theory of groups point in the direction of 
a third, competitive egalitarian, or revised pluralist approach.  
The first set of objections to the inclusion of culture in the pluralist model is 
usually put into use by the critics of multiculturalism and politics of difference of all 
variants. We saw these arguments in the chapter on the democratic pretensions of 
anti-multiculturalists. For these writers, democracy is strictly about agreement. The 
second set of objections could come from pluralists or multiculturalists. A liberal, for 
instance, could be pluralist and favour competition and bargaining over interests but 
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hold some aspects of culture outside of this model out of fear that it could have 
potentially devastating, uncontrollable effects on social stability. Different economic 
and social interests could be expected to mitigate each other, and therefore eliminate 
the risk of a deadly conflict, but religious or ethnic antagonism could result in an all-
out violence. This is a good reason to keep what might make effective raw material 
for violence out of the reach of daily political bickering. The second argument, from a 
different moral perspective, also advocates a solution that is strikingly similar in form 
if not substance. This is the multiculturalism argument for constitutional protection of 
cultural identity from the negative impact of majoritarianism. Language or religion is 
not good material for politics, not for merely prudential, but for moral reasons. 
Competitive pluralism with regard to these non-material goods is less palatable 
because often the outcome will be a more damaging subjugation of already 
marginalized groups. To be sure, the two arguments are interconnected, but it is useful 
to maintain the conceptual distinction between them. Now, notwithstanding their 
differences on the preceding two positions, Williams, Young, Tully, Taylor, and 
Kymlicka all share a commitment to this last line of thought.  
Why do the three reasons for groups militate against the two sets of 
objections? Earlier in the chapter I showed how normative minimalist democracy has 
a distinctive anti-assimilation bias, which clearly alleviates the worries concerning 
majority tyranny. The unacceptability of discriminating between citizen motives also 
creates lots of democratically justified freedom for minority groups to operate without 
interference from the state or dominant segments of society with better access to the 
state power. The third cluster of reasons that pointed at the negative theory of groups 
showed that groups matter not just for the wellbeing of their members, but also matter 
politically for being an ineliminable part of the democratic modus operandi. The 
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extent to which these justify calling the emerging theoretical construct a theory of 
democratic multiculturalism is a subject left to the final chapter, but I think here one 
can safely point out that the particularly multiculturalist form of the objection, the 
third line of thinking, has serious flaws.  
The argument that culture is special in some predetermined sense seems to 
violate all three clusters of reasons – reasons that leave room for a democratic theory 
of groups – at the same time. First, it contains the kind of motives discrimination that 
NMD tries to avoid. Second, by eroding the conceptual distinction between 
democratically acceptable and unacceptable, forceful assimilation, the objection 
seems to create room for unnecessary state intervention (to prevent natural 
assimilation), and in doing so disrespects democratic agency of its citizens. Third, it 
misunderstands the role of groups in democratic politics. That is, it does not respect 
the individualistic ontology on which expressive equality and non-domination are 
based.  
6.4 CONCLUSION: 
Because NMD as a theory is committed to individualism in an obviously strong way, 
I had to begin this chapter by explaining how NMD’s individualist commitments do 
not translate into a group-free theory of politics. Kateb’s democratic individualism 
was seen to be a particularly helpful point of reference when making a preliminary 
case for the place of groups in an individualist democratic theory. For, it clearly 
shows that groups continue to perform an important role in democracies, despite all 
the scepticism towards them that individualism entails. As we saw in section two, not 
only does not the individualist commitment of democratic theory shut groups out of 
politics, but it also offers, together with other aspects of NMD, important reasons for 
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constructing a democratic theory of groups. The elucidation of the reasons for having 
a negative theory of groups, however, in itself does not respond to various other 
objections that the rival theories of group involvement may raise.  Section three tried 
to respond to the criticism of the negative theory of groups that emanates from its 
alleged silence on injustices suffered by ascriptive groups. I responded to these 
concerns by examining the democratic merits of Melissa Williams’ account of 
substantive group equality, and identifying problems that make it a less appealing 
alternative to the revised versions of the interest group view that she criticizes. These 
problems, however, do not mean ascriptive groups should be totally ignored, nor do 
they amount to a rejection of self-representation for minorities. I am not denying that 
legislative presence for minorities might prove a legitimate goal. It is an inescapable 
fact of modern politics that when minorities are large, territorially concentrated 
groups, listening to their concerns will have to take place largely through certain 
representative institutions. Moreover, the preceding chapters outlined a democratic 
case for decentralization or devolution of political power, which is likely to result in 
more self-representation for minority groups. My objection is that as far as the general 
trajectory of a theory of pluralistic democracy is concerned, the ascriptive theory of 
groups offers very limited resources for relating to diversity in a way consistent with a 
coherent understanding of democracy. In other words, Williams’ account fails in ways 
similar to Iris Young’s and James Tully’s. 
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Chapter 7: Is Democratic Multiculturalism Really Possible?  
The preceding chapters present a particular – I argue a more consistently democratic – 
way in which contemporary democracies could respond to multiculturalism. The 
normative underpinnings of minimalist democracy suggest specific responses to 
important concerns discussed in the political theory of diversity politics. The main 
question that this chapter tries to answer is the following: Could one call the 
theoretical construct that emerges from the comparative analysis of these two sets of 
normative concerns a theory of democratic multiculturalism, or not? Multiculturalists 
will try to argue that the construct presented in this dissertation is too conservative in 
its acceptance of culture, therefore undeserving of the title multiculturalism. Anti-
multiculturalist liberal egalitarians who hold views similar to Brian Barry’s could 
argue that the view I call normatively sound minimalist democracy (NMD) sacrifices 
an important degree of democratic equality or individual freedom for the sake of more 
cultural freedom or equality, and therefore offers a very thin notion of democracy 
undeserving of the title democratic. To support their respective critical viewpoints, 
multiculturalists and liberal egalitarians could raise reformulated variants of the 
normative, as well as the more institutional and practical, objections that we have seen 
throughout the dissertation. I have already tried to debunk the democratic pretensions 
underlying certain normative points made by thinkers from both camps in the second 
part of the dissertation. Here, I plan to draw on the more specific criticisms of NMD’s 
approach to multiculturalism likely to come from these contrasting vantage points. 
Defending NMD against such objections, and arguing that it represents a respectable 
approach to multiculturalism, will require clarifying and systematizing what it entails 
with respect to some important questions that emerge at the nexus of democracy and 
difference. A very important part of my response to the guiding question of this 
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chapter, and more largely of the thesis, consists of exploring how democratic 
multiculturalism satisfies some important multicultural and democratic concerns 
better than its theoretical alternatives.  
In what follows, I evaluate how NMD performs with respect to four 
multiculturalist and three liberal egalitarian concerns that are often invoked in the 
literature to support and challenge different conceptions of multiculturalism. On the 
pro-multiculturalism side of the equation, the primary concerns are that NMD could 
worsen the assimilative pressures against the most vulnerable groups, detract from the 
goal of equal recognition, undermine legitimate aspirations for self-rule, and last but 
not least, result in an under-inclusive politics. Among the critics of multiculturalism, 
the main worries have to do with the well-known concern with the exacerbation of 
socio-political inequalities, balkanization, and institutional impasse as a result of the 
multiplication of intractable groups or erosion of trust and solidarity. After I assess 
each of these claims on the basis of the evidence that piled up from the work done in 
the previous chapters, I move on to the concluding section where I elaborate on why 
the emerging theoretical construct deserves the title multiculturalism.   
Responses to some multiculturalist concerns 
 Speeding up assimilation of already disadvantaged groups?  
There is a worry that this type of democratic theory that places emphasis on 
competition will speed up the process of assimilation for small groups, hence further 
disadvantaging the most disadvantaged. For instance, a small group with limited 
electoral capacity could be the hardest hit by a political setting that distributes rewards 
in proportion to the overall influence. To alleviate this concern, one could bring up the 
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fact that in a pluralist democratic system, groups can often compensate for their small 
size by other resources. But this too, critics could suggest, militates against the most 
disadvantaged.1 Overall, the fate of small and resource-poor multicultural minorities, 
critics could argue, is a particularly inegalitarian and unjust implication of the theory 
of democratic pluralism I offer.2 
To be sure, there is an obvious sense in which my view offers more benefits to 
bigger groups than it does to smaller ones. Namely, ‘the bigger the group, the stronger 
its political influence’ is often going to be true. A populous group with knowledge 
and other resources could find it easier to find itself room in successful power 
coalitions, and more generally to function well in a competitive democratic system.3 
Nonetheless, this does not justify overlooking how smaller groups will benefit from 
the system. First of all, this view guarantees the rule of law and equal democratic 
concern to members of all private, political, social associations – an important sense 
in which it is strongly egalitarian. The competitive pluralism that NMD offers does 
not rest on a laissez-faire approach to power. As we saw clearly in chapters two and 
three, democratic theory has an important egalitarian dimension that effectively 
protects citizens against many forms of disadvantage that arise from unequal exercise 
of power. Second, it recognizes the importance of the group dimension of politics and 
the importance of an enhanced access to public space, particularly, for minority 
groups with poor resources. This is quite an important difference between NMD and 
                                                            
1
 Melissa Williams voices a similar concern when she writes about the inadequacy of the pluralist 
model of democratic politics. Williams writes “that social interests backed by wealth are much more 
likely to become organized as interest groups than are economically disadvantaged groups.” (VTM, 76) 
Permanent minorities are particularly disadvantaged under this model: “meeting liberal representation’s 
standard of equity in the electoral process is especially difficult with regard to permanent minorities” 
because deep cleavages separate them and the rest of society. (VTM, 77; 259n78) 
2
 There is a general, and well-founded, concern among egalitarian theorists for the well-being of the 
worst off groups largely due to the influence of John Rawls’ work.  
3
 See Holyoke, Competitive Interests: Competition and Compromise in American Interest Group 
Politics. 
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classical forms of pluralism. NMD guarantees a voice and presence to all groups 
irrespective of their size or wealth. The strength and openness of public space ensures 
that groups will not have major problems in making their grievances known. If the 
parties in power are reluctant to listen, pluralism and enhanced competition will make 
sure some well-organized opposition do arise.  
A third related factor is that NMD is an anti-cartel and anti-monopoly view of 
political competition, which protects minorities more than it helps the dominant. 
Group size is not as important a factor in restricting the group influence as liberal 
egalitarian critics might argue. The normative underpinnings of minimalist democracy 
require improved transparency and competitiveness for a better overall 
responsiveness. Therefore, under a functioning NMD, institutional design would look 
for better ways of preventing a dominant group or groups from artificially restricting 
competition or blocking channels of contestation to prolong their stay in power. And 
finally, group size is rendered more insignificant because dissensus is not only 
grudgingly tolerated, but accepted as an ineliminable part of democratic politics. For 
NMD recognizes the transience of any majority, and democratic politics is not geared 
towards discovering truth. Those on the losing side know that a particular outcome 
has not been carved in stone. With the exception of the rules of the game that are 
supposed to guarantee a satisfactory performance along the dimensions of NMD, 
every electoral victory and defeat is subject to reversal. It is difficult to downplay the 
ethical significance of dissensus in such a system without running into conflict with 
important procedural rules.  
Overall, smaller groups are actually offered more protection under this view 
than under some rival conceptions. For example, the view at hand seems to bypass 
CHAPTER 7: Is Democratic Multiculturalism Really Possible? 
255 
 
most problems known in the literature as minorities within minorities without the state 
having to undermine the identities of many groups on a daily basis. Even very thick 
egalitarian views of multiculturalism such as James Tully’s and Charles Taylor’s face 
difficulties when they are challenged with the issue of what to do with relatively 
small, often more recent, defiant groups within a large, well-defined minority group 
with a history of semi-autonomous political institutions. In Taylor’s multiculturalism, 
accommodement raisonnable between Muslim immigrants and Francophone 
Quebecers puts principles of cultural recognition under a significant tension. In 
Tully’s Strange Multiplicity, it is the stories of rights conflicts between Aboriginal 
groups and internal dissenters that most challenge the principle of post-colonial self-
rule. NMD ensures that such groups – e.g., Anglophone immigrants within Quebec or 
defiant Aboriginal groups within well-organized First Nations bands – enjoy a secure 
access to public space just as any other substantially larger, and historically 
recognised minority group. Overall, even theories of egalitarian multiculturalism end 
up, albeit reluctantly, condoning some kinds of assimilation – recognition of cultural 
rights submerges a vast number of actual and potential cultures under a more 
homogenous conception of a group. From the perspective of the theory of democracy 
presented here, they do so on a more arbitrary basis – often, what determines which 
groups have to yield is something as arbitrary as which group moved to a place first 
and which group is currently well-resourced enough to dominate the cultural sphere of 
the group. Thus, the idea of an innocuous cultural coexistence that equally satisfies all 
groups and subgroups making up a modern pluralistic society is simply utopian. The 
Bouchard-Taylor report commissioned in response to the tensions between Canadian 
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multiculturalism and Quebecois identity gives vivid testimony to the failed optimism 
of multiculturalist theories based on ‘equal respect for all cultures’.4  
Because groups do not have to pass any tests to qualify for a place in this 
competition – a mere entry into public space to voice one’s grievance is sufficient for 
political recognition – there is going to be no need to discriminate between the 
interests of a large group versus its defiant subgroups. In many cases, the government 
will avoid the democratically inapt task of passing judgement on the cultural identities 
of its subgroups that reifies, and sometimes demeans, those identities.  When it is 
difficult to avoid conflict between groups, NMD will take a more genuinely mediating 
role that tries to prevent or bring an end to the actual infringement of individual rights 
rather than targeting cultural practices that are believed to give way to these 
violations. In other words, society will intervene out of a concern for the infringed 
rights, not out of contempt for the culture that allegedly caused the infringement. This, 
I think further alleviates worries over assimilation, because, even when intervention 
becomes difficult to avoid, it will be limited in its target and therefore in its effects, 
leaving minority communities’ ways of life, to a large extent, undisturbed.  
 Not enough cultural recognition?  
Even after minimalist democracy’s group-sensitive and egalitarian underpinnings 
have been clarified and espoused, multiculturalists could continue to feel concerned 
about the degree of recognition NMD offers to minority cultures. They could argue 
that, under NMD, majorities continue to inflict, or reserve the power to inflict, a 
grievous harm on minority groups by denying them equal recognition.5 An egalitarian 
                                                            
4
 See Howard and Anctil, Religion, Culture, and the State: Reflections on the Bouchard-Taylor Report. 
5
 The Schumpeterian variant of minimalist democracy, in its strict adherence to the right of the demos, 
or the major part of it, to define itself, is certainly guilty of this charge. For instance, Iris Young wrote 
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multiculturalist of recognition could argue that the socio-political norms continue to 
reflect a bias in favour of the majority culture and when majority and minority 
cultural norms come into conflict minorities are still expected to yield.6 In short, a 
multiculturalist could argue that the commitment to the primacy of the majoritarian 
strand of liberal democracy that the first wave of multiculturalism tried to puncture 
makes a comeback with the NMD.7  
Here, too, potential critics would be exaggerating their own theories’ 
achievements and their rivals’ shortcomings. NMD recognizes groups in a democratic 
way. It recognizes them not because culture in the narrow sense (of some 
ethnolinguistic or religious identity) is a special, more important consideration than 
many other interests around which citizens mobilize into social movements, pressure 
groups, political parties, charities, etc. To the contrary, NMD recognizes groups, 
among them many cultural ones, due to the democratic processes in which these 
groups are involved with the aim of bringing the attention of the public to their 
problems and finding solutions.  
Moreover, the account of democratic politics that recognizes groups for their 
presence and activity in the democratic public space gives them the additional 
possibility of identifying which aspects of their identity they want to politicize. By 
having an important degree of discretion on what aspects of their identity to politicize, 
groups are engaged in a process of self-definition, which is arguably superior to the 
dominant segment of society having a large degree of control over the discourse of 
recognition – often quite a subtle and unnoticed influence. This is perhaps more in 
                                                                                                                                                                               
that “The fragmented and privatized nature of the political process, moreover, facilitates the dominance 
of the more powerful interests. ( “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship,” 251-52) 
6
 See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. 
7
 See Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 34 
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line with the spirit of even the thicker theories of multiculturalism than recognition of 
a minority group through a parliamentary declaration or a court ruling, where the 
ultimate decision on whether and what to recognize rests more firmly with the 
dominant party. With NMD, however, no majority is able to shut out a minority group 
from political competition or make political recognition impossible to attain.  
 In addition to the challenge of recognizing groups, the foregoing line of 
criticism against NMD, also involves the related, broader challenge to how 
democratic theory should deal with culture. As Tully points out in Strange 
Multiplicity, the question of a political system’s disposition towards cultural diversity 
is prior to the question of recognising actual groups or their specific cultural claims. 
As we saw in Part Two, Tully criticises contemporary liberalism, not only for specific 
violations of principles of recognition and self-rule, but for the more fundamental 
wrong of being ill-disposed towards cultural diversity. On this count, too, NMD can 
prove more multicultural than the multiculturalist objection is willing to accept. The 
democratic response developed in this dissertation is not ill-disposed towards cultural 
diversity in the ways that we saw the critics of neutral, homogenizing state such as 
Tully and Young condemn. NMD is receptive, and to an important extent hospitable, 
to cultural diversity, but not in the exact way that multiculturalists demand. Let us 
recall that Chapter 4 identified two senses of the term culture in order to capture 
different ways in which the word is invoked in the political theory of 
multiculturalism. A distinction was drawn between the broad and narrows senses of 
the term culture. There, I noted that the broad sense corresponds closely to the choice-
enabling aspect of culture that Raz and Kymlicka emphasize, whereas the narrow 
sense has to do with the more particularistic connotations of the term culture.  
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NMD accepts that culture in the broad sense may have some crucial links to 
the regenerative dimension of democracy. Democracy has its own cultural 
prerequisites, which were discussed in the previous chapters, and failure to attain 
them may cause problems for the regeneration of the democratic form of government 
in a given society. Culture in the narrow sense, on the other hand (contra the critics of 
multiculturalism who ignore that it can still have a legitimate role to play in 
democracies), may be closely linked to the responsiveness dimension.8 For this 
reason, culture in some narrow sense could well become a subject of democratic 
decision-making; that is, democratic majorities and minorities could engage in day-to-
day political exchanges to reserve to themselves, temporarily, certain parts of the 
cultural space. In short, there is a democratic process in which societies engage in 
order to arrive at provisional settlements on cultural questions. Thus, NMD is in 
disagreement with multiculturalists concerned with recognition over the attempt to 
win culture some kind of immunity from democratic uncertainty. In other words, 
recognition itself is not the problem; democracies can even recognize culture in its 
narrow sense. What causes the tension with democratic theory is the permanence of 
that recognition demanded by some multiculturalists. 
The above helps show how NMD can offer culture (in both broad and narrow 
senses of the term invoked by multiculturalists) a significant degree of recognition. 
But there still remains room for the objection that such recognition will not be equal 
or even equitable. Now, it is true that at a given time, a particular minority group 
could earn less recognition under NMD than they could have achieved under some 
liberal multiculturalist proposal, but such losses could well be compensated by the 
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 Although NMD is sceptical of various aspects of the social ontology presented by writers such as 
Kymlicka and Tully, it does not claim that culture should not play any role in democratic interactions 
between various groups.   
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fact that NMD is more receptive towards minority groups, and the recognition it 
offers conceives of minority groups as active rather than passive (involved more fully 
and equally in the process rather than being merely in the role of demanding justice or 
retribution). Therefore, on the issue of recognition, it is not obvious NMD does worse 
than many multiculturalist theories. The recognition that NMD offers carries the 
dignity of equal citizenship and of having equal access to the public space for one’s 
preferred association. Moreover, this access and the ensuing recognition are quite 
secure insofar as no majority group can block it for a minority.  
 Undermining legitimate aspirations to self-government?  
Another important concern is that NMD accepts the demos as it is – within its present 
boundaries –  hence disregarding histories of injustice and oppression associated with 
colonialism. It therefore undermines the legitimate aspirations to self-government of 
historically marginalized national minorities.9 Will NMD end up perpetuating the 
subjugation of peoples to foreign rule? In this work, I have said very little on the 
question of secession not because I tried to avoid this difficult question, but mainly 
because NMD is, to an important extent, a theory of democracy at work, not one of 
democratization or democracy in crisis. The politics of secessionism, on the other 
hand, is often a species of crisis politics, which thus juxtaposes normal democratic 
values with pressing concerns for political stability and peace.10 To be sure, in the first 
part of the dissertation I discussed decentralization and devolution as important ways 
of securing non-domination. But the crucial characteristic of non-domination as a 
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 See Tully, Strange Multiplicity. 
10
 “On this second view, the justifications for democracy and for recognizing a group's right to secede 
are quite distinct. The right to democratic governance is seen as a general right which the citizens of 
every state have, while the right to secede is understood to be, like the right to revolution, a remedial 
right only—a right which groups come to have if seceding is the remedy of last resort for serious 
injustices perpetrated against them by the state.” See Allen Buchanan, "Democracy and Secession," 
in National Self-Determination and Secession, 16. 
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component of normative minimalist democracy is that it is an individual-centric rather 
than group-centric norm.11 Everything it advocates from privatization to devolution 
and decentralization is justified not because there is such a thing called a democratic 
right to group sovereignty, but because the individual right to democratic self-
government has some group-related aspects that the preceding chapter further 
explored. It is these individualist commitments that end up having a collective effect 
that at times resembles some group rights discussed in the literature.12 When such 
resemblance occurs, what we have is a democratic settlement between groups, often a 
joint outcome of some individualist rights and their interplay with politics, not a group 
right to that kind of settlement.  
Another related point to take note of is that NMD assumes a desire on the part 
of minority groups to continue their association with the majority. In other words, 
aspirations for self-government alone do not make up the minority attitude towards 
society at large.13 In the absence of this disposition to continue the common 
association, I concede what NMD offers may be inadequate as a political theory. This, 
however, does not translate into the recognition of a collective right to self-
determination. It simply has to do with the acceptance of the desire of a large group of 
individuals to discontinue their association with a state. There is nothing a country 
committed to democratic principles can do in such situations to keep the group as part 
of the demos other than offering to renegotiate the terms of association. Again, here 
the terms of negotiation to be compatible with democratic principles are governed by 
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 See chapter 3. 
12
 For a discussion of this point see chapter 6. 
13
 Secession and multiculturalism are two different things. Secession is a rejection of the common 
polity, whereas multiculturalism, at its most, is a call to renegotiate the terms of association.  The latter 
still assumes an important commitment to common public institutions. 
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individualist considerations such as democratic equality and non-domination, the 
collective elements only figuring as by-products. 
Once these features of NMD are recognized, there still remains an important 
space for groups to be self-determining in a sense that resembles the collective self-
determination we see in the writings of Tully and other theorists of self-rule or 
decolonization. The crucial point of divergence between the two views is that the 
principle that governs this decentralization is not that of cultural sovereignty, and 
similarly, it is not based on some rival predefined conception of the demos. It is the 
democratic principle that decisions should be made by individuals whose interests are 
at stake. Decentralization and devolution, together with privatization, are responses to 
particular problems of democratic governance such as preference clustering that end 
up electorally marginalizing certain fractions of a population. From the perspective of 
NMD, it would be wrong to elevate these – as we saw in part one of the dissertation – 
to the level of self-standing principles that have to be met for any society to be called 
democratic. It is similarly mistaken to see these as corollaries of group rights, despite 
their obvious group-related aspects. Thus, we do have a significant degree of 
convergence between principles of decentralization and devolution that follow from 
democratic non-domination and considerations of self-rule in the multiculturalism 
literature, but the principles derived from non-domination are not based on the 
valuation of culture.  
 Not being able to provide the requisite level of democratic inclusion?  
Another possible challenge is that despite its commitment to equal concern and non-
domination, and the ensuing efforts to overcome the problems of permanent 
minorities and other forms of electoral marginalization, NMD fails to achieve more 
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inclusiveness, or, at the very least, what it offers is nowhere close to what a truly 
multicultural polity should offer. Here, perhaps, the most crucial part of the challenge 
is not the possibility of a proactively exclusionary government, which is quite 
straightforwardly ruled out by the normative components of NMD. More pressing is 
the claim that NMD does not make sufficient attempts to remove informal or 
structural barriers to minority presence in the legislature, or, more broadly speaking, 
in the socio-political life of a given democracy.14  
NMD’s dismissal of substantive, outcome-based standards of group equality 
does, in fact, represent a departure from some theories of multiculturalism, but it does 
not make the polity under-inclusive in a meaningfully democratic sense. Throughout 
this work we have seen that there is an important tension between norms underlying 
minimalist democracy and a social ontology that presents groups as having rights or 
some other kind of fixed importance which requires group interests to be balanced 
with individualist considerations. One such balancing act that multiculturalists who 
are focused on inclusion often invoke is the guaranteed representation to achieve 
substantial equality between groups.  
To respond to these concerns, NMD often will not include groups in the full 
form that they would like to be included in the political community. Nor can it give a 
guarantee that groups qua groups will enjoy substantive equality in the legislature or 
other socio-political venues because these outcomes will have to be determined, to a 
large extent, in accordance with the openness of the democratic process.15 However, 
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 As we saw in the previous chapters, Iris Young, Seyla Benhabib, Anne Phillips and many other 
scholars of the politics of difference make this claim against the types of democratic theory that adhere 
to individualist rather than group-centred considerations.  
15
 Thickening the substantive core of democracy in order to offer to the existing groups guarantees on 
representation and political influence could not only distort the competitive nature of democracy, but 
also create problems for the other normative aspects of NMD as well. I have already discussed why this 
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NMD is not more difference-insensitive than, say, Young’s theory because the latter 
too disregards what one may call celebratory multiculturalism to the benefit of what 
Young calls the politics of structural difference.16 Moreover, groups will make 
conflicting claims against each other, and any particular settlement between them will 
be only provisionally satisfactory or agreeable. Thus, NMD tones down 
multiculturalism not simply to balance it with democratic individualism, but also to 
make it more consistent with competing multicultural concerns such as that of 
recognition or self-rule. The egalitarian multiculturalism of inclusiveness, in 
predefining the terms of inclusion, actually favours one kind of multiculturalism over 
another, and it fails to deliver even on the type that it favours for the reasons to be 
discussed next.  
If there is no ex ante democratic answer as to which cultures the state should 
recognize, and in what form, that respects the democratic agency of all citizens, the 
only acceptable solution seems to be making such decisions subject to the openness of 
democratic processes. If most groups cannot be guaranteed the right amount of 
recognition or inclusion, from the democratic perspective it is preferable to make sure 
that no group is stuck in a position of disadvantage for a long time.  Theories of 
democratic inclusion that rely on substantive principles will find it particularly hard to 
satisfy this requirement. For in the process of democratically engaging with each 
other, group identities often undergo an important degree of transformation. More 
interestingly, groups that are thought to need the most protection from marginalization 
– reclusive groups or groups that differ most from other participating groups – are 
likely to undergo even more dramatic change in the course of their contact with other 
                                                                                                                                                                               
is inacceptable from the perspective of NMD in the preceding chapter. For rival views, see Williams, 
Voice, Trust, and Memory. 
16
 See Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference; and Young, “Structural Injustice and the Politics 
of Difference” in Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy. 
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groups.17 Given this, to try to locate substantive standards of fair inclusion for existing 
groups could result in either making electoral competition impossible or making it 
difficult for groups to resist biases against them that emerge over future political 
cycles. Underlying this resistance to identifying substantive terms of inclusion is not 
some kind of controversial ideal of progress or social fluidity. It is simply recognition 
of the fact that what groups view as the most important interest always changes not 
only because of what happens within a group, but also as a result of what happens in 
the larger society, between different groups.18  
 Despite these dissimilarities, the emerging standards of inclusion are not 
completely different from the prominent multiculturalist ones we have examined in 
Part Two of the dissertation. There is an overlap between the motivating concerns as 
well as practical implications of the two standards of inclusion. Many of the concerns 
that motivate voices in the politics of difference debate to seek more inclusive forms 
of political theory – the concern with electoral marginalization, vote dilution, and 
other forms of use of coercive state power that depart from the ideals of equal concern 
and non-domination – are taken on board by NMD, lest the social ontology of groups 
that elevates them to levels of normative importance comparable to that of 
individuals. On both accounts systemic underrepresentation of minorities in important 
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 “But the Amish have not stopped the clock of progress. Modernization has not by-passed their 
communities. Indeed, it has often pushed them toward the same patterns of social organization that 
virtually all other groups have been forced to adopt. That the Amish have not been pushed as far or as 
fast as others is a tribute more to their self-conscious resistance to modernization than to their 
immunity from it.” (See Kraybill and Olshan, The Amish Struggle with Modernity, viii) 
18
 Kraybill presents a historical account of the intra-Amish conflicts that resulted in a series of splits 
from existing groups and multiplication of distinct, and even  non-cooperating, Amish  groups known 
as New Orders over social issues such as how stringently to apply the shunning policy, as well as 
openness to technological advances, etc. (p.  57) As a result, “Some twenty different Amish and 
Mennonite groups have branched out from the original Amish settlement that took root in the Holmes 
County in Holmes County in 1809. ... This cultural diversity, flowing from a common historical root, 
and yet seeking to be obedient to particular understandings of the faith, provides a rich laboratory for 
reflecting on the Amish struggle with modernity. Each group has drawn different lines in the endless 
battle with the forces of assimilation. The lines not only mark off boundaries with the outside world, 
they also stake out intergroup fences that give symbolic identity and integrity to each of the subgroups 
that claim the Amish name.” (The Amish Struggle with Modernity, p. 53-54) 
CHAPTER 7: Is Democratic Multiculturalism Really Possible? 
266 
 
offices or low levels of minority participation in elections could raise a concern over 
unequal treatment or some other subtle departure from democratic equality. But the 
way governments approach such problems would be different because conceptions of 
equality underlying these accounts differ in noteworthy ways. 
Responses to some anti-multiculturalist concerns: 
 Inegalitarian social life: 
The charge of sweeping social inequalities under the carpet by privatizing them is 
probably the most serious challenge to any pluralist theory of politics including all 
variants of multiculturalism. Susan Okin has raised the challenge in the context of 
feminism, arguing that multiculturalism “may not be in the best interests of the girls 
and women of those cultures” because it would make “inequalities between the 
sexes … less public, and thus less easily discernible.”19 Brian Barry has made it a 
subject of a general treatise on the relationship between differentiated citizenship and 
egalitarian concern with impartiality.20 David Miller has deemed too much 
multiculturalism bad for social unity – on his account, a precondition of the welfare 
state.21  
NMD, as we saw in previous chapters, is not silent on these challenges. 
Because NMD presupposes equal standing before the law, it is not vulnerable to the 
part of the liberal egalitarian challenge that criticises legal inequality. The most 
critical part of the challenge has to do with the inequality that ensues from deep 
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 Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, 23. 
20
 See Barry, Culture and Equality. 
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 See Miller, On Nationality. 
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diversity.22 In western liberal democracies deep diversity takes two forms: first, the 
relatively reclusive religious and cultural communities that have not undergone, to a 
comparable extent, the social liberalisation to which mainstream of society has been 
subject; and second, recent immigrant groups from countries where patriarchal 
practices are still common. One of the questions most commonly asked of 
multiculturalism over the last two decades has been how to pursue an egalitarian 
agenda in the midst of such deep diversity.23 As we have seen throughout the 
dissertation, intervention and non-intervention are two obvious stylized options in the 
debate.  
Respect for the agency of democratic citizens – entailed by equal concern, as 
well as non-domination – can require both intervention and non-intervention, 
depending on the particulars of a case.24 But such variations are based on a principled 
distinction, not mere expediency. Intervention can serve only one possible purpose – 
to strengthen democratic agency of the party whose agency is at risk here and now. Its 
end can be to overturn present oppression, not social engineering with expected future 
returns. Thus what NMD does is shift the focus of the intervention debate not in an 
inegalitarian group-centric direction, but more in the direction of individual agency. 
This account of agency is still universalistic, but the predefined part of it is not as 
thick as in standard liberal democratic accounts. It suits the normative conditions of 
NMD as well as the more general expectation of openness and pluralism in a 
democratic society. I think this principle comes very close to simultaneously 
                                                            
22
 Deep diversity is characterized by a more fundamental tension between the norms and values of the 
mainstream and minority cultures. Writers such as Ayelet Shachar and Jacob Levy use the term to refer 
to the more intractable variants of pluralism that come up in the multiculturalism debates. See Shachar, 
Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights. Moreover, this distinction – in 
the way that I refer to it – should not be confused with Kymlicka’s distinction between societal cultures 
and polyethnic groups. A deep diversity could exist in the midst of polyethnic groups, whereas national 
minorities could be less fundamentally distinct from each other.  
23
 See Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. 
24
 See the first part of the preceding chapter for a detailed discussion of intervention/assimilation. 
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protecting the individual and respecting pluralism. This is not an anti-individualist or 
inegalitarian move; on the contrary, it is what democratic egalitarianism requires.  
Thus, NMD’s approach to deep diversity produces policies that differ from 
both standard multiculturalist and anti-multiculturalist solutions that we saw in the 
previous chapters. Only those interventionist policies that produce real gains in terms 
of democratic agency can be chosen. Due to the place of non-domination in the 
multidimensional account of NMD, policies will be evaluated on how well they serve 
this particular purpose of setting right any immediate violation of a democratic norm, 
not on the degree to which they weaken a cultural practice that a majority deems 
inherently repulsive. One implication of this general standard is that with groups like 
the Old Order Amish, whose members are going to experience a significant loss of 
agency, a large-scale intervention would be self-defeating.25 However, the same does 
not seem to be the case with every state intervention in the internal affairs of a group. 
For example, minor adjustments are not going to produce the same kind of negative 
impact on agency that grander schemes will do. 
The upshot is that NMD shifts the focus from the content of cultural norms or 
history of a group to factors such as infringements of democratic agency. This allows 
NMD to balance considerations of associational freedom and equality, which as we 
saw in preceding chapters are supported by the individualist commitments of 
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 The history of assimilationist policies towards indigenous peoples of the former British Empire 
offers strong reasons to reject large-scale assimilation projects. For instance in 2008 Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper issued an official apology to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada that recognised 
how assimilationist projects such as residential schools did not achieve their intended objectives and 
caused significant suffering to the indigenous peoples of Canada: " Today, we recognize that this 
policy of assimilation was wrong, has caused great harm, and has no place in our country. ... The 
government now recognizes that the consequences of the Indian residential schools policy were 
profoundly negative and that this policy has had a lasting and damaging impact on aboriginal culture, 
heritage and language." For a historical account of how the assimilationist policies failed see Miller, 
Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada, Chapter 6. For a 
critique of Aboriginal justice claims see Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts.  
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democracy, with the overall goal of maintaining an egalitarian socio-political order. 
NMD shares with liberal egalitarians the commitment to the rule of law and equal 
concern, but disagrees with their views that present diversity and pluralism as 
nuisances when trying to achieve liberal egalitarian ends.26 With multiculturalists it 
shares the commitment to accommodation and/or non-intervention to the extent that 
these are necessary to meet the requisite level of respect for the democratic agency of 
all citizens and equal concern for their interests.  
 Balkanization:  
Another widely voiced concern by the anti-multiculturalist camp is that allowing 
ethno-cultural and religious difference free access to the public and political life of 
society will make democratic politics very difficult and often lead to destructive 
consequences. Historian Arthur Schlesinger expresses this concern in an alarmist tone 
when he asks the following rhetorical question: ‘If the republic now turns away from 
Washington’s old goal of “one people,” what is its future? – disintegration of the 
national community, apartheid, Balkanization, tribalization?’27 Such authors cite the 
examples of bloody conflicts from the history of Western Europe, as well as more 
contemporary examples from the developing world.  
It is true that the forms of multiculturalism that take cultural identity as a fixed 
point of reference run the risk of essentializing groups and therefore turning conflicts 
between them from an array of transient clashes of interest into well-defined and 
permanent struggles.28 Even the most well-intentioned state that tries to stand at an 
                                                            
26
 See Jeremy Waldron’s critique in his Law and Disagreement.  
27
 See Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, 124. 
28
 Anne Phillips draws on Rogers Brubaker to suggest that although such groups are likely to be at the 
centre of conflicts, what turns them into “protagonists of most ethnic conflicts are ... organisations with 
a vested interest in making people see themselves in ethnic terms.” (Multiculturalism without Culture, 
17) 
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equal distance from all parties to such a conflict will not be immune from the 
challenge of balkanization. In the context of NMD, however, balkanization is less of a 
threat than liberal egalitarians such as Brian Barry claim because NMD neither 
invents new channels of political conflict, nor tries to make existing conflicts 
permanent.29 Instead it ensures that grievances are voiced and dealt with, as much as 
possible, in a piecemeal manner through day-to-day adjustments rather than 
constantly postponing them (the liberal egalitarian strategy) or tackling them in the 
form of a grander scheme (the egalitarian multiculturalist view).30 Ironically, the first 
of the two alternatives runs a risk of Balkanizing society similar to the second 
alternative. Ethnocultural conflicts that arose following the fall of the Eastern Bloc 
were not a chain reaction to the adoption of multiculturalism, but a consequence of 
the decades of repression of political difference by a manipulative and dominating 
state.31 Thus, it is ironic that proponents of suppressing difference in the name of 
social unity continue to advocate state-centric responses to the questions of diversity 
similar to those that had led to disastrous conflicts in the former USSR and its proxy 
states.  
                                                            
29
 See Culture and Equality and Post-Ethnic America. 
30
 James Tully’s advocacy of constitutional renegotiation in his Strange Multiplicity is a vivid example 
of the latter view. Melissa Williams in Voice, Trust, and Memory offers several instructive 
contemporary and historical examples for what she calls the “suppressive views of representation”.  
31
 Of course, it is difficult to identify any single thread in all of these conflicts, but the question is an 
important one because the experience of the Post-Communist Eurasia is frequently invoked by the 
critics of multiculturalism to warn against the slippery slope of the politics of difference. With the 
exception of Yugoslavia, other socialist and communist republics in the Block chose to, for the most 
part to suppress minority nationalities. Historian of Balkans, Mark Biondich writes that in recognizing 
national plurality Yugoslavia was the main exception to the policy of “narodno jedinstvo, which was 
predicated on the amalgamation and ‘oneness’ of the South Slav peoples.” (The Balkans, p. 181) In 
Yugoslavia, federalism was a response to the preceding suppression of minority cultures by the Serbian 
majority that had led to “the failure of interwar integral Yugoslavism”. (The Balkans, p. 181) The 
conflict of the late 80s and early 90s – the jewel in the crown for most anti-multiculturalists – was 
spurred by a Serbian nationalist reaction to decentralization. “Serbs continued to believe that they were 
handicapped by a system in which Serbs were still proportionally overrepresented in federal state and 
party institutions”. (The Balkans, 187) 
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To return to the more philosophical aspect of the issue, the idea that political 
conflict can be eliminated by means of suppressing destabilizing elements of society 
is a myth that cannot be defended from the perspective of democratic theory. For the 
methods of suppression to be successful, there is a need for a great degree of social 
engineering and censorship, which are strictly ruled out by various normative 
components of democracy. The more open and democratic a country becomes, the 
more such suppression and denial of conflict will appear anachronistic and 
counterproductive. Also, the myth of a conflict-free, perfectly cohesive political 
community is one that at present serves no meaningful democratic purpose. Empirical 
studies in political science confirm that suppression of culture-related conflicts often 
backfires, whereas trying to address conflicts through reform and inclusion (e.g., 
improved power-sharing) tends to mitigate tensions by preventing polarization.32 
Even when mild suppression does not aggravate a specific cleavage, there is a good 
chance that it will end up deepening the effects of other political cleavages.33 In their 
response to the critics of recognizing ethnoracial plurality of a nation in the context of 
the American debate on multicultural education, Gary Nash and his historian 
colleagues make a similar point about the unfounded optimism surrounding the ideal 
of social unity that motivates much criticism of diversity politics. They argue that the 
critics of multiculturalism “do not reflect on whether groups that have been ignored, 
demeaned, or marginalized can be expected to feel part of the unum when they are not 
                                                            
32
“Representative institutions, even if not fully autonomous, thus seem to inhibit secessionism. They do 
so by reducing the overall amount of alienation or polarization between regime-dominant and 
regionally dominant identity groups and by reducing the likelihood that individuals identifying with the 
regionally dominant group will be in tension with the majority of those with whom they have direct 
contact.” (Ian Lustick, et al., “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or 
Encourage It?,” 223)  
33
 This could be considered as one of the reasons for the relative salience of religion in American 
politics, where the political system can be said to more effectively suppress conflicts that emerge along 
other fault lines such as class and ethnicity. For a related discussion of the distinction between 
suppressive and non-suppressive theories of political representation see Voice, Trust, and Memory, 
chapter 1. 
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counted among the pluribus.” Nash and his colleagues rightly cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of ignoring or insulting people as a way of achieving unity.34  
Finally, balkanization is not going to be a challenge decisive enough to 
convince one of the merits of assimilative strategies of integration for important 
principled reasons presented in the previous chapters but well worth reiterating. 
Namely, there are normative reasons for avoiding direct assimilation, as well as 
discrimination between cultural and other interests or motives of citizens, for the very 
same reasons that liberal egalitarians claim to uphold – equal concern for citizen 
interests and non-domination being two very important ones. The liberal critics of 
multiculturalism tend to overlook that in many cases their concern with balkanization 
ends up disregarding or devaluing the equal standing of citizens – a cornerstone of 
democratic theory. The egalitarian theorists of social unity – knowingly or 
unknowingly – commit a serious error of judgment. They rightly reject the non-
individualist social ontology when they talk of the moral significance of individual 
rights. However, when discussing assimilation, particularly its negative effects, they 
write as if all they are disregarding are unfounded collective categories. If all they 
were doing was to advocate clarification of some misconception, their defence of 
liberal egalitarianism would have been more coherent. However, most such defences 
currently overlook the fact that those prescriptions affect not just nonexistent, 
imaginary groups but real, existing individuals. This is the precise reason why NMD 
departs from Barry’s and other egalitarians’ views on assimilative strategies of 
integration animated by the ideals of social unity. 
 Institutional conundrum  
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 Gary Nash et al, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past, 102 
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Finally, there is the worry that this kind of democratic theory if implemented could 
result in an institutional impasse. To give an example from Canadian politics, the 
country’s “constitutional impasse” is often blamed on the recognition debate 
(primarily of Quebec, and Aboriginal groups, but following the Charter of other 
groups as well).35 The worry is that letting multicultural differences into the equation 
will overload democratic institutions, and undermine the social trust or solidarity that 
keeps the wheels of the government turning, which in turn will result in various 
governability problems. This, however, could be one of the more surmountable of the 
anti-multiculturalist concerns. NMD is perhaps the easiest and simplest to implement 
in many contemporary democracies because it is a non-revisionist theory aimed at 
interpreting the normative underpinnings of existing democratic institutions and 
reforming them in that direction.36 
Under this broad concern, we could be dealing with two kinds of issues. The 
first set has to do with issues of increased complexity. A multicultural politics, on this 
view, would significantly expand the domain of politically relevant differences and 
therefore could complicate the governmental process. The second set of worries has to 
do with issues of social capital required to run the more complex governmental 
system. There are important reasons to be sceptical of both aspects of the claim that 
multiculturalism of the type that NMD supports will have destabilizing effects on, or 
create practicability issues for, political institutions.  
                                                            
35
 See Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Daiva Stasiulis “Ethnic Pluralism under Siege: Popular and Partisan 
Opposition to Multiculturalism”. 
36
 My use of the term revisionism should not be confused with the use of the term to refer to the elite 
theorists of democracy who revised the popular conception that contained references to the general will 
with references to competitive electoral struggle for political authority. (For this use see Carole 
Pateman’s Participation and Democratic Theory, where she refers to Schumpeter, Dahl, and Giovanni 
Sartori as revisionist democratic theorists.) I take deliberative theories of democracy as the most 
prominent modern example of revisionist democratic theory. These theories are difficult to implement 
because they require significant changes to political institutions, as well as to the rights and duties of 
citizenship. Of course, revisionism is a matter of gradation, but the point is that NMD is far less 
demanding in terms of institutional reform. 
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First, NMD does not introduce any new legal categories of citizenship. There 
are no minority or majority categories of citizenship or cultural rights that are granted 
to specific groups to the exclusion of others. Because groups and their diversity are 
recognized and taken into account within an individualist framework, the egalitarian-
individualist character of citizenship remains unchanged. On the other hand, critics of 
multiculturalism are mistaken to assume that choosing to suppress differences as a 
general principle will render institutions less complicated. Whether governments, in 
their official discourse, choose to recognize diversity or try to deny it does not change 
the fact that institutions have to respond to these sociological facts in some way.37 
That a negative and dismissive response is necessarily more straightforward and less 
convoluted than more positive and accepting responses is not evident. Surely, the 
more unresponsive, and undemocratic types of government could, albeit temporarily, 
bypass this kind of complexity. Moreover, by looking at the kinds of changes that 
NMD will necessitate, we can see why it will do little to complicate the process.  
Probably, the most substantial change will be required in the area of electoral 
competition and governmental transparency. Existing laws that make it difficult for 
some political parties and other political organizations to compete in an equitable 
way; for example, laws that give procedural advantage to established parties, will 
have to be reformed to ensure that competition, and hence the electoral prospects of 
all groups, remains strong.38 Campaign financing laws and electoral districting are 
two of the most important areas that may need some adjustments to fall more fully in 
                                                            
37
 Kymlicka and Eisenberg make a similar claim in a recent work about the institutional dynamics of 
multiculturalism. See Identity Politics in the Public Realm, Introduction.  
38
 For a convincing account of the impact of vesting powers to gerrymander the districts in the hands of 
political cartels see pp. 620-30 of  Samuel Issacharoff, “Gerrymandering and Political Cartels,” 593-
648. 
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line with the normative underpinnings of NMD.39 The second area of institutional 
reform has to do with strengthening free access to public space and making sure that 
there are credible and effective venues for citizens to voice their concerns and avoid 
the sense of helplessness and domination.40 In most established democracies, this area 
will require very little adjustment as there already exist free media and other civil 
society organizations that effectively perform this job.  
Second, because normative minimalist democracy does not posit anything like 
a unified general will or a “thick” common good, institutions that it requires are 
naturally accepting of what some consensus theorists would regard as unwelcome 
levels of disagreement. Therefore, the use of terms such as trust, social unity, and 
their corresponding inclusion among the requirements of the regenerative dimension 
takes a different form in the NMD than it does in the more substantive and revisionist 
theories of democracy. To be sure, NMD does not accept any kind of division as 
normal – it has to recognise the danger that animosity between groups would pose. 
But unlike the political theories that assign more normative weight to consensus, the 
presence of groups that try to achieve their competing policy goals through 
competitive mechanisms is not taken as a sign of dangerous division or impending 
violent conflict.41 However, since an important degree of contestation is taken as a 
                                                            
39
 “In sum, attempts to reform the districting process and campaign financing may be limited in their 
ability to improve electoral competitiveness, but these analyses underscore that these efforts to improve 
competition in hopes of boosting responsiveness are not misguided.” (Griffin, “Electoral Competition 
and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis,” 920) 
40
 “Access to public spaces for expressive purposes is an important part of political equality. The 
provision of such space helps to subsidize effective communication in a way that most sections of 
society can utilise. It therefore provides a channel of participation that not only helps to provide 
information, but also serves the individal’s interest in participation.” (Rowbottom, Democracy 
distorted : wealth, influence and democratic politics, 169) 
41
 “Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that a community’s level of homogeneity plays a 
prominent role in fostering good citizenship. To be sure, the notion that a country’s or community’s 
degree of homogeneity matters is nothing new in comparative research and harkens back to 
longstanding discussions about the role of heterogeneity (e.g., in the form of ethnic divisions) in 
encouraging stable democratic rule or economic development (Alesina et al. 2003; Dahl 1971; Easterly 
and Levine 1997; Hibbs 1973; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1968; see also Weingast 1997).” Anderson and 
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sign of a well-functioning, not ill-functioning, political process, the requisite levels of 
institutional concord are also to that extent lower.  
Robert Putnam’s work implicitly confirms the strength of the foregoing 
suggestion that one’s perception of multiculturalism as a burden or asset to 
democratic institutions hinges on how one perceives these institutions and the 
function of democracy in general. Putnam’s research on the topic of social capital 
suggests that multiculturalism is bad for advanced democracies, at least “in the short 
to medium run”, because it erodes the social bases of solidarity and trust.42 In the long 
run, Putnam suggests, it could be possible to turn this around. In his words, “the 
challenge that immigration and diversity pose to social capital and solidarity” requires 
“a reconstruction of diversity that does not bleach out ethnic specificities, but creates 
overarching identities that ensure that those specificities do not trigger the allergic, 
‘hunker down’ reaction.”43 Once we take a closer look at Putnam’s views, we see that 
underlying his relative pessimism about multicultural diversity, at least “in the short 
to medium run”, is the dualism of a big metropolis where there is relatively little civic 
engagement and solidarity, and a small, close-knit community epitomising the 
opposite. The suggestion that diversity erodes social capital does not strike Putnam as 
surprising once he discovers that cities are not places that realize his ideals of civic 
engagement and solidarity – instead they are home to “anomie or social isolation”.44 
Thus, what one takes as a dangerous, “allergic” response – and the measurements of 
social discord and mistrust that follow from that – have a great deal to do with one’s 
ideals of political community and expectations from political engagement. To those of 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Paskeviciute, ‘How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society," 
784-85. 
42
 See Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community.”  
43
 Ibid., 164. 
44
 Ibid., 148-51. 
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us who have Rousseauian ideals, the political and cultural diversity that comes with 
multiculturalism carries unwelcome consequences that have to be mitigated through 
integrationist social policy. But those who see democratic potential in the diversity 
and, even cacophony, of places like New York will see in Putnam’s findings little risk 
to the functioning of the democratic system. 
What do these institutional changes translate into in terms of normative 
concerns of multiculturalism? I think they make society more multiculturalism-
friendly and go a long way to satisfy some important multicultural concerns. The 
provision about improving access to media and other venues of civil society ensures 
that groups can present themselves as they would like to be recognized, and combat 
the negative preconceptions that might dominate where culture is not allowed free 
access to public space. Moreover, easing restrictions on competition as I have already 
argued should make it easier for smaller and newer groups to find themselves room in 
stronger more viable political coalitions, be it in political parties, or other political and 
civil organizations. Increased transparency and accountability, on the other hand, will 
ensure that groups do not face illegitimate obstacles resulting from deep-seated 
cultural biases of officeholders. Under reformed political institutions it will be 
difficult to disguise such biases as a neutral exercise of political prerogative.45 Thus, 
there is a significant overlap between NMD and some theories of politics of 
difference. NMD, like Young’s theory of inclusion, wants to overcome informal 
biases that disadvantage certain groups.46 However, it does this not by giving more 
authority to the government but by my making it difficult for any party to cast others 
in a negative light and manipulate their political prospects as a group. 
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 The concern with false neutrality is a common theme in the multiculturalism literature (e.g., 
Kymlicka’s  Multicultural Citizenship). 
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 See Young, Inclusion and Democracy. 
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Why call this democratic multiculturalism? 
On the one hand, the approach to culture – to its recognition and inclusion in the 
public space – that emerges in this work resembles multiculturalism more than it does 
the anti-multiculturalist variants of liberal egalitarianism. To give some examples, 
NMD defends groups as an integral part of democracy, and rules out assimilationist 
policies for being in contradiction with democratic rights. On the other hand, if what 
we mean by multiculturalism is any one of the three views that I examined in part two 
of this work, NMD seems to demand significant concessions from multiculturalism; 
and, perhaps, it would be too much to claim that multiculturalism is fully compatible 
with NMD. To be sure, NMD can prove compatible with various degrees of 
recognition, self-rule, and greater inclusiveness demanded by theorists such as Taylor, 
Tully, and Young, but it is in disagreement with these views because the latter 
mischaracterize various aspects of democratic citizenship. For instance, the 
recognition that NMD makes available to all groups cannot have the permanence and 
necessity that theses such as that of cultural survival or cultural continuity would 
prescribe. Although NMD leaves room for a theory of groups thicker than the one 
standard liberal egalitarianism allows, this is still substantially thinner than the one its 
multiculturalist critiques require because it is clearly constrained by democracy’s 
individualist commitments. Thus, the flip side of the coin is that even if proponents of 
these views were to concede that they have democratic pretensions, their claim to 
multiculturalism could remain strong. In other words, could multiculturalists turn the 
argument against NMD, and accuse it of having multicultural pretensions? 
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At first glance, there may seem to be a kernel of truth in the claim that NMD is 
a theory of democracy with multiculturalist pretensions. Critics could try to argue that 
the theory being presented here should not be regarded as democratic 
multiculturalism because it does not make sufficient attempts to reach a compromise 
with multiculturalism – for example, it does not become more group-centric by 
curbing its individualistic presuppositions in response to the multiculturalist 
challenges. NMD outlines a particular normative theory of democracy and does not 
amend it even when facing serious challenges from multiculturalism. In short, for one 
to call this a theory of democratic multiculturalism, the theory would have to be a 
product of balancing acts between these two sets of values.  
In response, I would like to return to the nature of the relationship between 
difference and democracy. The theory of democracy presented here already accepts 
and incorporates these seemingly conflicting dispositions towards diversity and unity, 
or the need to reach agreement and the respect for disagreement. What brings NMD 
closer to multiculturalism is the fact that the former is a product of individualism and 
pluralism at the same time. It is worth repeating that under NMD there is no 
independent commitment to pluralism or celebration of it for its own sake. The 
negative commitment to pluralism has to do with the place of disagreement and the 
underlying importance of non-domination as a democratic norm. This, however, does 
not change the fact that, under NMD, the universalizing core of democracy is 
accompanied by an equally strong commitment to respecting disagreement that ends 
up creating (or leaving) a vast space for diversity. This, in a nutshell, is what brings 
democracy closer to multiculturalism. Furthermore, from the side of multiculturalism 
what bridges the gap between the two sets of ideas is that the former is often regarded 
as an amalgam of several normative concerns, which when maximized could 
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undermine each other. Because multiculturalists too share several interrelated, but at 
times conflicting goals, there are intra-multiculturalism questions that can make it 
more or less suitable to democracy depending on how they are resolved. This intra-
multiculturalism fluidity, too, creates a host of new opportunities for democratic 
mediation of conflicts revolving around cultural claims.  
Once we take into account the fact that different aspects of the three views 
gathered under the rubric of multiculturalism can pull in somewhat opposing 
directions, and moving too much in the direction of inclusion, for example, could 
weaken recognition or self-government (and vice versa), then it is clear that the 
attenuation of some multiculturalist claims does not have to imply anti-
multiculturalism or an incompatibility between the two sets of ideas. Once we come 
to terms with the essential contestability of multiculturalism, calling the emerging 
construct a theory of democratic multiculturalism becomes more plausible. In this 
new mode of evaluation, the bigger picture of how the emerging construct performs 
with respect to several pressing multicultural concerns becomes more important than 
how it does with respect to any single multicultural concern pushed to its logical 
extreme. When we characterize multiculturalism as a political theoretical project 
aimed at achieving greater inclusiveness, self-governing capacity, and recognition for 
members of diverse ethno-linguistic and religious groups, I think the convergence 
between NMD and these goals is difficult to miss. On this account, democratic 
multiculturalism is a distinct theoretical possibility not because it is equally 
democratic and multiculturalist but because it is a theory of democracy that can 
satisfy many multiculturalist concerns. NMD goes beyond the alternative theories of 
democracy (e.g., general will theories of democracy of both aggregative and 
deliberative variants obsessed with consensus) in offering multiculturalism a more 
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expansive place, although it does not go as far as most multiculturalists would want to 
take it. It is an exercise in exploring what a normative theory of democracy implies 
with respect to diversity, not an attempt to find a compromise between conflicting 
political theories.  
To be sure, there are important philosophical differences between the 
minimalist democratic and other substantive egalitarian theories of diversity politics 
because these approaches are underpinned by different normative commitments. 
Nonetheless, NMD shares not only political pragmatics with this more complete, and 
true to the world, picture of multiculturalism, but also bears a great deal of 
philosophical affinity to many aspects of it. It is wrong to dismiss the possibility that 
we are dealing with a political theory that combines democratic and multicultural 
elements in a meaningful way that deserves the title democratic multiculturalism 
because at the ideational level an important part of the three primary multiculturalist 
concerns can be taken on board without much need for revising our democratic 
principles. The partial acceptance of these concerns, however, comes for reasons other 
than those emphasized by their supporters. For instance, groups matter not because 
they have rights over and above those of individuals, but because the non-
assimilationist individualism of NMD leaves substantial space for groups to 
politically engage with each other. Recognition is offered to various groups not 
because each culture is unique and valuable, but because they all voice their concerns 
through various democratic channels. Cultural minorities are protected from certain 
kinds of interference not because their cultural practices deserve special constitutional 
status, but because democratic considerations at the heart of NMD constrain what 
transient majorities of the day can legitimately demand from their respective 
minorities. In other words, what this shows is not that multiculturalism is 
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incompatible with democracy, but that it is mostly compatible for reasons somewhat 
different from those that multiculturalists advocate. As long as these amount to a 
political order in which multicultural concerns are dealt with in a fair and consistent 
manner, there seems to be another strong reason to call the emerging theoretical 
construct a theory of democracy with a non-negligible degree of multicultural 
potential.  
In addition to having ideational affinity to theories of multiculturalism, the 
emerging theoretical construct is also multicultural in the political and sociological 
senses of the term. Although more precise comparisons of how much diversity will 
exist in different types of regimes favouring different approaches to multiculturalism 
falls under the expertise of empirical political theorists, the body of theoretical 
evidence presented in this work suggests that there are no good reasons to think a 
polity structured along the lines delineated by NMD will be less multicultural than 
any of the more proactively multiculturalist theories of politics. Any contemporary 
democratic society that takes the normative components of NMD seriously will show 
strong multicultural characteristics because openness and fluidity are inescapable 
features of a system of government that not only sees disagreement as an integral part 
of the political process, but also depends on disagreement for its successful operation. 
NMD does not promote the multiculturalism of Tully, Taylor or Kymlicka, but it does 
offer undeniably strong reasons against social engineering to create a politically and 
culturally more unified public. Most forms of diversity supported by multiculturalists 
go undisturbed, while even newer forms of diversity for which radical egalitarian 
multiculturalism seems too leave little room (e.g., celebratory forms of 
multiculturalism left out by Young or some forms of internal dissent disadvantaged by 
the collectivist elements in Taylor’s or Tully’s social ontology) may find a new 
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breathing space under NMD. Even in situations where intervention is inescapable, it 
comes in forms that are decoupled from cultural contempt and paternalism that 
degrade citizens’ democratic agency.  
 To sum up, this chapter brought together lessons from the earlier parts of the 
dissertation in order to compare and contrast the normative implications of the 
minimalist democratic approach to cultural diversity with those of multiculturalism 
and its critical counterparts. It argued that NMD offers a distinct response to the 
questions that arise at the nexus of democracy and multiculturalism, which is more 
consistently democratic than the answers provided by the radical egalitarian 
supporters and opponents of multiculturalism that tend to undermine various precepts 
underlying contemporary democracies. The chapter concluded by pointing out that the 
emerging theoretical construct, despite its opposition to certain normative concerns of 
multiculturalists, carries a notable degree of ideational as well as practical affinity to 
multiculturalism, and comes with an important multicultural potential. 
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Conclusion: The Strange Death of Multiculturalism 
For close to three decades, the Berlin Wall stood as a symbol of the rivalry between 
the two ideologies aspiring to global dominance. When the Wall fell, all of a sudden 
its ruins turned into a symbol of democracy’s triumph over authoritarianism. The 
expansion of democratic ideals across the world – one of the defining characteristics 
of the post-World War II era – reached its culmination. With these dramatic 
developments came grand expectations about the future of liberalism and democracy. 
Months before the Fall, one commentator noted that “[w]hat we may be witnessing is 
not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar 
history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.”1 Now that the euphoria of the early 1990s has faded away, we 
can clearly see that the expansion of democratic ideals has not meant more clarity in 
what democracy as a form of government stands for.  
As one author notes “political regimes of all kinds describe themselves as 
democracies.”2 Among these are regimes that victimize a populous ethnic or religious 
minority, those that curtail democratic rights in the name of more democracy to come 
in a future time, or those that manipulate the demos’s passions and grievances for the 
realization of their own political ends. Some claim that similar problems and 
confusions concerning the meaning of democracy beset the more established 
democracies of the West. More particularly, there is talk of dwindling legitimacy in 
the form of democratic deficits, civic disenchantment, and a more general distrust of 
democratic institutions. In the course of this dissertation, we saw that these 
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 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History.” 
2
 David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 1. 
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differences in how democracy is perceived around the world are also, in perhaps less 
dramatic forms, reproduced in academic democratic theory.  
It is against this historical and intellectual background that I chose democratic 
minimalism as the point of departure for this dissertation. In the absence of a readily 
available definition of democracy that could be borrowed and juxtaposed with the 
principles and concerns of multiculturalism, the dissertation had to begin by 
identifying certain limits within which it would make sense to speak of principles as 
democratic. Rather than starting with an ideal theory of what a good democracy 
should look like, the dissertation began by constructively engaging with Joseph 
Schumpeter’s influential account of realist democracy. Chapter 2 evolved into a 
broadly sympathetic critique of Schumpeter’s minimalism. It accepted parts of 
Schumpeter’s critique of the classical theories of democracy that are based on the 
ideals of common good and general will. However, it also pointed out the need to turn 
the minimalist account into a normatively more plausible theory by clarifying and 
embracing the normative underpinnings of the minimalist democratic considerations. 
Otherwise, the minimalist account, chapter 2 argued, would continue to overlook 
some crucial aspects of the institutional evolution of democracy such as the extra-
electoral dimension of the democratic process and the place of equality in that 
process.  
Chapter 3 examined the relationship between equality and non-domination – 
the two most central components of the four-dimensional account of democracy that 
began to emerge from the previous chapter’s critical engagement with the 
Schumpeterian minimalism. It argued that not only do these two concepts define the 
core of normatively sound minimalist democracy, but they also more definitively 
shape the boundaries of the theory by clarifying the respective limits and value of 
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consensus and dissensus. While equality sets some positive guidelines that players can 
follow in trying to build agreements, the principle of non-domination tends to remind 
the democratic actors the boundaries within which they are allowed to work if the 
game is to count as a democratic one. The exposition of the role of equality and non-
domination in NMD revealed that the tendencies towards agreement and disagreement 
are both normatively important, and the normative significance of disagreement 
should not be overlooked for the sake of facilitating deeper or more substantive 
agreements.  
While Part One was preoccupied with developing the idea of a normatively 
sound minimalist democracy, Part Two began to apply the emerging democratic 
perspective to the debates in the political theory of multiculturalism by critically 
examining the democratic aspirations of the multiculturalist camp and their critics. 
Chapter 4 studied the three multiculturalist challenges to liberal democracy – 
recognition, self-rule, and inclusion. The chapter argued that although each challenge 
represents a certain genuine problem for democratic theory, these are not challenges 
that require a comprehensive revision of democratic norms or their substitution with 
more substantive ones that the multiculturalists advocate. For the democratic theory 
outlined in Part One offers internal resources to tackle these problems and resolve 
them in democratic ways. 
Chapter 5 followed the same method as Chapter 4 to evaluate the democratic 
merits and shortcomings of the anti-multiculturalist critique. The chapter focused on 
the liberal egalitarian arguments for equal rights and solidarity, and the more holistic 
arguments that fear multiculturalism will weaken democracy in the long run by 
eroding sociocultural characteristics favourable to its functioning. In response to these 
concerns, the chapter advanced the view that the anti-multiculturalist arguments 
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operate with some important misconceptions about democratic decision-making, 
which in large part stems from not appreciating the respective limits of consensus and 
dissensus that were highlighted in Part One of the dissertation. Among these are the 
misconceived view of the relationship between democracy and pluralism, and the 
flawed accounts of democratic decision-making on which the anti-multiculturalists 
extensively draw.  
Part Three embarked on the more constructive task of laying out an approach 
to multiculturalism that is more in line with the democratic perspective outlined in 
this thesis than the ones offered by the multiculturalists and their critics. Chapter 6 
presented an alternative approach to groups that tries to steer clear of the anti-
multiculturalists’ common mistake of neglecting the democratically acceptable roles 
groups play in democratic politics, and the tendency of the multiculturalist arguments 
to undermine the individualist elements of NMD. The chapter began by arguing that 
the individualist overtones of NMD leave room for a negative, but robust, theory of 
groups. Not only do groups play an important role in the political dynamics of 
democracy, but this presence is supported by normatively relevant reasons such as the 
impropriety of politicizing motives of individuals and the anti-assimilationist bias of 
NMD. An egalitarian reformulation of the interest groups pluralism, the chapter went 
on to argue, can account for the democratic functions of groups more adequately than 
the substantively thicker theories that we find in the literature on identity politics.  
 In light of the theoretical lessons that emerged from the preceding five 
chapters, chapter 7 revisited the guiding question of the thesis – is democratic 
multiculturalism really possible? By engaging with the multiculturalist and anti-
multiculturalist counter-challenges to the democratic perspective developed in the 
dissertation, the chapter argued that the normative conclusions of the previous 
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chapters point to a distinctly democratic response to multiculturalism. This 
democratic outlook, the chapter argued, offers a considerable degree of multicultural 
potential because NMD satisfies many important multiculturalist concerns about 
recognition, self-rule, and inclusion without compromising democracy’s egalitarian 
and individualist commitments.  
The main aim of this dissertation was to contribute to the understanding of the 
normative relationship between principles of democracy and philosophical concerns 
motivating the multiculturalist arguments. Along the way, we managed to clear away 
a number of unfounded claims made by multiculturalists and anti-multiculturalists 
regarding the supposedly democratic merits of their arguments. The dissertation also 
offered a more constructive account of how multiculturalism and democracy can be 
compatible by drawing attention to the multicultural potential offered by normatively 
sound minimalist democracy. Because multiculturalism is one of the most contested 
subjects in contemporary democracies, I would like to conclude by offering a brief 
reflection on the broader lessons concerning the politics of multiculturalism that we 
can draw from this dissertation. 
Multiculturalism is dead. Or so we have been told recently by British Prime 
Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.  Some Western 
democracies were never officially engaged with multiculturalism, so they would not 
need to ceremoniously break up with it. But as David Cameron claimed in a speech at 
the Munich Security Conference, the countries that adopted some kind of 
multiculturalism as a state program are left grappling with its dreadful legacy. Not 
only has the official multiculturalism led to segregation, radicalisation, and even 
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terrorism, it has also – in the eyes of its critics –created an illiberal climate of fear.3 
As a result, many refrain from criticising the fallacies of multiculturalism out of fear 
of facing accusations of racism, Islamophobia, etc. To overcome multiculturalism’s 
dreadful legacy, the democratic West has to reject the “passive tolerance”, and 
embrace the “muscular liberalism”. In that speech we are offered some concrete 
examples of what this “hardnosed” approach towards clearing society of the remnants 
of multiculturalism would involve. The government would refuse to engage with 
organisations that fail its test of moderateness – for instance, the organisations that do 
not proclaim the value of democracy, human rights, and integration. “Fail these tests 
and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations – so, no public 
money, no sharing of platforms with ministers at home.”4 In addition, the countries 
that have suffered from the negative consequences of multiculturalism will have to 
embark on a bold project of identity-building: “we need a clear sense of shared 
national identity that is open to everyone.”  
There is something very strange about celebrating multiculturalism’s death (or 
wishing it if the death is yet to come about). As we saw in the course of this 
dissertation, multiculturalism is not immune to criticism. In previous chapters, some 
of the core philosophical claims of multiculturalism – for instance, those concerning 
cultural integrity and autonomy –were critiqued from the perspective of normatively 
sound minimalist democracy. It was pointed out that the multiculturalist arguments 
for recognition, self-rule and inclusion were laying unjustifiable claims to democratic 
credibility. However, one of the interesting lessons we learned along the way is that 
many of these core multiculturalist principles could lend themselves to a more 
democratic reinterpretation. I argued that many of the defining moves advocated by 
                                                            
3
 Cameron, “Speech at Munich Security Conference.” 
4
 Ibid. 
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multiculturalists – even those such as recognition of cultural groups and some types of 
self-rule that would arise from decentralisation – could be compatible with 
democracy, albeit for reasons different from the original ones put forth by the 
multiculturalists. In other words, removing or toning down the theoretical components 
of multiculturalism that clash with the individualistic and egalitarian elements of 
democracy would not radically transform the politics of multiculturalism in the 
direction advocated by anti-multiculturalists. Given the philosophical affinity, and the 
convergence about the practical implications, of democracy and multiculturalism, to 
achieve a political death for multiculturalism would require the death of important 
democratic principles as well. Multiculturalism’s death would not just be a sign of the 
ultimate failure of its philosophical ideals. It would also mean that the ideals of liberal 
democracy that are supposed to guide us into the post-multicultural age have failed as 
well. 
Yet the political warfare launched against multiculturalism clearly shows that 
the notion of “muscular liberalism” and the “hardnosed” attitude with which such 
liberalism would have to be implemented closely resemble the anti-multiculturalist 
project that we put under scrutiny in chapter 5. Insofar as the “muscular liberalism” 
repeats the same mistakes, it cannot prove more compatible with the values of 
normatively sound minimalist democracy than the separatist and relativist strands of 
multiculturalism that it tries to supplant. To be sure, governments may choose to 
pressure those groups they find resistant to change or to adopting mainstream values. 
Such coercion perhaps could be defended on grounds of security or stability. But its 
shortcomings from the democratic perspective are obvious. The democratic outlook 
defended in this dissertation does not lend support to unilateral restrictions that shun 
and/or marginalize groups with the intention of limiting their ability to contest and 
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disagree until they are malleable enough to given a new identity more in line with the 
majority values. Integration is a legitimate democratic aspiration only to the extent 
that it is carried out in accordance with the norms of democracy. Moreover, we saw in 
previous chapters that attempts to engender a stronger, more cohesive community 
would require a great deal of social engineering, which would not only root out the 
radical, undesirable factions, but also create generally less favourable conditions for 
disagreement and dissent.  
 All this said, there may be a broader objection to the argument of this thesis. A 
critic could note that the implications of NMD for real-world multicultural questions 
are not specific or concrete enough. But the objection misses the point. This 
dissertation did not intend to build a fully developed account of normative minimalist 
democracy. For instance, it did not try to identify the exact combination of the four 
democratic considerations that make up the normative core of NMD. It may appear, 
on many important issues, the dissertation merely drew the contours of an answer and 
did not paint the full picture. This has to do with the minimalist democratic 
characteristics of NMD as opposed to the incompleteness of the argument constructed 
in this dissertation. The aim of the dissertation was to elucidate the shortcomings of 
the classical and Schumpeterian understandings of democracy and present an 
alternative outlook that does not commit those mistakes. To be sure, a larger project 
that deals solely with the question of normatively sound minimalist democracy could 
draw slightly thicker and bolder contours. However, it would still not be immune to 
the charge of leaving substantive gaps. As a matter of fact, these gaps in substantive 
content are required by the conditions of uncertainty, competition, and openness, all 
of which are defining attributes of NMD. Within this minimalist understanding, the 
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four normative dimensions can only represent the contours of legitimate democratic 
activity.  
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